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ABSTRACT
The dissertation consists of three chapters measuring the degree of risk-sharing in a panel of
US households, and its impact on welfare and portfolio choice. Conventional wisdom suggests
financial innovation improves risk-sharing by completing markets and lowering transaction
costs–households engage in risk-sharing to insure against idiosyncratic income shocks to improve their own welfare. In the first chapter, using household level income and imputed
consumption data, I find that households’ ability to smooth permanent shocks has slightly
increased while transitory insurance remained unchanged. However, I find that participating
households have higher consumption insurance. Their ability to insure permanent shocks has
improved while their ability to insure transitory shocks has decreased. I also document a
change in the composition of risk where the variance of transitory shocks is increasing while
the variance of permanent shocks is decreasing. I find significant heterogeneity among households. These results are robust to different income and consumption measurements. In the
second chapter, I investigate the welfare and life satisfaction consequences of incomplete markets in a subset of US households. I use a set of parameters describing households’ economic
environments in terms of income growth, income risk, and transmission risk. I find that
changes in risk-sharing have significant implications for household welfare. Cross-sectional
differences in risk-sharing environment result in significantly different welfare criteria. I then
use IV-regressions to separate the impact of permanent and transitory income and consumption shocks on life satisfaction. As suggested by consumption insurance theory, I find that
transitory shocks have no effect on life satisfaction while permanent shocks do. This result
suggest that risk-sharing environments have important consequences for households’ wellbeing as well as a significant degree of insurance despite incomplete markets. In the third
chapter, I consider the implications in consumption insurance for portfolio choice. Having
documented a significant degree of risk sharing, I find that households experiencing positive
labor income shocks invest more in risky assets. However permanent shocks are used to
increase housing investment, evidenced by the increased allocation towards secured debts.
Furthermore, transitory shocks are used to decrease households liabilities, evidenced by the
decreased latent unsecured debt allocation.
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Chapter 1

FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND RISK-SHARING

Abstract
What are the effects of the sharp acceleration of financial innovation over the last fifty years?
Conventional wisdom suggests financial innovation improves risk-sharing by completing markets and lowering transaction costs–households engage in risk-sharing to insure against idiosyncratic income shocks to improve their own welfare. Using household level income and
imputed consumption data, I find that households’ ability to smooth permanent shocks has
slightly increased while transitory insurance remained unchanged. However, I find that participating households have higher consumption insurance. Their ability to insure permanent
shocks has improved while their ability to insure transitory shocks has decreased. I also
document a change in the composition of risk where the variance of transitory shocks is
increasing while the variance of permanent shocks is decreasing. I find significant heterogeneity among households. These results are robust to different income and consumption
measurements.
JEL classification: E21,D12,D31,G52
Keywords: Risk-Sharing, Income Shocks, Financial Innovation
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1.1

Introduction

What are the consumption insurance effects of financial innovation? Income inequality has dramatically increased over the past 50 years and is especially skewed in the United
States compared to other developed nations (Saez and Zucman, 2016; Piketty, 2015; Wolff,
2016). Financial institutions and markets have undergone fundamental changes over the
same period (Miller, 1986; Frame and White, 2004).
Since the turn of the second millennium, financial innovation has greatly accelerated,
yet the empirical effects of these innovations remain largely unexamined. The standard view
of financial innovation is that it facilitates the completion of markets, thereby allowing for
the equalizing of marginal rates of substitution and improves welfare. Risk-sharing, or the
cross-sectional alignment of marginal rates of substitution, should be more pervasive with
successive financial market innovations under this traditional view. Cochrane (2009, p. 56)
writes: “better risk sharing is much of the force behind financial innovation. Many successful
new securities can be understood as devices to share risks more widely.” However, recent
theoretical papers have challenged the textbook view. Simsek (2013a) and Simsek (2013b)
and Buss and Uppal (2017), in their model of financial innovation, consider heterogeneous
information and beliefs which serve to increase speculative activity and volatility—thus attenuating welfare improvements.
There is extensive work on consumption insurance (Cochrane, 1991; Blundell and
Preston, 1998; Krueger and Perri, 2006; Kaplan and Violante, 2010). However, much of the
literature seeks to quantify the degree of consumption insurance and whether households
are fully insured against idiosyncratic income shocks. While estimates of of consumption
insurance differ, the literature agrees that evidence of full insurance cannot be found and
markets are thus incomplete.
Some papers study specific mechanisms for risk-sharing (Olovsson, 2010; Ortigueira
and Siassi, 2013; Blundell, Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten, 2016; Hryshko, Luengo-Prado,
and Sørensen, 2010). However, to the best of my knowledge, I am the first to try to establish an empirical link between financial innovation and trends in risk-sharing. Given the
development of exchange-traded funds (Iachan, Nenov, and Simsek, 2021; Huang, O’Hara,
and Zhong, 2021) reducing transactions costs Turley (2012) and allowing households to form
more optimal portfolios, I should see improving trends in risk-sharing, especially for market
participants. Indeed, Guvenen (2007) argues that market participants might have lower insurance if they cannot optimally select a portfolio that minimizes their market risk exposure
in addition to their labor income risk.
This paper is related to the consumption insurance literature by documenting trends
2

in risk-sharing. It is also related to the literature on financial innovation by testing the claim
that financial innovation improves risk-sharing. I use data that survey both households’
income and consumption: the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID hereafter). To
estimate a robust measure of consumption in the PSID, I follow the literature on consumption
imputation (Johnson and Fisher, 2020; Attanasio and Pistaferri, 2014).
I first test a simple framework where idiosyncratic consumption responds to idiosyncratic income shocks. I confirm results from the literature. I find that a large portion of
shocks are insured but I reject full insurance. I do not find improvements in households’
ability to smooth idiosyncratic income shocks. There is a small increasing trend in the timevarying risk-sharing coefficients indicating a decline in consumption insurance. I do however
find that entrepreneurs, wealthy, and participating households have lower risk-sharing coefficients suggesting insurance heterogeneity across household groups.
I then estimate the empirical framework designed by Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston
(2008). Unlike Cochrane (1991) who uses proxies to test whether households are insured
against permanent or transitory shocks, Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) uses the
structure of the joint distribution of income and consumption autocovariances to describe
the variance of permanent and transitory shocks as well as the proportion of these shocks
that is transmitted to households’ consumption (they refer to the latter parameters as partial
insurance coefficients). The aim is to describe how the partial insurance coefficients evolve
through time. I therefore allow these parameters to freely time vary throughout my sample
period (1980-2016). I find that permanent insurance has increased in the whole sample and
increased for most subgroups of households. However, I do not find an improvement in permanent insurance for entrepreneurs (which have the lowest permanent insurance parameters
and thus the best insured), nonparticipating households, transfer recipients and low wealth
households (defined as having below median wealth). Transitory insurance is found to be
constant in the whole sample. However, I find that market participants, nonparticipating
households, and low wealth individuals have lower insurance parameters. The heterogeneity
in transitory insurance is smaller than the heterogeneity in permanent insurance, suggesting
that the differences observed in the simple transmission framework are caused by permanent
shocks.
I then estimate income shocks by removing different income streams such as financial, business, or transfer income to determine how subgroups smooth their income shocks.
I find that financial income has little to no impact on the risk-sharing parameters estimated. Business income has a large impact on high wealth and participating households
(and obviously entrepreneurs). This result suggests that entrepreneurs may have better
3

formal insurance mechanisms. Alternatively, entrepreneurs may have superior information
on their future income shocks which I could be classifying as insurance. Unfortunately I
cannot test this assertion. Transfer income is also a significant source of risk-sharing. This
is consistent amongst groups, although the impact is stronger for low-wealth households.
Overall, I document small improvements in the risk-sharing environment compared to the
sizeable development in financial markets; therefore casting doubt that financial innovation
does improve risk-sharing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 will connect this work to
the related literature. Section 1.3 will describe the data I use, the sample selection, and
the imputation technique used. Section 1.4 will show the results for static, time-varying
risk-sharing, and the joint distribution of permanent and transitory income shocks. Section
1.5 will conclude.
1.2

Literature Review

The degree of market completeness has been widely researched and discussed in the
literature. In a perfectly complete market, individual households’ consumption would only
react to aggregate risk but not their idiosyncratic risk. This assumption, common to many
models, is flawed. As Cochrane (1991) points out, conventional wisdom would refute the
existence of contingent claims insuring households on all idiosyncratic states of nature. Imperfect risk-sharing is seen as a potential solution to solve well-known asset pricing puzzles
(Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Mankiw, 1986) and has given rise to a new class of heterogeneous
agent models (Constantinides and Duffie, 1996; Constantinides and Ghosh, 2017).
A wide body of literature has studied the joint distribution of consumption and
income. Krueger and Perri (2006) use the Consumer Expenditure Survey to document that
despite the rise in income volatility, consumption has remained smooth providing evidence
for some risk-sharing. The CEX is one the datasets that is widely used in this literature1 .
Mace (1991) finds that only one specification is consistent with full insurance. Nelson (1994)
argues that some results might be partially driven by measurement error. More recently,
Gervais and Klein (2010) also use CEX data but address the shortcomings of the data
structure by estimating quarterly income from annual income. This allows them to estimate
a consistent estimator of risk-sharing. They do find evidence of imperfect risk-sharing and
reject the null hypothesis of perfect risk-sharing.
The Panel Survey of Income Dynamics is another dataset favored by researchers
(Cochrane, 1991; Guvenen, 2007; Hryshko, Luengo-Prado, and Sørensen, 2010; Heathcote,
1

Cutler et al., 1991; Blundell and Preston, 1998; Aguiar and Bils, 2015
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Storesletten, and Violante, 2014). The longitudinal aspect of the PSID provides certain
advantages; however consumption data is limited to food categories, rent and a few other
items on a consistent basis. The PSID also surveys a wide variety of proxies related to income
and consumption shocks. Income is better represented as a combination of transitory and
permanent processes (Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004; Abowd and Card, 1989). However, survey
data does not differentiate between the two income processes and researchers often study
only the response of consumption to income shocks.
Cochrane (1991) uses a large selection of proxies (short unemployment for transitory
shocks and disability for permanent shocks). He finds that illnesses less than 100 days or work
loss due to strikes is fully insured. He cannot reject the null hypothesis of full insurance for
these specifications. However, permanent shocks such as long-term illnesses and involuntary
job loss are not fully insured. Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008), in their seminal
paper, do not use proxies to determine the nature of shocks. They model permanent and
transitory shocks of income2 . Their income process allows their to measure the variance of
permanent and transitory shocks as well as the proportion of these shocks that translate
into consumption shocks. Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) refer to these parameters
as partial insurance parameters. Their results are consistent with Cochrane (1991). They
find that transitory shocks are fully insured (95% and in some specifications insignificantly
different from 0) while permanent shocks are not fully insured (36% of permanent income
shocks get transmitted to consumption.).
Kaplan and Violante (2010) argues that Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008)’s
insurance coefficients are central to macroeconomic research and are the benchmark to measure household insurance. Their methodology has been applied to multiple countries that
have datasets similar to the PSID. Kubota (2020) applies the partial insurance framework
to Japanese data and finds that transitory shocks are almost fully insured despite increasing
over time. On the other hand, permanent shocks are insured by half and remain constant
throughout the sample period. Casado (2011) uses the Spanish Household Budget Continuous Survey and find similar results. He also finds that home-owners, high-wealth households,
and college educated households have higher degree of permanent insurance. SantaeulaliaLlopis and Zheng (2018) use a longitudinal panel dataset of Chinese households. They find
that Chinese households experienced a decline in permanent insurance combined with increased levels of income risk accompanying the rapid economic growth during the past 30
years. Furthermore, they show that the welfare effects of growth can be as large as the
welfare effects of risk and insurance.
2

See section 1.4.2 for a more detailed description of their methodology
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While the papers discussed above attempt to quantify the amount of consumption
insurance in various economies, another strand of literature discusses the specific mechanisms
through which households insure the income risk. Cochrane (1991) does not discuss the
mechanisms for risk-sharing but does outline several formal and informal mechanisms for
consumption insurance. Such mechanisms include unemployment, disability Michaud and
Wiczer (2018) or medical insurance, social security (Olovsson, 2010), charities and other
family (Ortigueira and Siassi, 2013; Blundell, Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten, 2016) and
community safety net, wealth or home-ownership (Hryshko, Luengo-Prado, and Sørensen,
2010).
However, a fundamental mechanism for risk-sharing remains largely unexplored empirically: financial innovation. As Cochrane (2009) states, the fundamental drive of financial
innovation is risk-sharing. Cochrane (2009, p.56) writes: “better risk sharing is much of
the force behind financial innovation. Many successful new securities can be understood
as devices to share risks more widely”. Furthermore the past 60 years have seen a sizeable
development in financial innovations (Iachan, Nenov, and Simsek, 2021; Miller, 1986; Frame
and White, 2004). Zero coupon bonds, options, financial futures, options on futures, options
on indexes, collateralized mortgages, home equity loans, currency swaps are but a few examples of financial innovation in the past 50 years (see Miller, 1986). The notion that financial
innovation improves risk-sharing is well anchored in the literature (Allen and Gale, 1988;
Allen, Gale, et al., 1994; Weil, 1992; Elul, 1997).
Simsek (2013a) differentiates between two types of financial innovation: product and
process. Product innovation creates new assets while process innovation reduces transaction
costs. Consistent with increases in exchange traded products (Iachan, Nenov, and Simsek,
2021), Turley (2012) finds that trading costs have dramatically declined. Similarly Huang,
O’Hara, and Zhong (2021) show that ETFs are used by informed traders to hedge. They
conclude that market efficiency is improved by this financial innovation. Bai, Philippon, and
Savov (2016) find that stock prices have become more informative Dynan, Elmendorf, and
Sichel (2006) attribute the economic stability of the 1980s to financial innovation. Calvet,
Gonzalez-Eiras, and Sodini (2004) develop a model in which new instruments are introduced,
and allow participants to share more risk. Under this framework, market participation
increases, the equity premium decreases, and real rates increase as observed in the data.
However, Calvet, Gonzalez-Eiras, and Sodini (2004) assumes that all of the financial
innovation increases agents’ ability to insure, in line with the traditional view. Recent papers
contradict this view. Simsek (2013b) argues that investors’ belief disagreements on the value
of new assets have implications for portfolio risk. Specifically, he argues that disagreement
6

will lead to speculation which increases portfolio risk. In his model, he separates the risksharing motive for trading and the speculative one. He defines portfolio risk as a trader’s
variance of net worth. The variance is decomposed into uninsurable variance (i.e., variance
under no belief disagreement) and the speculative variance. He finds that financial innovation
(modelled as the introduction of new assets) increases the possibilities for risk-sharing, thus
decreasing the uninsurable variance. However, when belief disagreements are sufficiently
high enough which increases the speculative variance, the average variance increases. In this
case, financial innovation can increase portfolio risk and decrease the overall risk-sharing.
Simsek (2013a) models the different impact of different types of financial innovation
(product and process) on risk-sharing. His model yields the following results. When belief
disagreement is high, both types of innovation will increase portfolio risk. Surprisingly,
he also finds that product innovation can lead to increase portfolio risk in the absence of
disagreement. Indeed, when new assets are introduced, traders have an increased ability to
hedge, which in turns increases the size of their speculative bets. Simsek (2013a) and Simsek
(2013b) refer to this effect as the hedge-more/bet-more effect.
Buss and Uppal (2017) also challenges the assumption of homogeneous beliefs. They
argue that the presence of informed and uninformed traders (relative to new securities) can
have consequences for asset prices. They show that even in cases of improved risk-sharing
through financial innovation, it can increase return volatility and asset premium. In their
model, they introduce two classes of risky assets: a traditional asset which two groups of
investors have access to and an innovative asset which only experienced agents initially have
access to. They define financial innovation as granting inexperienced investors access to the
innovative asset. They show that inexperienced investors overweight the risk-free asset as a
consequence of having to learn the payoff structure of the new asset. They show that despite
the increased risk-sharing and the volatility of experienced investors’ stochastic discount
factor (SDF) declining, inexperienced investors’ SDF increases significantly more, leading to
increased asset premium.
Economic theory is divided. On the one hand financial innovation should increase
risk-sharing. On the other, risk-sharing will depend on price agreement; and even if risksharing is improved through process innovation, investors’ risk might be increased. These
implications have not been tested empirically. Although Krueger and Perri (2006) find that
an increase in income inequality has not led to an increase in consumption inequality. They
conclude that the development of credit markets is a likely explanation for their result and
leave the matter for future research. Furthermore, their data spans from 1980 to 1998,
omitting the rapid growth of mutual funds and exchange traded derivatives observed after
7

2000 (Iachan, Nenov, and Simsek, 2021).
Guvenen (2007) does investigate the risk-sharing capabilities of stockholders and nonstockholders to assess the importance of market incompleteness. While he is able to reject
perfect insurance for stockholders he cannot for non-stockholders. He argues that stockholders might be exposed to certain types of risk that non-stockholders are exposed to (consistent
with Simsek, 2013a; Simsek, 2013b). Stockholders tend to be wealthier and face more entrepreneurial risk which is harder to insure. He offers an alternative explanation that is
market based. Should investors face information or trading constraints (high costs, prohibited or limited short-selling), they will not be able to form an optimal portfolio, thus bearing
more risk.
Given the recent development in the literature, my contribution is two-fold. First,
I will estimate the joint distribution of idiosyncratic income and consumption risk through
time. Indeed, given the tremendous transformation of the financial sector, I can test whether
the conventional wisdom is correct. If so, I should see downward trends of risk-sharing (i.e.,
an appreciation in households’ insurance). Second, I test whether financial innovation is
responsible for the observed trends in risk-sharing. I can estimate risk-sharing for households
participating and not participating in the financial market. Given the lower transaction
costs and the availability of exchange-traded products, investors should form more optimal
portfolios, thereby reducing their risk. With a longer horizon than Guvenen (2007), I can
test whether stockholders have higher entrepreneurial risk and face additional market risk.
Overall, my contribution simply lies in the question: has financial innovation improved risksharing?
1.3

Data

The empirics of consumption insurance are somewhat rendered difficult by the availability (or lack thereof) data. Indeed, the identification strategy requires a large panel
dataset with a detailed distribution of household income and consumption. The Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) tracks households through time and surveys their income;
however, only food consumption is consistently available in the survey. The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) provides both detailed income and consumption. As a repeated
cross-section it is unsuited to this analysis. I therefore derive a consumption series using
imputation technique proposed by Attanasio and Pistaferri (2014) using PSID only.
The PSID is a longitudinal survey. It began in 1968 with 5,000 households. It follows
households interviewed in 1968 and the households formed by their descendants, increasing
the number of households being tracked over time. The PSID reports various household
8

characteristics, food spending, and income. Data are collected in the survey year3 , however
the timing of reporting is not always clear. While income is always reported for the prior
year, consumption and wealth can be reported for the current or prior year. I therefore treat
consumption and wealth to be reported for the prior year to coincide with income.
To impute consumption, I exploit the fact that food expenditure is consistently available . The temporary measure of consumption in the PSID is the annual expenditure on
food at home and food away from home. Several adjustments must be made to ensure comparability across waves. I add food delivered (including food stamps) to food at home when
available. I also add food away from home purchased with food stamps to the food away
from home category when available. When no distinction between the use of food stamps is
available, I add the monetary value of food stamps to the food at home category. I remove
top-coded values for each category of food consumption. Starting with the 1994 wave, the
PSID provides food consumption as well as the time units used by the household in their
reporting. I therefore adjust the categories into annual data points. These adjustments
sometimes result in obvious outliers which are removed from the sample. I then sum all food
consumption categories for each household-year: fi,t .
4

In 1999, the PSID started to include consumption categories, which now corresponds
to 70% of the categories covered by the CEX (Blundell, Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten,
2016). These categories include health expenditures, utilities, gasoline, car maintenance,
transportation, education, and child care5 . I remove top coded observations for each category.
I calculate a measure of consumption net of food consumption for each household-year for
the 1999 to 2017 PSID waves: ni,t 6 .
To match Attanasio and Pistaferri (2014)’s sample selection7 , I remove households
from the SEO sample. The SRC sample was designed to be representative of the US population; the exclusion of the SEO sample allows me to proceed without using sample weights.
I also remove households from the Latino and Immigrant subsamples. The households were
included in 1999 and would therefore not have any imputed values. Furthermore, their inclusion could change the regression’s projection. I exclude households whose reference person is
younger than 25 or older than 65. Finally, I remove households whose hourly wages are below
3

Households were interviewed each year until 1999. Post-1999 interviews are conducted on a biennial
basis.
4
Only the monetary value of food stamps is available for the 1988, and 1989 waves. I therefore do not
impute values for these waves.
5
Clothing and entertainment were added in 2005 and are not used in the imputation for consistency.
6
This measure also includes rent-equivalent expenditure calculated as 6% of house value (Attanasio
and Pistaferri, 2014; Flavin and Yamashita, 2002) for homeowners; rent is a expenditure category that is
consistently measured in the PSID.
7
This is also commonly done in the literature.
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half of the federal minimum wages, or have missing data on state of residence8 , employment,
or marital status.
I estimate the following approximation of a demand system using pooled OLS regression:
0
ln(Ni,t ) = Zi,t
β + p0t γ + g(fi,t , θ) + ui,t ,

(1.1)

where Z is a vector of socioeconomic variables9 , p is a vector of prices10 , g(·) is a thirddegree polynomial of food consumption, and u is the error term. Imputed consumption is
then:
0
Cc
(1.2)
i,t = fi,t + exp{Zi,t β̂ + pt γ̂ + g(fi,t , θ̂)}
I depart from Attanasio and Pistaferri (2014) in that I use the multiple imputation
methodology proposed by Rubin (2004) and used by Fisher and Johnson (2020). I produce
100 estimates of Cc
i,t by adding random noise to each coefficient. This random noise has
mean 0 and standard deviation equal to the standard error of the coefficient. This technique
allows me to account for potential measurement error in the data. The final measure of
consumption is the average of all the estimated Cc
i,t . To check the validity of the imputation,
I plot the first two moments of my imputation and the measure of total consumption provided
by the PSID in figure (1.1).
In computing the first two moments, I scale both consumption measures by the OECD
adult equivalent scale. However, in the following sections, I use the raw imputed consumption. I also scale the standard deviation of consumption to be indexed at 0 when the real data
starts. Figure (1.1) shows that my imputation fits the data relatively well. The correlation
between the imputed and real series is 80%.
Although data can be imputed backwards to 1968, I will restrict my analysis to the
1980 to the 2017 waves11 . This is done for several reasons. First, the demand system is
approximated with non-concurrent data (as opposed to imputation techniques that rely on
the CEX). Consumption heterogeneity introduced by preference shifts would not be captured
by the imputation, thus the quality of the imputation may decline in the PSID’s earlier waves.
Furthermore, my analysis will rely on the PSID wealth module that was first introduced in
the 1984 wave. While I can reasonably assume that households’ situation in 1984 was similar
to their situation in 1980, it is less likely further back in time.
8

mostly households residing abroad
Reference person’s hours worked, family size, dummy variables for reference person’s age, race, employment status, marital status, whether self-employed, whether disabled, home-ownership and state of residence
10
CPI for all items, rent, food at home, and food away from home.
11
Meaning my data spans 1979 to 2016. 1979 is kept to have the first differenced data start in 1980.
9
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Figure 1.1: Imputed Consumption Vs. PSID Consumption

The second aspect of risk-sharing is income. I use disposable income as the main
measure of income. I calculate disposable income as the sum of a household taxable income
(including reference person, spouse, and other family members), household transfers, social
security income, and financial income12 to which I subtract federal taxes. Note that prior
to the 1992 wave, the PSID provided a tax liability variable. I therefore make use of NBER
Taxsim and guidelines from Feenberg and Coutts (1993) and Kimberlin, Kim, and Shaefer
(2014) to estimate household taxes for the 1992 wave onward.
I then exclude households with top-coded values for each category of income. I also
remove income outliers defined as households whose income grows by more than 500%, falls
by more than 80%, or is less than $100. I then require each household to have at least
4 consecutive data points for income. Although this filter is arbitrary, 4 observations are
required to identify the parameters in the income process.
A note must be made on my definition of household. In order to identify households
12

Financial income is measured as the sum of income from dividends, interest, trust funds, and royalties.
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through each wave, I track the reference person. If the reference person changes or there is
a major family composition change13 , I drop the wave where the change occurs and consider
the household to be a newly formed in the subsequent waves. Blundell, Pistaferri, and
Preston (2008) requires households to have no changes to the reference person or their
marital status. Indeed, they consider only continuously married couples. However, Blundell,
Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten (2016) show that female labor supply is an important risksharing mechanism, thus their sample selection may overstate the degree of consumption
insurance. I impose no such requirement. Households resulting from a change in reference
person must however be present in at least 4 consecutive waves to be included in the final
sample.
Starting in 1984 (and every five years until 1999, when it becomes consistently available), the PSID included questions designed to assess wealth. I define wealth as the sum
of assets (farm and business, checking and savings, other real estate, stocks, vehicles, other
assets, annuities/IRA, and home equity) minus debt (debt on farms, businesses, real estate,
credit card debt, student loans, medical and legal bills, and loans from relatives). From these
data, I determine which households participated in the stock market. Participating households are defined as having nonzero values for amounts invested in stocks, mutual funds,
investment trusts, or IRAs. As these variables are not available in all waves, I follow Guvenen (2007) in identifying participating households. I first assume that the first recorded
status has not changed in the prior years. That is a household entering the sample prior to
a “wealth wave” will be assign the first non-missing participation status. Then, in order to
determine participation between waves, I require households to have the same status between
waves. As, I cannot identify when the household would exit or enter the market, I simply
treat those observations as missing. Although, an imperfect identification, this is only an
issue for waves prior to 1999. Figure (1.2) plots the average market participation and the
average proportion of risky assets held in households’ portfolio. I define the risky share of a
portfolio as the sum of assets invested in financial markets divided by the sum of financial
assets14 .
From figure (1.2), the average risky share has increased in the first half of the sample
and stabilizes in the second. Market participation is generally increasing, although it reached
a peak in 2000 and declined slightly afterwards. It goes from 27% in 1983 to 40% in 2016.
Note the dashed line for market participation. This represents the fact that data are missing
between these waves. While the interpolation would suggest that market participation is
13

defined as a change of reference person or spouse.
Financial assets are defined as assets invested in the stock market plus the value of checking and savings
accounts, money market funds, certificates of deposits, government bonds, or treasury bills.
14
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Figure 1.2: Average Financial Market Participation in PSID Households

steadily increasing between waves, my identification technique (not represented in this graph)
yields a different pattern. Since I am keeping households’ status constant, the average
participation remains constant15 between waves and spikes to its actual level when data is
available.
I also identify households’ positions within the wealth distribution using a similar
identification scheme. Total wealth is carried backwards from the most recent non-missing
value (limited to 5 years and only prior to the 1999 wave). I then identify households
in the top and bottom 50% of the total wealth distribution. This is again an imperfect
identification scheme. However, Fisher and Johnson (2020) find that there is little wealth
mobility. I differentiate between entrepreneurs and employees where entrepreneur households
are those where at least one household member reports non-zero business income. Finally, I
identify transfer recipients as those with non-zero transfer income (including family members
other than reference person and spouse).
15

There is very small decrease caused by household attrition between wealth waves.
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The final sample is composed of 6,291 unique households and 65,591 household-years
observations. Table 1.1 reports summary statistics for the sample. Panel A reports summary
statistics for all households in the final sample. Income and consumption data are deflated
to 1982 dollars. The median income is $30,303 and the median consumption is $13,312. 61%
of households’ reference person has some college education or higher, 87% are employed,
and 16% of households report owning a business or having a financial interest in a business
enterprise. The median wealth is $43,222. Unsurprisingly, the distribution is highly skewed
and is dominated by a few highly wealthy individuals. In panels B and C, I report summary
statistics for market participants and not participating households respectively. Participants
have higher median levels of income ($41,855 vs $23,844) and consumption ($16,705 vs
$11,542). Participating households tend to be more educated (79% vs 49%), more likely to
be employed (90% vs 84%) or have an interest in a business (23% vs 11.5%). Market wealth
(the sum of stocks and IRAs) median level is $23,303 and similarly to wealth, is highly
skewed.
1.4
1.4.1

Results
Idiosyncratic Income and Consumption

To capture the idiosyncratic components of income and consumption, I use OLS
regressions to remove the deterministic effects of observable household characteristics. The
regression is similar to Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008). I regress log income and
log consumption on dummy variables for education, race, employment status, and marital
status of the reference person. These characteristics are allowed to vary with time. I include
year dummies, and year-of-birth dummies to control for cohort effects. I also include dummy
variables for the presence of outside dependents, region of residence, whether the spouse earns
income, and the presence of income earners other than the reference person and spouse. As
noted before, I do not scale the dependent variables into adult equivalent shares. I do however
control for family size and the number of children. The residuals yi,t and ci,t are used in the
rest of the analysis. The adjusted R2 for the income regression is 49% while the adjusted
R2 for the consumption regression is 70%, indicating that a larger proportion of households’
consumption is directly observable. I then calculate the growth rates of yi,t and ci,t labelled
∆yi,t and ∆ci,t . Both growth rates are trimmed at the top and bottom 1%.
1.4.2

Static and Time-Varying risk-sharing

In its simplest form, risk-sharing can be understood as the degree of transmission of
idiosyncratic income shocks to idiosyncratic consumption shocks. Empirically, β is measured
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the final sample. The final sample is comprised
of 6,291 unique households and 65,591 household-year observations. Panel A reports mean,
median, standard deviation,25th , and 75th percentile for all households. Disposable income
is the sum of labor, business, transfer, social security, and financial income minus federal
taxes. Consumption is imputed following Attanasio and Pistaferri (2014). College takes the
value of 1 if the reference person reports having at least attended college. Employed takes
the value of 1 if the reference person reports being employed. Entrepreneur takes the value
of 1 if any household member reports owning a business or having a financial interest in a
business enterprise. Market participation takes the value of 1 for households with non-zero
stock or IRA wealth. Guvenen (2007)’s methodology is used to imputed missing data points.
Market wealth is defined as the sum of stocks and IRA wealth. Total Wealth is defined as the
sum of assets minus debt. Data are deflated to 1982 dollars.

Variable

Mean

Median

Std. Dev

25th P.

75th P.

30, 303
13, 312
1
1
0
43, 222
0
0

32, 262
7, 249
0.487
0.334
0.370
550, 287
0.488
281, 805

19, 840
9, 641
0
1
0
8, 231
0
0

43, 745
18, 132
1
1
0
130, 590
1
14, 686

Panel B. Market Participants
Disposable Income
50, 289 41, 855
Imputed Consumption 17, 980 16, 705
College
0.788
1
Employed
0.897
1
Entrepreneur
0.229
0
Total Wealth
267, 018 120, 041
Market Wealth
91, 779 23, 303

43, 885
7, 975
0.408
0.303
0.420
779, 559
428, 923

29, 948 58, 307
12, 558 21, 908
1
1
1
1
0
0
47, 538 264, 535
5, 435 76, 253

Panel A. All Households
Disposable Income
35, 874
Imputed Consumption 14, 618
College
0.612
Employed
0.872
Entrepreneur
0.163
Total Wealth
144, 254
Market Participation
0.391
Market Wealth
39, 081

Panel C. nonparticipating Households
Disposable Income
26, 608 23, 844
20, 736
Imputed Consumption 12, 730 11, 542 6, 310.570
College
0.489
0
0.500
Employed
0.841
1
0.365
Entrepreneur
0.115
0
0.319
Total Wealth
49, 083 15, 513
241, 920
15

15, 421
8, 330
0
1
0
1, 392

34, 071
15, 698
1
1
0
48, 958

as the coefficient in the following regression:
∆ci,t = α + β∆yi,t + εi,t

(1.3)

The coefficient β in equation (1.3) is the share of the variance of idiosyncratic income
that gets transmitted to consumption. β is theoretically bounded between 0 and 1, 0 indicating perfect risk-sharing, 1 indicating no risk-sharing. In other words, a lower coefficient
indicates a higher degree of consumption insurance. To test whether different groups of
households share risk differently, I interact idiosyncratic income with an indicator variable
(Ii,t ) and estimate the following regression:
∆ci,t = α + β∆yi,t + δ∆yi,t ∗ Ii,t + γIi,t + εi,t

(1.4)

I consider the following groups: participating households (vs. nonparticipating),
entrepreneurs (vs. employees), high wealth (vs. low wealth), no transfers (vs. households
receiving at least $1 of transfer income), and stock owners (vs. non-stock owners). Note that
I has a t subscript. Indeed, households can be part of a group one wave and the other group
for the next wave. Furthermore, groups are not mutually exclusive. I estimate equations
(1.3) and (1.4) with 3 different methods. First, I use OLS with the imputed consumption
series. Second, I use least absolute deviation (LAD) to ensure the estimation is robust to
outliers (i.e., large positive or negative shocks likely caused by measurement errors). Third,
I use OLS with non-imputed consumption (using 2000 to 2016 data only). Table 1.2 reports
the results16 .
In specification (1), I use all households in the sample. The results are consistent with
the literature (Gervais and Klein, 2010) in that I cannot reject complete risk-sharing; there
is however a significant amount of it. Indeed, I find that a 10% shock to idiosyncratic income
results in a 1.1% change in consumption. The estimation is robust to outliers. In panel B, I
find a coefficient of 0.1155. In panel C, I find a slightly higher coefficient of 0.1508 significant
at the 1% level, implying a lower degree of risk-sharing. This could be indicative of two
things. One, the imputation technique could produce a smoother consumption series thus
reducing shocks. This would overstate the degree of consumption insurance in Panel A. Two,
since I use only the 2000 to 2016 waves17 , consumption insurance could have deteriorated in
the second half of the sample. This implication is considered later in the paper.
I then turn to specifications (2) through (6). Note that the groups in the header of
table (1.2) have Ii,t = 0. Since the coefficient δ measures the change in slope, the sum of
16
17

Equations (1.3) and (1.4) are estimated with the constant term α although omitted from the table.
1998 has real data but is first differenced so the estimation starts with the 2000 wave.
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Table 1.2: Static Risk-Sharing Estimation
This table reports the estimated risk-sharing coefficients using equations (1.3) and (1.4).
Standard errors are reported below the coefficient in parentheses. Households are participating if they have non-zero ownership in stocks, mutual funds or IRAs. Households are
entrepreneurs if they report non-zero business or farm income. Households are high wealth if
they are in the top 50% of the wealth distribution. Household are transfer recipients if they
report positive transfer receipts. Households are stockowners if they have non-zero wealth in
stocks. Panel A reports OLS estimates using imputed data; panel B reports LAD estimates
using imputated data; and panel C reports OLS estimates using PSID measured data. *, **,
and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Ii,t = 0

All
(1)

Participation
(2)

Entrepreneurs High wealth
(3)
(4)

No transfer
(5)

Stockowners
(6)

Panel A. OLS with Imputed Data
0.0787***
(0.0057)

0.0560***
(0.0065)

0.0649***
(0.0043)

0.1000***
(0.0048)

0.0820***
(0.0070)

δ

0.0433***
(0.0071)

0.0720***
(0.0073)

0.0672***
(0.0060)

0.0185***
(0.0067)

0.0382***
(0.0079)

γ

0.0015
(0.0021)

0.0035
(0.0027)

0.0050***
(0.0018)

-0.0057***
(0.0021)

0.0009
(0.0023)

0.0751***
(0.0057)

0.0530***
(0.0069)

0.0700***
(0.0042)

0.1056***
(0.0046)

0.0815***
(0.0068)

δ

0.0491***
(0.0073)

0.0776***
(0.0078)

0.0640***
(0.0065)

0.0173**
(0.0070)

0.0392***
(0.0080)

γ

0.0020
(0.0022)

-0.0002
(0.0029)

0.0041**
(0.0020)

-0.0021
(0.0022)

0.0006
(0.0023)

β

0.1123***
(0.0029)

Panel B. LAD with Imputed Data
β

0.1155***
(0.0030)

Panel C. OLS with Measured Data
0.0991***
(0.0120)

0.0636***
(0.0160)

0.0860***
(0.0108)

0.1361***
(0.0117)

0.1119***
(0.0164)

δ

0.0908***
(0.0157)

0.1035***
(0.0180)

0.0941***
(0.0148)

0.0365**
(0.0162)

0.0475**
(0.0185)

γ

-0.0048
(0.0049)

-0.0019
(0.0069)

-0.0134***
(0.0046)

-0.0043
(0.0052)

-0.0111*
(0.0058)

β

0.1508***
(0.0069)
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β and δ gives the degree of risk-sharing for groups with Ii,t = 1. I find that participating
households tend to smooth consumption more than nonparticipating households. Indeed, I
find that a 10% shock to participating households’ idiosyncratic income causes a 0.8% shock
to consumption, while a similar shock to nonparticipating households results in a 1.22%
change in idiosyncratic consumption. This result is in contradiction with Guvenen (2007)
who find that participating households share risk less completely. However, I use a larger
panel and use a consumption measure that is broader the food consumption measure he
uses. Furthermore, I find similar results in panel C. This result strengthens my claim that
participants share risk more completely. Indeed, I do not have to rely on imputed data, nor do
I rely on an imperfect identification of participation. The magnitude of the difference in risksharing is also larger in panel C. The portion of income shocks transmitted to consumption
for shareholders is half of that for nonparticipating households. Results are similar when
considering direct participation through stock ownership only. I also find that entrepreneurs
and high-wealth households smooth consumption to a higher degree than their counterparts.
This is also in contradiction of Guvenen (2007) who claim that high wealth households (and
participating households) take on more entrepreneurial and market risk. However, high
wealth individuals have increased savings capacity and thus can more easily weather shocks.
Furthermore, it is possible that entrepreneurs have a better information on their future
income and are able to preemptively adjust their consumption (see Kaufmann and Pistaferri
(2009) for a discussion on insurance vs information). Regardless of the channel, these results
show that entrepreneurs and high-wealth households seem to be less impacted by income
shocks. Finally, in specification (5), I find that transfer recipients smooth consumption to a
less degree than households who do not receive any government transfers. However, while
statistically different, the difference in slope is 0.0185 which is lower than the δ estimated
for other groups. This result indicates that formal government mechanisms are imperfect
yet provide a significant amount of consumption insurance.
The grouping of households in table (1.2) is fairly coarse. In table (1.3), I separate
households based on their position within the income distribution. Households are sorted
into quartiles (Q1 to Q4 ). I separate households that have 0 values into Q0 . I know from table
(1.2) that households with at least $1 of business income tend to have a lower risk-sharing
coefficient, so I will sort employees into Q0 and sort households with non-zero business income
into the Q1 to Q4 . I consider the following variables and ratios when sorting households:
after-tax income18 , wave, transfer, business, financial income to total income. I estimate the
following regression:
18

Note that Q0 after-tax income are households who are below the poverty line according to the Census
tables. This variable is provided directly by the PSID.
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∆ci,t =

4
X

βj ∆yi,t ∗ Ii,t;j +

j=1

4
X

γi,t;j + εi,t

(1.5)

j=1

Equation (1.5) is estimated without a constant term with Q1 as the base group. The
coefficients in Q1 represents the baseline slope and coefficients Q2 to Q4 represent the change
in slope and statistical significance. γj are not reported. Q0 is estimated with equation (1.3).
Panel A reports the results when estimated with imputed data, while panel B reports results
estimated with PSID measured data.
In sorting households by after-tax income, I first divide their disposable income by
the OECD equivalent scale. Indeed, a household with more income earners will naturally be
more likely to be in a higher quartile19 . I find that households bottom 25% of the after-tax
income distribution smooth consumption to a lesser degree than households in the top 25%.
However, the relationship is not monotonic as I do not find a statistical difference between
Q1 and Q3 households. Almost 94% of shocks affecting households below the poverty line are
smoothed away. I offer two possible explanations for this result. Consumption of households
below the poverty line is likely to be a baseline of necessities and could hardly get any lower,
thus unaffected by shocks. Households below the poverty line are also likely to receive a
significant portion of income from government transfers and would thus experience fewer and
small shocks to income. Note that these results are consistent when estimating equation (1.5)
with measured data. The relationship between risk-sharing and after-tax income appears
to be monotonically decreasing suggesting that high-income households are better able to
smooth out shocks.
I then consider several sources of income as a ratio of total income. I scale these income
streams by total income instead of disposable income to insure that all ratios are between
0 and 120 . Secondly, these different streams of income are likely to contribute differently to
households’ overall tax liability. Scaling by total income does not require assumptions on
each stream’s tax contribution.
I find that households who receive more transfer income tend to share risk more
completely than those who receive a lower proportion of their income in the form of government transfers. This implies that formal risk-sharing mechanisms are efficiently insuring
households against income shocks. This result also indicates why the magnitude of the δ
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Note that without scaling, I find that households with higher after-tax income share less risk relative
to Q1 households.
20
Although business income can be negative indicating a loss. The households are sorted in Q0 . This
only affects are very small number of households.
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Table 1.3: Conditional Risk-Sharing - Income Distribution
This table reports the estimated risk-sharing coefficients based on household’s position within
the income distribution. Households are sorted into quartile and zero-values households are
placed into Q0 . The β coefficients from equation (1.5) are reported with standard errors
in parentheses. Panel A is estimated with imputed data. Panel B is estimated with PSID
measured data. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.
Q0

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

After-tax Income

0.0673***
(0.0154)

0.1262***
(0.0060)

-0.0141*
(0.0085)

-0.0061
(0.0084)

-0.0230***
(0.0082)

Wage / Total Income

0.0536***
(0.0176)

0.0976***
(0.0048)

0.0254***
(0.0078)

0.0323***
(0.0082)

0.0256***
(0.0079)

Transfer / Total Income

0.1000***
(0.0045)

0.1647***
(0.0142)

-0.0285
(0.0183)

-0.0422**
(0.0174)

-0.0739***
(0.0165)

Business / Total Income

0.1286***
(0.0035)

0.1093***
(0.0225)

-0.0443
(0.0287)

-0.0556**
(0.0276)

-0.0685**
(0.0271)

Financial / Total Income

0.1147***
(0.0039)

0.1404***
(0.0093)

-0.0055
(0.0130)

-0.0331***
(0.0127)

-0.0670***
(0.0118)

After-tax Income

0.0880**
(0.0391)

0.1923***
(0.0140)

-0.0332
(0.0204)

-0.0408**
(0.0198)

-0.0783***
(0.0195)

Wage / Total Income

0.1005**
(0.0412)

0.1338***
(0.0114)

0.0282
(0.0185)

0.0279
(0.0196)

0.0355*
(0.0191)

Transfer / Total Income

0.1361***
(0.0109)

0.2386***
(0.0329)

-0.0339
(0.0421)

-0.0676*
(0.0405)

-0.1069***
(0.0388)

Business / Total Income

0.1671***
(0.0082)

0.0997
(0.0651)

0.0205
(0.0810)

-0.0794
(0.0768)

-0.0775
(0.0740)

Financial / Total Income

0.1532***
(0.0087)

0.2043***
(0.0251)

-0.0691**
(0.0344)

-0.0517
(0.0333)

-0.0937***
(0.0315)

Panel A. Imputed Data

Panel B. Measured Data
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coefficient in table (1.2) is small. Q1 coefficient is 0.1647 while Q4 is 0.0908. Households
who receive most of their income (or its entirety) in the form of transfers share as much risk
as households who receive no transfers.
Households who receive a small portion of the income from owning a business appear
to share risk more completely than those who receive no business income (0.1093 vs 0.1286).
However, the large difference in risk-sharing observed in table (1.2) appears to come from
households who receive a significant portion (above median) of business income. Indeed, I
find that almost 95% and 96% of income shocks are insured for Q3 and Q4 households. Q1
and Q2 are not statistically different from each other, though appear larger than Q0 .
I also consider financial income. Recall that financial income is defined as the sum of
income from dividends, interest, trust funds, and royalties and thus may be a good proxy for
market participation and financial wealth. I find that households with a small proportion
of their income in the form of financial income have a risk coefficient of 0.1404 (.14 for Q1
compared to 0.1147 for Q0 households. This result is consistent with Guvenen (2007)’s claim
that participating in financial markets increases households’ risk. Indeed, it can be argued
that the increased risk outweighs the risk-sharing benefits from households that cannot
sufficiently diversify. However, the relation is monotonically decreasing and households who
receive most of their income in the form of financial income have a risk-sharing coefficient of
0.0734 (consistent with the 0.0787 of market participants).
These results are confirmed when looking at the distribution of wages to total income.
Households that receive most of their income from wages tend to risk-share less than those
who receive little from wages (implying more income from transfer, business, or financial
income). Note that results are similar in magnitude in panel B of table (1.3).
In table (1.4), I estimate equation (1.5) with households sorted based on wealth
variables instead of income variables. Note that prior to 1998, I record a household’s position
within the distribution when data are available (1983,1988,1993) and carry their position
backwards. Although imperfect, the low wealth mobility observed in the literature allows
me to do such an operation with a limited bias. I consider the following variables and ratios:
total wealth, financial, market, and stock to total wealth.
The relationship between risk-sharing and wealth is less striking than income. Indeed,
I find less statistical differences between quartiles. I do nonetheless find interesting patterns.
I find that the difference between households above and below the median level of wealth is
caused by households in the top 25% of the wealth distribution. Furthermore, I find that
the differences between participating and nonparticipating households are mainly driven by
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Table 1.4: Conditional Risk-Sharing - Wealth Distribution
This table reports the estimated risk-sharing coefficients based on household’s position within
the income distribution. Households are sorted into quartile and zero-values households are
placed into Q0 . The β coefficients from equation (1.5) are reported with standard errors
in parentheses. Panel A is estimated with imputed data. Panel B is estimated with PSID
measured data. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.

Q0

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

0.1167***
(0.0099)
0.1139***
(0.0075)
0.1213***
(0.0044)
0.1197***
(0.0039)

0.1244***
(0.0060)
0.0999***
(0.0060)
0.0532***
(0.0106)
0.0652***
(0.0127)

-0.0007
(0.0088)
0.0115
(0.0088)
0.0165
(0.0149)
0.0144
(0.0177)

-0.0058
(0.0088)
0.0218**
(0.0087)
0.0287*
(0.0148)
0.0184
(0.0179)

-0.0369***
(0.0082)
0.0154*
(0.0087)
0.0422***
(0.0145)
0.0282
(0.0172)

0.1632***
(0.0209)
0.1548***
(0.0175)
0.1899***
(0.0110)
0.1594***
(0.0088)

0.1498***
(0.0146)
0.1468***
(0.0147)
0.0959***
(0.0227)
0.1308***
(0.0317)

0.0270
(0.0212)
-0.0091
(0.0213)
-0.0242
(0.0312)
-0.0010
(0.0431)

-0.0191
(0.0211)
0.0139
(0.0209)
0.0492
(0.0307)
-0.0160
(0.0443)

-0.0076
(0.0196)
0.0046
(0.0205)
-0.0127
(0.0307)
-0.0489
(0.0423)

Panel A. Imputed Data
Total Wealth
Financial / Total Wealth
Market / Total Wealth
Stock / Total Wealth
Panel B. Real Data
Total Wealth
Financial / Total Wealth
Market / Total Wealth
Stock / Total Wealth

households with a relatively small proportion of their wealth invested in financial markets.
Indeed, the risk-sharing coefficient for Q1 households is 0.0532 relative to Q0 ’s coefficient
of 0.1213. Furthermore, risk-sharing is monotonically increasing (though I do not find a
statistical difference between Q1 and Q2 households). Households with most of their wealth
invested in the stock market (directly or indirectly) have a risk-sharing coefficient of 0.0954.
When considering only stock wealth (i.e. direct financial market participation), I do not find
a statistically significant relationship.
In panel B, I repeat the analysis with the PSID consumption series after 2000. This
subsample is also characterized by continuously measured wealth data. However, Q1 to
Q4 households do not appear to be statistically different for any ratio. It is to be noted
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that segmenting households into quartiles (plus Q0 ) results in each quartile being relatively
small. Thus, all tests will have lower power. While not significant, the signs indicate that
households with more of their wealth invested in the stock market (directly and indirectly)
appear to share more risk.
I then ask: has risk-sharing changed over time? Indeed, given the transformation of
financial markets in recent decades (Iachan, Nenov, and Simsek, 2021), I should see clear
improvement in risk-sharing. To establish a trend in risk-sharing, I estimate equation (1.4)
with interacting ∆yi,t with year-dummies. I plot the results in figure (1.3)
Figure 1.3: Time varying risk-sharing - All households

The results of figure (1.3) are surprising. Indeed, the risk-sharing coefficients display
an upward trend. The coefficients go from 0.1138 in 1980 to 0.1339 in 2016. The coefficients
remain relatively stable in the 1980s, fall in the 1990s, and steadily increase in the 2000s.
Although increasing, the economic significance of the change is relatively small. A 10% to
income would cause a 1.1% shift in consumption in 1980 and a 1.3% shift in consumption in
2016. Furthermore, the risk-sharing coefficient is the ratio of the covariance of idiosyncratic
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income and consumption shocks over the variance of shocks. Looking at the β coefficients
might obscure the transmission process. In figure (1.4), I plot the cross-sectional covariance
between income and consumption shocks. This plot shows a clearer upward trend. Although
I cannot strictly interpret these covariances as risk-sharing, the impact of income shocks on
consumption shocks seems to be intensifying.
Figure 1.4: Time varying covariances - All households

Households’ ability to smooth consumption appears to have slightly deteriorated since
the 1980s. However, I know from my previous results that not all households have the same
risk-sharing coefficients. In figure (1.5), I plot the risk-sharing coefficients of participating
and nonparticipating households. I can see that the coefficients for nonparticipating households always lie above the participating households after 1998. Prior to 1998, the differences
are not significant. Concentrating on the 1998-2016 period, I clearly see that nonparticipating households have seen their ability to risk-share deteriorate. Participating households
has a relatively flat trend. Interestingly, both participating and nonparticipating households
have a large increase in the coefficient around the financial crisis. However, this spike does
not occur at the same time. Participating households see their spike in 2008, then the coef24

ficients subsequently decline. Non- participating households’ coefficient increase in 2008 and
2010 again. This would indicate that nonparticipating households were more affected by the
ensuing recession than participating households. The slight increase in risk-sharing in figure
(1.3) can be partially explained by non participating households.
Figure 1.5: Time varying risk-sharing - Participating and nonparticipating households

I then plot the risk-sharing coefficients for entrepreneurs and employees. Indeed, I
have seen that households receiving less income in the form of wages tend to share more
risk. In figure (1.6), the differences between the two groups are striking. Indeed, employees’ coefficients always lie above the coefficients for entrepreneurs. In 2006, I see the β
for entrepreneur is negative, which violates theoretical bounds21 . However, I do see that
entrepreneurs’ ability to smooth consumption has generally increased (i.e lower coefficient)
since the 1980s. Employees’ consumption smoothing ability is increasing. Interestingly, I
also see that entrepreneurs experienced a large shock to risk-sharing during the financial
crisis (not observed for employees).
21

Note that a dip in 2006 is observed throughout the graphs. This is caused by a smaller variance of
idiosyncratic income. I fail to provide any explanation as to why this happens.
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Figure 1.6: Time varying risk-sharing - Entrepreneurs and Employees

Finally, I plot the risk-sharing coefficients for households above and below the median level of wealth. Figure (1.7) is relatively similar to figure (1.5). Wealthy households’
risk-sharing coefficients are relatively stable. These households experience a very moderate
shock around the financial crisis compared to households below median levels of wealth. Furthermore, households that are below median levels of wealth experienced a sharp decrease
in risk-sharing since the 1980s.
I have not detected the improvement in risk-sharing suggested by the increase in
financial innovation. Indeed, the risk-sharing coefficients seem to remain constant at best,
increasing at worst, in direct contradiction of the traditional view. However, the transmission
mechanism studied so far is simple. In the following section, I investigate a more complete
and robust framework of consumption insurance.
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Figure 1.7: Time varying risk-sharing - Above and below median levels of wealth

1.4.3

Joint Distribution of Consumption, Permanent, and Transitory Income

Cochrane (1991) uses PSID proxies to model shocks. He considers involuntary job
loss or number of days looking for jobs. The length of those variables can be construed as
proxies for temporary or permanent shocks. This is indeed one of the empirical strategies
used in the literature (Misra and Surico, 2014; Kan, Peng, and Wang, 2017; Fagereng, Holm,
and Natvik, 2019). Empirical proxies are often transitory in nature, thus the transitory
consumption response has been largely investigated. Alternatively, one can study the joint
distribution of permanent and transitory income shocks by imposing a certain structure on
the income and consumption response. This second method has the added benefit one not
requiring proxies.
Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) present a partial insurance insurance model
that allows me to differentiate between permanent and transitory income shocks and the
degree of transmission of those shocks. The flexibility of the framework lets me estimate
time-varying shocks and insurance parameters. This framework is used by Casado (2011),
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Ludwig (2016), or Santaeulalia-Llopis and Zheng (2018). In this model, the log unexplained
annual income (yt ) allows for a permanent component P and a transitory component ν:
yi,t = Pi,t + νi,t

(1.6)

Following Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), I define the permanent component as a martingale process with serially uncorrelated innovations ζi,t :
Pi,t = Pi,t−1 + ζi,t

(1.7)

Modelling the permanent component in this fashion ensures that the innovations do
not disappear. In addition, I model the transitory component to ensure that these innovations
do disappear. I represent ν as an MA(q) process with serially uncorrelated innovations. I
do not assume the order q of the process, rather I determine it empirically.

νi,t =

q
X

θj εi,t−j

(1.8)

j=0

The shocks to the permanent and transitory components are both independent and
identically distributed across time and households with mean 0 and their respective variance
2
). I can therefore write the growth in
σζ2t and σν2t : ζt ∼ i.i.d(0, σζ2t ) and ζt ∼ i.i.d(0, σνt
unexplained income as:
∆yi,t = ζi,t + ∆νi,t

(1.9)

I use equation (1.9) to determine the order (q) of the transitory process. I assume
that the permanent innovations ζi,t and transitory innovations εi,t are uncorrelated. Thus,
for the true order (q), the autocovariance between ∆yi,t and ∆yi,t+s with s ≤ q + 1 are
significantly different from zero and the autocovariance with s > q + 1 are equal to zero.
The order q is determined by estimating the autocovariance of ∆yi,t with various values of s
and testing their significance. Table (1.5) reports the results for s = 0, 1, 2, 3 over the entire
sample period.
The variance of income goes from 0.0718 in 1980 to 0.0873 in 2016 with a highest
point of 0.1098 in 2008. The variance is consistently and unsurprisingly significant at the 1%
level. The first-order autocovariance is, as expected, negative, and consistently significant at
the 1% level. Note that after 1996, I take the autocovariance as ∆yt ∗ ∆yt+2 22 . Although an
22

Similar approximation are used for s = 2, and s = 3.
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Table 1.5: Autocovariance of Idiosyncratic Income Growth
This table reports the autocovariances of unexplained income growth Cov(∆yi,t , ∆yi,t+s ) for
values of s = 0, 1, 2, 3. I use all households in the calculation. I treat the post 1996 waves
as if consecutive. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.

Year

V ar(∆yt )

Cov(∆yt , ∆yt+1 )

Cov(∆yt , ∆yt+2 )

Cov(∆yt , ∆yt+3 )

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016

0.0718***
0.0756***
0.0705***
0.0803***
0.0812***
0.0872***
0.0830***
0.0760***
0.0922***
0.0794***
0.0823***
0.0785***
0.1003***
0.0959***
0.0974***
0.0890***
0.0936***
0.1083***
0.1042***
0.1036***
0.1098***
0.0979***
0.1012***
0.1023***
0.1008***
0.0952***
0.0873***

-0.0211***
-0.0210***
-0.0199***
-0.0237***
-0.0275***
-0.0245***
-0.0223***
-0.0281***
-0.0291***
-0.0236***
-0.0233***
-0.0293***
-0.0314***
-0.0340***
-0.0262***
-0.0266***
-0.0304***
-0.0291***
-0.0322***
-0.0344***
-0.0316***
-0.0263***
-0.0315***
-0.0276***
-0.0288***
-0.0276***

-0.0021
-0.0066***
-0.0046**
-0.0030
0.0004
-0.0020
-0.0036
0.0009
-0.0044**
-0.0042**
-0.0032
0.0023
-0.0058**
-0.0007
-0.0023
-0.0076***
-0.0014
-0.0027
-0.0028
-0.0012
-0.0012
0.0000
-0.0015
0.0024
-0.0022

-0.0029
0.0032
0.0029
-0.0033
-0.0015
-0.0004
0.0001
-0.0014
0.0013
0.0045*
-0.0008
0.0009
-0.0051**
0.0037
0.0043
0.0041
-0.0002
0.0025
-0.0025
-0.0049*
-0.0028
-0.0017
-0.0038
-0.0013
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approximation of the true autocovariance, I cannot get around this hurdle. I do address the
biennial structure in the estimation process. The second and third order autocovariances
are small and not consistently significant. In fact they are significant for a few years only.
This result supports a MA(1) process for the transitory component. Although I adopt the
MA(1) process in the estimation process, the rest of this section will present a special case
of the process with MA(0) as in Heathcote, Perri, and Violante (2010) where the transitory
shocks ν and the transitory innovations ε are not differentiated23 .
In order to determine how the consumption process responds to the income process,
Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) introduce two parameters φ and ψ that measures
how much the consumption process reacts to permanent and transitory shocks, respectively.
These two parameters are often referred to as partial insurance parameters. I describe the
unexplained consumption growth process as:

∆ci,t = φi,t ζi,t + ψi,t εi,t + ξi,t

(1.10)

ξ measures changes to the consumption process that are unrelated to changes in
the income process, such as heterogeneous shifts in preferences. It is distributed as ξ ∼
i.i.d(0, σξ2 ). The four main parameters of interest are φ, ψ, ζ, and ε. The first two account for
the degree of insurance. A lower loading factor means a higher degree of insurance. Indeed,
in perfectly complete markets, both ψ and φ would be equal to 0. In perfectly incomplete
markets, both parameters would be equal to 1. The consumption process described in
equation 1.8 allows me to test whether the rapid growth in financial innovation has improved
households’ ability to insure against permanent or transitory shocks.
While I do observe ∆yi,t in the PSID, I do not ∆ci,t . Indeed, I do not have a true
consumption series, rather an imputed one. Following Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston
(2008), I add a measurement error parameter ui,t to account for potential biases introduced
in the imputation. I can re-write equation (1.10) as:
∆c∗i,t = φi,t ζi,t + ψi,t εi,t + ξi,t + uci,t − uci,t−1

(1.11)

While the theory on financial innovation affirms that it will increase risk-sharing,
it does not differentiate between its permanent and transitory components. Furthermore,
Krueger and Perri (2006) hypothesize that an increase in the variance of shocks should
provide households more incentives to insure themselves. Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston
23

The MA notation can get cumbersome, I present this simpler process in the interest of space.
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(2008) does find increased variance for the 1980s. The decomposition of the response to
income shocks can perhaps explain why I observed the trends in overall risk-sharing in
figures (1.3) and (1.4). Indeed, it is possible that the exogenous financial market development
hypothesized by Krueger and Perri (2006) improved households’ ability to insure against one
type of shock while their ability to insure against another deteriorated, thus resulting in no
observable trend in a simple transmission process.
1.4.4

Minimum Distance Estimation

To estimate the parameters outlined in the previous section, I follow the literature
standard: the Minimum Distance Estimator used by Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008),
Casado (2011), Ludwig (2016), Santaeulalia-Llopis and Zheng (2018), and Kubota (2020).
The parameters are derived from the variances, covariances, and autocovariances of the unexplained income and consumption growth. I then estimate these parameters by minimizing
the distance between the empirical moments and the moments predicted by the parametric consumption-income model described below. I start by describing the implications of
equation (1.9). I write the variance and autocovariance of idiosyncratic income as:

V ar(∆yi,t ) = V ar(ζi,t ) + V ar(εi,t ) + V ar(εi,t−1 )

(1.12)

Cov(∆yi,t , ∆yi,t+1 ) = −V ar(εi,t )

(1.13)

Equation (1.13) explains why I expected the first autocovariance to be negative. As
noted in Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008), equations (1.12) and (1.13) are sufficient
to identify the variance of transitory and permanent income shocks. Adding consumption
moments refines the estimation. I then describe the implications of equation (1.11). I can
write the variance and autocovariance of idiosyncratic consumption as:

V ar(∆ci,t ) = φ2t V ar(ζi,t ) + ψt2 V ar(εi,t ) + V ar(ξi ) + V ar(uci,t ) + V ar(uci,t−1 )
Cov(∆ci,t , ∆ci,t+1 ) = −V ar(uci,t )

(1.14)
(1.15)

∆ci,t is linked to ∆ci,t+s only through uci,t . In Table 1.6, I calculate the variance and
autocovariance of consumption for s = 1, 2, 3. The variance of consumption increases from
0.0348 in 1980 to 0.0438 in 2016 (growth that is similar to that of idiosyncratic income).
The observation of note in Table 1.6 is the covariance between ∆yt and ∆yt+1 . Firstly,
it is negative as predicted by equation (1.15). Secondly, it is consistently significant, thus
justifying the introduction of uci,t in the estimation. However, it is relatively small and
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consistent throughout the sample period. It does not invalidate the imputation procedure.
Furthermore, the higher order autocovariances are small and not significant.
I can use equation (1.15) to identify the variance of the measurement error. However, I still cannot identify the partial insurance parameters and the preferences shock using
consumption moments alone. I write the covariances between income and consumption as:

Cov(∆yi,t , ∆ci,t ) = φt V ar(ζi,t ) + ψt V ar(εi,t )

(1.16)

Cov(∆yi,t+1 , ∆ci,t ) = −ψt V ar(εi,t )

(1.17)

From equation (1.17), I identify the transitory insurance parameter which is then
used in equation (1.16) to identify the permanent insurance parameter. Although all parameters can be time-varying, note that the parameter describing shifts in preferences ξ will be
restricted to be the same for all periods. This is done for two reasons. First, there are no
theoretical justifications as to why it should vary. Second, it reduces the number of estimated
parameters.
The first differenced moments and the lagged values are all defined for annual data.
However, post-1996 PSID data are only available biennially. Ludwig (2016) shows that I can
rely on second seasonal differences and adjust the moments to fit the data structure24 . Given
the yearly variances cannot be estimated, I assume that they are equal for the measured year
and the gap year. The variances then become an average of two years. I can rewrite the
moments in equations (1.12), (1.14), and (1.16) as:

V ar(∆yi,t ) = 2V ar(ζi,t ) + V ar(εi,t ) + V ar(εi,t−2 )
V ar(∆ci,t ) = φ2t 2V ar(ζi,t ) + ψt2 2V ar(εi,t ) + 2V ar(ξi ) + V ar(uci,t ) + V ar(uci,t−2 )
Cov(∆yi,t , ∆ci,t ) = φt 2V ar(ζi,t ) + ψt V ar(εi,t )

(1.18)
(1.19)
(1.20)

In Table 1.7, I calculate the autocovariances of unexplained consumption and income
growth. The covariance at s = 0 is the series plotted in figure (1.4). The main interest of
this table is the Cov(∆ct , ∆yt+2 ). A significant covariance between today’s consumption and
future income shocks would suggest superior information from households. Kaufmann and
Pistaferri (2009) argue that the identification strategy requires a clear separation between
unforeseen shocks and anticipated events. They use a micro-level household dataset which
24

Similar adjustments are used by Santaeulalia-Llopis and Zheng (2018) to account for gaps in their data.
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Table 1.6: Autocovariance of Idiosyncratic Consumption Growth
This table reports the autocovariances of unexplained consumption growth Cov(∆ci,t , ∆ci,t+s )
for values of s = 0, 1, 2, 3. I use all households in the calculation. I treat the post 1996 waves
as if consecutive. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.

Year

V ar(∆ct )

Cov(∆ct , ∆ct+1 )

Cov(∆ct , ∆ct+2 )

Cov(∆ct , ∆ct+3 )

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016

0.0348***
0.0342***
0.0329***
0.0317***
0.0357***
0.0331***
0.0330***

-0.0133***
-0.0122***
-0.0096***
-0.0121***
-0.0124***
-0.0103***

-0.0009
-0.0001
-0.0009
0.0006
-0.0014

0.0006
0.0012
-0.0005
0.0001

0.0357***
0.0374***
0.0337***
0.0333***
0.0311***
0.0345***
0.0348***
0.0417***
0.0375***
0.0443***
0.0483***
0.0462***
0.0495***
0.0499***
0.0464***
0.0484***
0.0438***

-0.0135***
-0.0130***
-0.0104***
-0.0116***
-0.0116***
-0.0128***
-0.0133***
-0.0110***
-0.0128***
-0.0137***
-0.0174***
-0.0165***
-0.0186***
-0.0157***
-0.0177***
-0.0150***

-0.0010
-0.0007
0.0005
-0.0005
0.0004
0.0010
-0.0004
-0.0009
-0.0010
-0.0000
-0.0007
0.0007
-0.0017
-0.0010
-0.0011

0.0014
-0.0001
0.0000
-0.0003
-0.0011
-0.0014*
0.0006
0.0003
-0.0000
-0.0016
0.0005
0.0002
-0.0009
0.0004
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contains expectations of future income and employment to disentangle insurance and information. They find that households do have some superior information which may overstates
the degree of insurance. The PSID does not contain households’ income expectations thus
rendering me unable to differentiate the two effects. However, I find that the covariance
between ∆ci,t and ∆yi,s is not significant for s = 2 and s = 3. This result implies that
households are not likely to possess superior information and adjust consumption ahead of
shocks. I can be reasonably certain that the parameters I measure are indeed insurance
parameters.
To estimate the parameters, I first collect the residual consumption and income growth
for each household. The sample period in first difference is 1980 to 2016. I therefore have
27 possible income growth data points and 24 possible consumption growth data points
for each households25 . For each household, I stack the consumption values (∆ci ) and the
income moments (∆yi ) in the vector xi . I create two vectors for each households dci and dyi
containing 1 for non-missing years, 0 otherwise, for consumption growth and income growth
respectively. These two vectors are stacked into di which has the same dimensions as xi .

xi =

∆ci
∆yi

!
and di =

dci
dyi

!

I calculate the variance-covariance matrix of unexplained consumption and income
growth M :

M=

X

xi x0i



i

X

di d0i



i

where represents an element-wise division. M is a 51 by 51 matrix (24 observations
from consumption, 27 from income). M contains all estimates of the variance, covariances,
and autocovariances of unexplained consumption and income growth. This formulation
allows me to get around the unbalanced nature of the PSID data in a simple manner and
account for years where I am unable to impute consumption data or households dropping
out of the sample. I define m as the half-vectorized matrix M . m contains all unique second
moments of the data. I define the objective function as f (Λ) implied by the consumption
income process defined above. Λ contains the parameters that I am identifying (insurance
parameters, variance of shocks, measurement errors, and preferences shift). I estimate the
parameters by simply minimizing the distance between:
25

27 years results from the biennial structure of the PSID, and 24 years results from missing consumption
in 1987,1988, and the inability to first difference 1989.
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Table 1.7: Covariance of Idiosyncratic Consumption Growth and Idiosyncratic Income
Growth
This table reports the covariances of unexplained consumption growth and income growth
Cov(∆ci,t , ∆yi,t+s ) for values of s = 0, 1, 2, 3. I use all households in the calculation. I treat
the post 1996 waves as if consecutive. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

Year

Cov(∆ct , ∆yt )

Cov(∆ct , ∆yt+1 )

Cov(∆ct , ∆yt+2 )

Cov(∆ct , ∆yt+3 )

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016

0.0082***
0.0079***
0.0091***
0.0099***
0.0104***
0.0104***
0.0104***

0.0007
-0.0003
-0.0031**
-0.0019
-0.0049***
-0.0014
-0.0023*

-0.0019
-0.0014
-0.0005
0.0011
0.0013
-0.0002
-0.0030**

-0.0002
-0.0006
0.0009
-0.0005
-0.0013
0.0021
0.0035**

0.0087***
0.0092***
0.0113***
0.0092***
0.0083***
0.0084***
0.0083***
0.0100***
0.0099***
0.0108***
0.0137***
0.0100***
0.0136***
0.0134***
0.0132***
0.0110***
0.0115***

-0.0003
-0.0042***
-0.0002
-0.0018
-0.0024**
-0.0006
-0.0044***
-0.0004
-0.0047***
-0.0042***
-0.0016
-0.0001
-0.0053***
-0.0034**
-0.0027
-0.0033*

-0.0004
0.0014
-0.0014
0.0005
0.0015
0.0002
0.0005
0.0002
0.0023
0.0015
-0.0015
-0.0006
0.0034**
-0.0024
-0.0001

0.0004
0.0007
-0.0004
-0.0012
0.0007
0.0007
0.0003
0.0022
0.0020
-0.0019
-0.0022
-0.0010
0.0017
0.0008

35

(1.21)

min(m − f (Λ))0 A(m − f (Λ)),
Λ

For inference purposes, I rely on the variance-covariance matrix of m defined as:

V =

X
N

0

((mi − m)(mi − m) ) ⊗

vech(di d0i )



i=1

X
N

vech(di d0i )


,

i=1

and standard errors following Chamberlain (1984):
V\
ar(θ̂) = (G0 AG)−1 G0 AV AG(G0 AG)−1 ,

(1.22)

∂f (θ)
|
is the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the estimated parameters
∂θ θ=θ̂
θ̂. Note that the matrix A in equations (1.21) and (1.22) is an identity matrix in Equally
Weighted Minimum Distance (EWMD), V −1 for Optimal Minimum Distance (OMD), or
diag(V −1 ) for Diagonally Weighted Minimum Distance (DWMD).
with G =

As certain parameters depend on autocovariances, I must make certain assumptions
to ensure stability. I will assume that the variance of transitory shocks of the last measurable
period is equal to the variance of transitory shocks for the last available year. This allows
me to identify the variance of permanent shocks in the last available year. I make the same
assumption for the variance of the measurement error. I also assume that the lag variance of
the measurement error in the first year is equal to the variance of the measurement error in
the first available year. I must assume that the last available year and the first available year
are equal to their respective lags for the missing intervals26 . Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston
(2008) replace missing moments with the whole sample average. Considering the panel has
a longer time dimension and I am interested in the time series properties of the estimates,
replacing missing moments with the most recent non-missing values is more appropriate.
1.4.5

Results of the MDE

I first restrict the partial insurance parameters to be the same for the whole sample
period. I estimate φ and ψ for the same groups used in table 1.2. The results are presented in
table 1.8. Panel A reports the diagonally-weighted estimates using imputed data while panel
B reports the diagonally-weighted estimates using PSID measured data. When estimating
with the PSID measured data, I maintain the measurement errors term ui,t in the moments.
26

For the sample period, I have V ar(ε2016 ) = V ar(ε2014 ), V ar(u1979 ) = V ar(u1980 ), V ar(u1986 ) =
V ar(u1985 ), V ar(u1989 ) = V ar(u1990 ), and V ar(u2016 ) = V ar(u2014 ).

36

Although the term is added to account for measurement error arising from imputation, I feel
it is prudent to leave it in. Indeed, the PSID data remains subject to potential measurement
errors. Before going into the results of table 1.8, I can mention results not reported27 .
The measurement error parameters are precisely measured indicating that they absorb a
fair amount of the cross-section of consumption. The parameter measuring preference ξ is
consistently significant and varies between 0.03 and 0.08 across specifications. The serial
correlation of the transitory shock (as I estimate a MA(1) process) is also significant and
varies between 0.09 and 0.10 between specifications.
As pointed out by Commault (2020), estimating subgroups presents several advantages. In the baseline estimation, I assume that all households have the same income and
consumption process and the same parameters. When estimating subgroups separately, I can
relax the assumption of homogeneous parameters. Indeed, this separate estimation yields
more precise estimates of θ and ξ. Furthermore, the comparison between groups is made
easier as differences observed cannot be caused by different income processes.
My estimates are consistent with the literature. I find that across specifications, the
permanent insurance parameters is always larger than the transitory insurance parameter.
This result suggests that transitory shocks are easier to insure than permanent ones. For all
households, the permanent insurance parameter φ is 0.2586 and significantly from 0 at the
1% level. This implies that a 10% shock to permanent income will cause a 2.586% shift in
permanent consumption. The transitory insurance parameter ψ is 0.0677 and is significantly
different from 0 at the 1% level, indicating that that a 10% shock to transitory income will
cause a 0.677% shift in transitory consumption. This is consistent with the result of (1.2). If
we think of β in equation (1.3) as a weighted average of φ and ψ with the respective variances
as weights, then the variance of transitory shocks should account for approximately 75% of
the variance of total shock28 .

β̂ =

φt V ar(ζi,t ) + ψt V ar(εi,t )
cov(∆c, ∆y)
= 0.1123 ≈
σ∆y
σ∆y

Unlike Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) who fail to reject perfect transitory
insurance, the partial insurance parameter is significantly different from 0 at the 1% level
for all specifications except for entrepreneurs. Recall from tables (1.2) and (1.3) that entrepreneurs have the lowest risk-sharing coefficients. Furthermore from table (1.2), I show
that different groups have significant differences in risk-sharing coefficients. From table (1.8),
27

Full results are available upon request.
This is of course an approximation as the estimation of the partial parameters depend of the value of
ξ, and θ absent of the estimation of equation (1.3).
28
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Employees

Entrepreneurs

Market
participants

0.0683***
(0.0136)

0.0677***
(0.0107)

ψ
Trans. ins.

0.0142
(0.0196)

0.1974***
(0.0321)
0.0642***
(0.0182)

0.1643***
(0.0212)

0.3352***
(0.0323)
0.1197***
(0.0330)

0.2730***
(0.0252)

0.1481***
(0.0276)

φ
Perm. ins.

ψ
Trans. ins.

0.0291
(0.0468)

0.1905**
(0.0789)
0.1031**
(0.0451)

0.1716***
(0.0385)

Panel B. Diagonally weighted estimates - Real Data

0.2865***
(0.0152)

0.2586***
(0.0129)

φ
Perm. ins.

Panel A. Diagonally weighted estimates - Imputed Data

All
households

0.1986***
(0.0413)

0.3598***
(0.0535)

0.0423***
(0.0154)

0.3847***
(0.0291)

No
participation

0.1283*
(0.0696)

0.1703***
(0.0438)

0.0796***
(0.0232)

0.1475***
(0.0222)

Stock
owners

0.1667***
(0.0357)

0.2878***
(0.0345)

0.0552***
(0.0142)

0.3263***
(0.0217)

Non stock
owners

0.0542
(0.0511)

0.2509***
(0.0321)

0.0683***
(0.0175)

0.2080***
(0.0176)

No transfer
receipts

0.2142***
(0.0421)

0.3219***
(0.0629)

0.0767***
(0.0172)

0.3573***
(0.0401)

Transfer
recipients

0.1087***
(0.0380)

0.1325***
(0.0304)

0.0382***
(0.0136)

0.1625***
(0.0173)

High
Wealth

0.1915***
(0.0474)

0.3081***
(0.0448)

0.0602***
(0.0170)

0.3291***
(0.0238)

Low
Wealth

This table reports the results from the minimum distance estimation presented in section 1.4.4.The parameters are estimated
using equation (1.20) and the standard errors using equation (1.21). Only the variance of shocks and the variance of the
measurement errors are time-varying. I use the diagonal of the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the empirical
moments as the weighting matrix. Panel A uses the imputed consumption series while Panel B uses the PSID measured data.
I still include the term ui,t when estimating Panel B. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.

Table 1.8: Minimum Distance Partial Insurance Estimates

the differences appear to be caused by differences in permanent insurance. Indeed, the levels
of transitory insurance appears to be similar across groups (employees/entrepreneurs being
the exception). A similar relationship is found for direct participation where the permanent
insurance parameter of stockowners is 0.1475 vs 0.3263 for non stockonwers.
Transfer recipients’ transitory insurance parameter is 0.0683 versus 0.0767 for households who do not receive any transfer income, suggesting the difference in risk-sharing is
coming from differences in permanent insurance. However, the permanent insurance parameters are different across the two groups (0.2080 for households not receiving transfers vs
0.3573 for households who do). This would suggest that formal government transfers are
effective at providing consumption insurance for transitory shocks; less so for permanent
shocks. This is somewhat not surprising. Indeed a transitory shock such as a short period
of unemployment would be covered by unemployment insurance. However, unemployment
insurance would run out and not cover long-term unemployment, which I could characterize
as a permanent shock to income.
High wealth households have a lower permanent insurance parameter (0.1625 vs
0.3291) than low wealth households. The difference in transitory insurance is also more
pronounced for high and low wealth households with wealthy households being less sensitive to transitory shocks. These patterns are similar for entrepreneurs/employees and
participants/nonparticipating households. This casts some doubt on the precise nature and
channel of the observed differences. Indeed, entrepreneurs are more likely to have higher
wealth and/or participate. Similarly, high wealth individuals are more likely to participate
in the stock market. Unfortunately, data constraints make it impossible to disentangle the
precise effects29 .
In panel B of table (1.8), I only consider the sample period 2000 to 2016 and estimate
the partial insurance model using the actual consumption variables measured in the PSID.
The permanent insurance parameters are reasonably similar across groups (0.2586 vs 0.2730
for all households). However, I do obverse large differences in the transitory insurance parameter, more specifically an increase. I fail to find a significant transitory parameter for
nontransfer recipients in panel B, though the point estimate is similar to panel A. These results are, for the most part, consistent with the results of table (1.2) where the risk-sharing
coefficient went from 0.1123 to 0.1508. This could indicate two things. First, the autocovariance between income and consumption is smaller for imputed consumption than for
actual consumption, thus overstating the degree of transitory insurance. Second, transitory
29
Ideally, I could condition market participation or entrepreneurship on wealth level. This conditioning
results in very small groups rendering my estimates unstable.
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insurance has deteriorated in the second half of the sample period considered. The second
explanation seems more likely. Indeed, I have observed a slight increase in the risk-sharing
coefficient. I formally test change in insurance parameters in table (1.9).
Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) did not find a significant difference of insurance in their sample period. However, the sample period in question (1980-1992) is relatively
short and not particularly characterized by changes in macroeconomic conditions. My sample period is longer and is characterized by profound changes notably to financial markets.
I therefore test whether I can observe changes in households’ ability to smooth out consumption shocks. The empirical exercise is similar to Santaeulalia-Llopis and Zheng (2018).
They test whether Chinese households’ ability to insure permanent and transitory risk has
changed between the 1989-1997 and 1998-2009 periods. The periods are chosen as they are
characteristic of different economic environments marked by reform. The determination of a
“pre” and “post” period is not as clear in my sample period. I do not have exogenous shocks
that would help make a determination so I pick 1980-1996 as my preperiod and 1998-2016
as my postperiod. Although arbitrary, I have several reasons for choosing this breakpoint.
Firstly, it marks the first year where the wealth module is consistently administered and I am
not relying on an imperfect identification of market participants. If nothing else, it will make
participation and wealth estimation more robust. Secondly, it also marks the beginning of
the PSID biennial structure, thus making it a natural breakpoint. Finally, and perhaps more
importantly, these two periods appear to be characterized by different regimes of permanent
and transitory income shocks. I argue that if differences are to be found in the degree of
insurance, it is most likely to be around the chosen breakpoints.
In figure (1.8), I plot the estimates of V ar(ζ) and V ar(ε). I see that the variance
of transitory shocks is increasing from 1980 to 1996 when it then stabilizes for the 19982016 period. The variance of permanent shocks increases through the first period, then
sharply falls and stabilizes over the second period. Note that I estimate these parameters
while restricting the insurance parameters to be different in the pre and post period30 . The
variance of shocks are similar up to 1993 when they diverge.
I therefore estimate 2 transitory and 2 permanent insurance parameters. I report
the result in table 1.9 along with the p-value for a t-test of difference in parameters. I find
that households’ ability to insure against permanent shocks seems to have increased. φP re97
is equal to 0.2856 vs 0.2371 for the post period. This result is significant at the 5% level.
The point estimate of ψP ost97 is larger than the preperiod coefficient, though the difference
30
Similar patterns can be seen when estimating static insurance parameters, pre and post parameters, or
simply estimating the variances alone using only income moments
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Figure 1.8: Variance of permanent and transitory income shocks - All households

is statistically insignificant. The post period coefficients are different from the coefficients
estimated in table (1.8) panel. It is to be noted that table (1.8) is estimated only with 2000
to 2016 data. Thus, the time-invariant parameters (ξ and θ) are different. The impact of
past transitory shocks is likely to cause the observed differences. Although different point
estimates, the general patterns observed in panel B of table (1.8) and table (1.9) are similar.
Looking at subgroups, I find that market participants experienced a large increase
in their permanent insurance; 0.2340 vs 0.1312 with a p-value of 0.0151. nonparticipating
households pre-1997 φ parameter is 0.3856 and the post-1997 parameter is 0.3844. The
difference is not statistically significant. Both, however, have experienced a decrease in their
ability to smooth transitory shocks. The transitory parameters are statistically insignificant
prior to 1997 and close to 0 but highly significant afterwards and equal to 0.0880 and 0.0729
for participating and nonparticipating households respectively. In figure (1.9), I plot the
the variances of income shocks for participating and nonparticipating households. The yaxis for panels A and B have the same scale to make easy comparisons. The variance of
41
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0.3069***
(0.0207)
0.2722***
(0.0193)
0.1819
0.0500***
(0.0189)
0.0858***
(0.0194)

0.2856***
(0.0174)

0.2371***
(0.0166)

0.0298

0.0528***
(0.0151)

0.0794***
(0.0149)

0.2036

φpre97

φpost97

p-value test of equal φ

ψpre97

ψpost97

p-value test of equal ψ

0.1844

Employees

All
households

0.6975

0.0149
(0.0276)

0.0316
(0.0324)

0.2011

0.1234***
(0.0383)

0.1892***
(0.0370)

Entrepreneurs

0.0882

0.0880***
(0.0238)

0.0238
(0.0292)

0.0151

0.1312***
(0.0226)

0.2340***
(0.0377)

Market
participants

0.0783

0.0729***
(0.0222)

0.0197
(0.0208)

0.9789

0.3844***
(0.0409)

0.3856***
(0.0327)

No
participation

0.3616

0.0956***
(0.0343)

0.0527*
(0.0316)

0.0312

0.1166***
(0.0256)

0.2127***
(0.0374)

Stock
owners

0.0095

0.0884***
(0.0186)

0.0182
(0.0203)

0.0485

0.2992***
(0.0256)

0.3675***
(0.0294)

Non stock
owners

0.6650

0.0696**
(0.0274)

0.0541**
(0.0225)

0.0002

0.1606***
(0.0209)

0.2837***
(0.0277)

No transfer
receipts

0.5966

0.0847***
(0.0243)

0.0665***
(0.0242)

0.4659

0.3440***
(0.0476)

0.3948***
(0.0600)

Transfer
recipients

0.1328

0.0574***
(0.0191)

0.0174
(0.0190)

0.0011

0.1119***
(0.0203)

0.2079***
(0.0235)

High
Wealth

0.0127

0.1074***
(0.0237)

0.0232
(0.0242)

0.8862

0.3181***
(0.0321)

0.3237***
(0.0275)

Low
Wealth

This table reports the results from the minimum distance estimation presented in section 1.4.4.The parameters are estimated
using equation (1.20) and the standard errors using equation (1.21). The variance of shocks and the variance of the measurement
errors vary with each wave. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

Table 1.9: Minimum Distance Time Varying Partial Insurance Estimates

permanent shocks for both subgroups averages around 0.02. Furthermore, both groups have
increasing transitory shocks variances. However, nonparticipating households experience
larger transitory shocks. Once again, these results are in direct contradiction of Guvenen
(2007). Not only are market participants sharing risk more completely (through better
permanent insurance against permanent shocks), the gap is getting wider. Furthermore,
market participants are not exposed to larger income shocks.
Figure 1.9: Variance of permanent and transitory income shocks for participating and nonparticipating households
Panel A. Participating Households

Panel B. nonparticipating Households

High wealth households experience a significant increase in permanent insurance and
no significant change in transitory insurance. The opposite is true for low-wealth households
that experience no change in permanent insurance and a significant decrease in transitory
insurance. I fail to detect any change in the insurance environment of transfer recipients.
Both permanent and transitory tests have high p-values. Non transfer recipients have a
significantly lower permanent loading but no transitory insurance changes. Entrepreneurs
and employees are two subgroups that stand out in that neither experience any changes
to their ability to smooth shocks. Indeed, p-values for either group are extremely large.
Entrepreneurs are also the only group for which I fail to reject the null of full transitory
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insurance.
In figure (1.10), I plot the variances of permanent and transitory shocks for entrepreneurs and employees. I see that the variances of shocks for employees are smaller
and smoother. Relative to entrepreneurs, employees’ variance of transitory shocks is barely
increasing. However, entrepreneurs have a variance of permanent shocks twice as large as
employees in the early years of my sample and experience a dramatic decrease throughout
the sample. I can see that employees’ shocks are similar to that of the whole sample. This
is not surprising considering entrepreneurs make up a small proportion of my sample.
Figure 1.10: Variance of permanent and transitory income shocks for Entrepreneurs and
Employees
Panel A. Entrepreneurs

Panel B. Employees

To get a clearer picture of the trend in permanent and transitory insurance parameters, I let both parameters vary through time and plot the resulting parameters. To ease
computation, I group parameters with 2 to 3 years groups. While I failed to find a significant
difference in transitory insurance, figure (1.11) tells a different story. φ1980−1983 is not significantly different from 0 while the others are. I do see an increasing trend in the transitory
insurance parameters. However, the increase is gradual and thus not picked up by the test
around the 1997 breakpoint. There is also a large increase for φ2010−2016 . This is consistent
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with the financial crisis. This spike also explains why some groups have significant differences
in transitory insurance in table (1.9). From previous results in figure (1.7), I know that lowwealth households were more affected by the financial crisis explaining the deterioration of
transitory insurance. From figure (1.5), I know that both participating and nonparticipating
households were similarly affected by the financial crisis with different timing. The test in
table (1.9) would be unable to detect such differences.
Figure 1.11: Partial Insurance Parameters - All households

The trend in permanent insurance is however similar to table (1.9) results The parameters are on average 0.28 in the preperiod and 0.23 in the postperiod. There is a large drop
in permanent insurance in the 1994-1996 year group. This significant shift is likely caused
by a small spike in the variance of income. It is unlikely to have affected my results. Indeed,
if anything, it is pushing the pre-1997 average permanent insurance down thus reducing the
difference between the two period. Overall, I find a small improvement in permanent insurance and a more significant decline in transitory insurance. The combination of these two
trends are consistent with the trend observed in figure (1.3).
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As pointed out before, subgroups are not exclusive and the precise insurance mechanisms are difficult to highlight. To provide alternative explanations for my previous results,
I consider different measures of income. Specifically, I repeat the analysis of table (1.9) with
disposable income net of financial income, disposable income net of business income, and
disposable income net of transfer income. I do not have information on the specific contribution of income categories on a household’s tax liability, so I must assume that taxes paid
on subcategories of income are a linear function of total income. In other words I make the
following adjustments:

Yadjusted = (YT otal − YSubcategory ) − T axes ∗

YT otal − YSubcategory
YT otal



(1.23)

I then re-estimate ∆yi,t using each new income variable31 . Financial income is the
sum of income from dividends, interest, trust funds, and royalties. Removing this stream of
income allows me to see if the observed differences across participating and nonparticipating
households are indeed caused by financial income as a smoothing component. I recognize
the limitation of this proxy. It does include revenues streams that are available to nonmarket participants. However, dividend income, as a separate item, is not consistently
measured. Furthermore, the proportion of firms paying dividends has declined (Fama and
French, 2001). Thus the proportion income stemming from dividends must also be declining.
However imperfect, this measure is the best PSID has to offer for my test. Business income
is the sum of labor and asset income derived from unincorporated business or farm for all
household members. Removing business income from total family income allows me to test
whether the lower marginal propensity to consume out of permanent or transitory shocks
of market participants or high wealth individuals is caused by them being entrepreneurs.
Transfer income32 is also removed to investigate how formal government transfers contribute
to risk-sharing.
The effect of removing these components of income is not necessarily straightforward.
In the case of transfers, the variance of permanent and transitory shocks would increase
and the insurance parameters would decrease (i.e., appear better). This is because I am
artificially introducing shocks (removing buffers) but consumption still reflects the smoothing
benefits (Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston, 2008). Government transfers are designed to be
received when households experience shocks to their income. Business and financial income
are not. On one hand, if financial and business income are countercyclical to wage risk,
31

I require households to have at least $100 in Yadjusted
Note that I include social security income to the PSID transfer income variable (when not included) to
have a consistent measure throughout the sample
32
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then removing them would increase the variance of permanent and transitory shocks. The
insurance parameters would appear lower. On the other hand, if these streams of income
are sources of income risk, then the variance shocks would be lower than the baseline levels
of table (1.9). This lower variance would result in higher (i.e worst insurance parameters).
This is easy to see in my sample transmission framework where β = cov(∆c, ∆y)/σ∆y . A
lower σ∆y results in a higher β. In the partial insurance framework, I can easily show that
the parameters φ and ψ are:

ψ=
φ=

E[∆ct ∆yt ]
E[∆yt ∆yt+1 ]

E[∆ct (∆yt−1 + ∆yt + ∆yt+1 )]
E[∆yt (∆yt−1 + ∆yt + ∆yt+1 )]

where, E[∆yt ∆yt+1 ] and E[∆yt (∆yt−1 + ∆yt + ∆yt+1 )] are the respective variance
of transitory (σε2 ) and permanent shocks (σζ2 ). Thus, lower variances would also result in
larger insurance parameters. The results are presented in table (1.10). I first consider
nonfinancial income in panel A. In the first column, for all households, I find that the
permanent insurance parameters are higher than their baseline counterparts. The pre-1997
coefficient is .3094 (vs 0.2856) and the post-1997 coefficient is 0.2511 (vs 0.2371). Both are
statistically significant at the 1% level and their difference is statistically significant at the
5% level. The higher insurance parameters would imply lower variance of shocks. Financial
may increase households’ total income risk. The transitory insurance parameters for both
periods are also higher (0.0612 vs 0.0528 and 0.0833 vs 0.0794). While the parameters
are statistically significant, their difference is not. It must be noted that the differences in
point estimates between tables (1.9) and (1.10) are indeed small when estimating with the
whole sample. That is caused by the fact that financial income, on average, makes a small
proportion of households’ income. Thus, its removal was unlikely to cause a big change in
the estimation.
The main group of interest in panel A is participating households. I find that when
excluding financial income, φpre97 goes from 0.2340 to 0.3199. This would indicate that
financial income is a significant source of income risk for market participants. However,
φpost97 remains unchanged (0.1307 vs .1312). Furthermore, the transitory parameters are
also unchanged from table (1.9). This result indicates that financial income is a source of
permanent shocks for participating households and does not contribute to transitory income
risk. Furthermore, this particular source of risk does not have the same effect in the second
half of the sample. I have mentioned above the imperfect nature of this proxy. Consider
nonparticipating households. Their permanent parameters have also increased, albeit to
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Employees

0.2863***
(0.0204)
0.3404
0.0651***
(0.0194)
0.0878***
(0.0192)

0.2511***
(0.0175)

0.0141

0.0612***
(0.0152)

0.0833***
(0.0147)

0.2928

φpost97

p-value test of equal φ

ψpre97

ψpost97

p-value test of equal ψ

0.1066***
(0.0199)
0.7270
0.0310
(0.0272)
0.0481**
(0.0229)

0.2285***
(0.0169)

0.1912

0.0576***
(0.0150)

0.0695***
(0.0143)

0.5600

φpost97

p-value test of equal φ

ψpre97

ψpost97

p-value test of equal ψ

0.6161

0.1176***
(0.0263)

0.1166

0.0870***
(0.0232)

0.0296
(0.0276)

0.0001

0.1307***
(0.0227)

0.3199***
(0.0453)

Market
participants

0.2006***
(0.0152)

0.9137

0.0140
(0.0277)

0.0186
(0.0311)

0.0909

0.1348***
(0.0363)

0.2306***
(0.0455)

Entrepreneurs

φpre97

Panel B. Disposable Non-Business Income

0.4050

0.3122***
(0.0212)

0.3094***
(0.0188)

φpre97

Panel A. Disposable nonfinancial Income

All
households

0.0211

0.0807***
(0.0221)

0.0123
(0.0198)

0.4203

0.3729***
(0.0414)

0.3361***
(0.0317)

0.0772

0.0749***
(0.0214)

0.0226
(0.0208)

0.8700

0.4114***
(0.0443)

0.4194***
(0.0351)

No
participation

0.2247

0.0267
(0.0310)

0.0754***
(0.0287)

0.4163

0.1155***
(0.0231)

0.0887***
(0.0256)

0.5530

0.0806**
(0.0324)

0.0540*
(0.0299)

0.0021

0.1363***
(0.0276)

0.2930***
(0.0445)

Stock
owners

0.0101

0.0838***
(0.0177)

0.0168
(0.0195)

0.8375

0.3020***
(0.0274)

0.3092***
(0.0281)

0.0207

0.0845***
(0.0183)

0.0226
(0.0203)

0.0315

0.3202***
(0.0271)

0.3991***
(0.0318)

Non stock
owners

0.3762

0.0256
(0.0264)

0.0568**
(0.0228)

0.5574

0.1371***
(0.0186)

0.1525***
(0.0196)

0.4777

0.0648**
(0.0271)

0.0394*
(0.0228)

0.0000

0.1724***
(0.0215)

0.3365***
(0.0301)

No transfer
receipts

0.9903

0.0623***
(0.0237)

0.0627***
(0.0228)

0.4227

0.3792***
(0.0515)

0.3259***
(0.0513)

0.9696

0.0854***
(0.0241)

0.0840***
(0.0261)

0.4806

0.3565***
(0.0494)

0.3101***
(0.0512)

Transfer
recipients

0.8206

0.0340*
(0.0190)

0.0281
(0.0191)

0.2124

0.0740***
(0.0178)

0.1028***
(0.0164)

0.1332

0.0618***
(0.0191)

0.0205
(0.0198)

0.0001

0.1183***
(0.0210)

0.2392***
(0.0244)

High
Wealth

0.0167

0.1114***
(0.0236)

0.0334
(0.0227)

0.6537

0.3174***
(0.0329)

0.2992***
(0.0296)

0.0162

0.1077***
(0.0238)

0.0262
(0.0242)

0.9824

0.3246***
(0.0325)

0.3237***
(0.0281)

Low
Wealth

This table reports the results from the minimum distance estimation presented in section 1.4.4.The parameters are estimated
using equation (1.20) and the standard errors using equation (1.21). The variance of shocks and the variance of the measurement
errors vary with each wave. Financial income is measured as the sum of income from dividends, interest, trust funds, and
royalties. Business income is measured as the sum of business and labor income for non-incorporated business and farms.
Transfer income is the sum of all transfer categories plus social security income. Refer to the PSID codebook for more detail.
All household members’ income are taken into account. I assume that each subcategory of income contributes equally to the
overall tax liability of the household. I require households to have more than $100 in the income category to be included in the
estimation. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

Table 1.10: Partial Insurance Estimates Net of Financial, Business, or Transfer Income

a lesser degree than it did for participating households. This indicates that this source of
income is not strictly coming from financial markets, although it seems to affect participating
households to a stronger degree.
Financial income being a significant source of risk is a puzzling result. Consider
high wealth households. The pattern found is similar to that of market participants with
a smaller change. Indeed, while the permanent insurance parameter prior to 1997 does
increase relative to table (1.9), its change is small (0.2392 vs 0.2079). This is consistent
with financial innovation improving households’ ability to share risk. Process innovation,
mainly the creation of ETFs, allows for cheaper diversification. As Guvenen (2007) points
out, under-diversification is a significant source of risk. However, wealthy households would
have the means to diversify more completely by having access to reserved financial products.
The introduction of ETFs allows for households of modest financial means to fully diversify
and reduce their exposure to market risk.
I also find that that financial income has a moderate to no impact on employees,
entrepreneurs, low wealth households, transfer recipients and nontransfer recipients. These
results indicate that entrepreneurs higher consumption smoothing abilities are not caused
by financial income. The lack of impact of financial income on the transfer groups is simply
caused by the fact that nonfinancial income would be small even in the nontransfer group.
I then consider business income in panel B of table (1.10). Note that employees
and entrepreneurs are not estimated in this panel. Employees, by construction, receive no
business income, so the results are identical to the baseline estimation of table (1.9). Entrepreneurs are not estimated simply because I cannot. As opposed to market participants
whose portion of income derived from financial assets is relatively small, entrepreneurs derived most of their income from their business. Thus removing this income stream results in
a large portion of the sample dropping out. The resulting sample (households who receive a
small portion of income from business) is too small to estimate. Nonetheless, the patterns
emerging from panel B are very interesting.
In the whole sample, I find that the pre-1997 φ parameter is lower than the baseline
point estimate (0.2006 vs .2856). The post-1997 parameter is relatively similar. The difference is no longer significant implying no change in households’ ability to insure against
permanent shocks. Removing business income from the estimation has no impact on transitory insurance. These results indicate that the improvement documented in table (1.9) is
caused (in part) by business income. Subgroups are not all equally affected by removing
business income. The parameters for permanent insurance for participating and high wealth
households are the most impacted in Panel B. The post 1997 parameters are lower, although
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less so than the preperiod parameters. This would indicates that a large portion of consumption insurance observed in these groups is in fact caused by households in these groups
receiving business income. Households that do not participate or do receive transfer have
small changes, suggesting that business income is not a significant source of consumption
insurance. Similarly to financial income, I find the results on transitory insurance to be similar to their baseline level suggesting that business income is not used to smooth transitory
variation in income shocks anymore than other sources of income.
In panel C, households that do and do not receive transfers are excluded from the
estimation. Non-recipient, by construction, are unaffected. The recipient sample is too small
to estimate. In the first column of panel C, I find point estimates for permanent insurance
to be smaller than the baseline parameters for both periods. Indeed, φpre97 is 0.2087 vs
0.2856 and φpost97 is 0.1475 vs 0.2371. Furthermore, while the difference in parameters was
significant at the 5% in the baseline estimation, it is now significant at the 0.1%. Formal
government transfer income is a significant source of permanent insurance and is now more
effective than in the past. These patterns are extended to employees, nonparticipating, and
low-wealth households. Market participants and entrepreneurs also have lower permanent
insurance parameters, although to a lesser degree. This indicates that while these groups do
receive government transfers, transfers represent a lower proportion of their total income.
High wealth households also have lower permanent insurance parameters, especially φpost97 .
This result is surprising. This could indicate that wealthy households do in fact receive
enough transfers to increase their ability to smooth out shocks. Alternatively, it could
indicate that households above median levels of wealth still are not particularly wealthy and
require government assistance33 . I also do find the same level of differences for transitory
parameters. This is also surprising as I would think that government transfers are an excellent
source of transitory insurance. One potential explanation can be found in Commault (2020).
She argues that constraining the idiosyncratic consumption process to be a random walk
creates a downward bias on transitory insurance thus overstating the marginal propensity
of households to consume out of transitory shocks. The question remains in the data: what
type of income source is generating transitory insurance?

33
Although I would like to test high/low wealth with more restrictive separation, I am constrained by the
data.
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Employees

0.1532***
(0.0121)
0.0007
0.0644***
(0.0174)
0.1050***
(0.0204)

0.1475***
(0.0110)

0.0004

0.0678***
(0.0141)

0.0953***
(0.0157)

0.1893

φpost97

p-value test of equal φ

ψpre97

ψpost97

p-value test of equal ψ

0.8985

0.0214
(0.0273)

0.0269
(0.0308)

0.0252

0.0886***
(0.0283)

0.1792***
(0.0304)

Entrepreneurs

0.0405

0.0767***
(0.0232)

0.0000
(0.0289)

0.0004

0.0833***
(0.0133)

0.1931***
(0.0290)

Market
participants

0.1513***
(0.0121)
0.0016
0.0585***
(0.0175)
0.1089***
(0.0200)

0.1259***
(0.0100)

0.0588

0.0700***
(0.0146)

0.1001***
(0.0164)

0.1636

φpost97

p-value test of equal φ

ψpre97

ψpost97

p-value test of equal ψ

0.0554

0.2105***
(0.0154)

0.1545***
(0.0121)

φpre97

0.4616

0.0543**
(0.0233)

0.0270
(0.0286)

0.3411

0.0695***
(0.0131)

0.0945***
(0.0231)

Panel D. Disposable nonfinancial, nontransfer, and non-business Income

0.1275

0.2184***
(0.0158)

0.2087***
(0.0142)

φpre97

Panel C. Disposable nontransfer Income

All
households

0.0555

0.1252***
(0.0268)

0.0631***
(0.0194)

0.5678

0.1725***
(0.0203)

0.1877***
(0.0194)

0.3428

0.1019***
(0.0234)

0.0738***
(0.0188)

0.8088

0.2108***
(0.0236)

0.2035***
(0.0219)

No
participation

0.7124

0.0383
(0.0298)

0.0527**
(0.0257)

0.5642

0.0615***
(0.0155)

0.0777***
(0.0241)

0.1275

0.0779***
(0.0293)

0.0132
(0.0293)

0.0005

0.0715***
(0.0181)

0.1940***
(0.0310)

Stock
owners

0.0093

0.1238***
(0.0212)

0.0522***
(0.0189)

0.0123

0.1417***
(0.0143)

0.1982***
(0.0190)

0.0210

0.1258***
(0.0205)

0.0631***
(0.0189)

0.0237

0.1609***
(0.0156)

0.2155***
(0.0202)

Non stock
owners

0.6602

0.0439
(0.0272)

0.0280
(0.0239)

0.0804

0.1331***
(0.0182)

0.1799***
(0.0206)

No transfer
receipts

Transfer
recipients

0.4850

0.0522***
(0.0202)

0.0712***
(0.0183)

0.1019

0.0441***
(0.0109)

0.0720***
(0.0132)

0.3292

0.0510***
(0.0196)

0.0259
(0.0165)

0.0000

0.0645***
(0.0117)

0.1799***
(0.0202)

High
Wealth

Table 1.11: Partial Insurance Estimates Net of Financial, Business, or Transfer Income (Continued)

0.0642

0.1203***
(0.0271)

0.0532**
(0.0243)

0.6795

0.2074***
(0.0216)

0.1958***
(0.0206)

0.0224

0.1219***
(0.0269)

0.0398*
(0.0240)

0.5572

0.2002***
(0.0202)

0.2159***
(0.0208)

Low
Wealth

In panel D of table (1.11), I repeat the analysis by removing the effect of financial,
business, and transfer income. Entrepreneurs are transfer recipients are excluded from this
analysis. In the whole sample, I find that the permanent insurance parameters are lower
than their baseline levels (0.1545 vs 0.2856 for the pre-1997 coefficients and 0.1259 vs 0.2371
for the post-1997 coefficients). The difference is significant at the 10% suggesting a moderate
improvement in households’ ability to insurance against permanent shocks.
The transitory parameters are slightly higher than their baseline levels (0.0700 vs
0.0528 for the pre-1997 period and 0.1001 vs 0.0794 for the post-1997 period). While both
parameters are significant at the 1% level, their difference is statistically insignificant. These
results indicate that the alternative streams of income are both a source of permanent consumption insurance and a source of transitory risk. The observed for employees is similar.
I find that the permanent insurance parameters are lower and the transitory insurance parameters are higher than their respective baseline levels. The test of differences of transitory
insurance reveals that the marginal propensity to consume out of transitory shocks has increased (at the 5% level). In the previous 3 tests, I fail to detect a significant difference.
This could indicate that separately, each income stream did not generate significant changes
to the variance of transitory risk. Taken together, they do add significant transitory risk
in the post-1997 period. In the case of market participants, I find that neither permanent
nor transitory insurance has changed from the pre-1997 to the post-1997 period. while I
found significant permanent insurance improvements and significant transitory insurance
deterioration. The lack of difference may indicate that the income streams play opposite
roles.
To get a clearer picture of the contribution of each income category to consumption
insurance, I repeat the analysis and allow insurance parameters to vary across groups of years.
I plot the results alongside the baseline results (figure 1.11) in figure (1.12). The top panel
plots the permanent insurance parameters φt ; the bottom panel plots the transitory insurance
parameters ψt . nonfinancial income is above the baseline result. The two are close, suggesting
that financial income is neither used for consumption smoothing or a significant source of risk.
This is not surprising. Indeed, financial income is small (or zero) for most households in the
sample. Non-business income is below the baseline results until 1996. In the second half of the
sample, non-business income is similar to the total income and nonfinancial income baseline
levels. nontransfer income is consistently below the baseline level, although relatively close
for the 1994-2002 period. The wage income line is approximately the sum of all deviations
from the baseline level. It shows that, on average, nonwage income generates significant
consumption insurance (mainly in the form of government transfers). Furthermore, I can see
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Figure 1.12: Partial Insurance Parameters for Different Income Streams - All households

that the decrease in permanent insurance is caused by an increase in risk caused by financial
and business income. In the bottom panel, I see that the trends in nonbusiness, nonfinancial,
nontransfer, and wage income are relatively similar. There is no noticeable pattern in terms
of movement or magnitude. The deterioration of transitory insurance observed in figure
(1.11) is robust to measurement of the income variable.
In figure (1.13), I plot the same series for participating households only. I see that
separate sources of income are an important smoothing mechanism for market participants.
Indeed, permanent insurance parameters of wage income are consistently lower than baseline
levels. In the first year group (1980-1984), φt is 0 indicating full permanent insurance. As
the permanent insurance baseline trends downward, the permanent trend of nonfinancial,
business, and transfer income trends upward. As similar trend is observed for non-business
income. Non-business income appears to be a significant determinant of the marginal propensity to consume out of permanent shocks. Its importance seems to be decreasing throughout
the sample. Nonfinancial income tracks the baseline level almost perfectly. It could be easy
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to assume that financial income represents a proportion of households’ income too small to
have an effect. However, I do observe stronger differences in transitory insurance relative to
nonfinancial income. However, it appears that the major source of transitory insurance is
business income.
Figure 1.13: Partial Insurance Parameters for Different Income Streams - Market Participants

As a final robustness check, I reestimate idiosyncratic income and consumption shocks
by restricting the set of demographics variables detailed in section (1.4.1). I consider 4
sets of variables to exclude and their year-dummy interaction terms. First, I exclude the
employment status of the reference person. As pointed out by Commault (2020), adding
the employment status could (at least in part) capture the effect of unexpected job loss
(or hiring). By adding the variable, I may be implicitly reducing the variance of shocks.
Furthermore, the annual nature of the data makes it impossible to distinguish between
being unemployed or losing one’s job which would illicit different consumption responses. I
then exclude the dummy variables for the presence of extra income earners and whether the
spouse earns income. Blundell, Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten (2016) shows that female labor
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supply is an important determinant of consumption insurance. However, it is possible that
the inclusion of the two dummy variables partially captures shocks to household’s income
stemming for income earners other than the reference person. The third exclusion is the
region of residence. A change in residence might reflect a shift in preferences. However, it
could also reflect changes in job status, tax situation, and standards of living, all of which
could be construed as permanent shocks. Finally, I also exclude the households’ marital
status. Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) required all households to be continuously
married. I do not. Thus, controlling for whether the reference person is single, married,
or divorced might capture changes that would induce permanent shocks to income and
consumption. The results are presented in table (1.12).
In panel A, I find that removing the employment status of the reference person has a
limited impact on the permanent insurance parameters. In the whole sample, the parameters
net of employment dummies are 0.2782 and 0.2119 vs their baseline levels of 0.2856 and
0.2371. The one exception is transfer recipients. The pre-1997 parameter is 0.3083 in table
(1.12) vs 0.3948 in table (1.9). This may indicate that the inclusion of this variable captures
unexpected shocks to employment and understates risk-sharing in table (1.9). However,
these concerns cannot be alleviated given the data constraints. Removing the employment
dummy has a significant impact on transitory insurance. Across the board, ψ pre and post
1997 are consistently insignificant (with the exception of market participants and transfer
recipients) and in most cases actually 0 (that is, the point estimate is too small for me to
precisely measure). At face value, this could indicate that transitory insurance is complete.
However, this would contradict the literature that uses natural experiments to estimate the
marginal propensity to consume transitory income shocks (Fagereng, Holm, and Natvik,
2019). Their estimate is not only significant but also higher than ours. The notion that
transitory income shocks are fully insured is therefore unlikely. It is, however likely that the
employment dummy variable does capture some shocks to income and these shocks are of a
transitory nature.
The general trends observed in table (1.9) are consistent with results in table (1.12).
Indeed, entrepreneurs appear to share permanent and transitory income risk more than
employees; market participants smooth shocks more completely as well. The difference in
parameters are however not significant. The small changes in the point estimate are most
likely caused by measurement of shocks instead of the dummy variable on extra income
earners wrongly capturing shocks. Similar patterns are found in panel C, and D. The result
do show that the estimation is robust to small variation in the set of controls used in the
estimation of the deterministic component of income and consumption. In figure (1.14), I plot
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Employees

0.2388***
(0.0171)
0.0576
0.0000
(0.0200)
0.0069
(0.0219)

0.2119***
(0.0149)

0.0019

0.0000
(0.0153)

0.0153
(0.0158)

0.4862

φpost97

p-value test of equal φ

ψpre97

ψpost97

p-value test of equal ψ

0.2807***
(0.0195)
0.3997
0.0507**
(0.0202)
0.0871***
(0.0189)

0.2493***
(0.0168)

0.6604

0.0489***
(0.0156)

0.0814***
(0.0144)

0.1216

φpost97

p-value test of equal φ

ψpre97

ψpost97

p-value test of equal ψ

0.1825

0.2596***
(0.0189)

0.2590***
(0.0170)

φpre97

Panel B. Net of Extra Income Earners

0.8149

0.2856***
(0.0198)

0.2782***
(0.0171)

φpre97

Panel A. Net of Employment Shocks

All
households

0.9615

0.0210
(0.0264)

0.0230
(0.0307)

0.3375

0.1364***
(0.0448)

0.1932***
(0.0402)

0.5256

0.0189
(0.0291)

0.0449
(0.0293)

0.1116

0.1137***
(0.0338)

0.1936***
(0.0397)

Entrepreneurs

0.3961

0.0737***
(0.0237)

0.0415
(0.0302)

0.2758

0.1337***
(0.0220)

0.1773***
(0.0350)

0.2848

0.0519**
(0.0258)

0.0097
(0.0293)

0.0083

0.1276***
(0.0207)

0.2337***
(0.0364)

Market
participants

0.0949

0.0790***
(0.0220)

0.0274
(0.0221)

0.0935

0.4058***
(0.0407)

0.3313***
(0.0292)

0.9658

0.0014
(0.0248)

0.0000
(0.0235)

0.3417

0.3289***
(0.0345)

0.2896***
(0.0279)

No
participation

0.8900

0.0925***
(0.0320)

0.0988***
(0.0335)

0.7348

0.1141***
(0.0255)

0.1283***
(0.0334)

0.6422

0.0559
(0.0344)

0.0343
(0.0316)

0.0342

0.1275***
(0.0270)

0.2204***
(0.0373)

Stock
owners

0.0053

0.0928***
(0.0181)

0.0166
(0.0211)

0.6462

0.3188***
(0.0260)

0.3345***
(0.0275)

0.9710

0.0011
(0.0204)

0.0000
(0.0224)

0.5591

0.2747***
(0.0229)

0.2940***
(0.0275)

Non stock
owners

0.5499

0.0704***
(0.0271)

0.0485**
(0.0244)

0.0250

0.1618***
(0.0195)

0.2286***
(0.0240)

0.5693

0.0554*
(0.0289)

0.0342
(0.0231)

0.0000

0.1529***
(0.0205)

0.2909***
(0.0279)

No transfer
receipts

0.4150

0.0948***
(0.0232)

0.0654**
(0.0275)

0.2555

0.3397***
(0.0473)

0.2731***
(0.0407)

0.3034

0.0426
(0.0296)

0.0000
(0.0285)

0.1925

0.2428***
(0.0355)

0.3083***
(0.0416)

Transfer
recipients

0.1489

0.0598***
(0.0182)

0.0228
(0.0186)

0.0028

0.1098***
(0.0211)

0.2005***
(0.0237)

0.2306

0.0329
(0.0203)

0.0000
(0.0192)

0.0021

0.1123***
(0.0182)

0.1961***
(0.0220)

High
Wealth

0.0150

0.1028***
(0.0240)

0.0196
(0.0245)

0.2924

0.3384***
(0.0329)

0.2977***
(0.0271)

1.0000

0.0000
(0.0267)

0.0000
(0.0278)

0.2060

0.3125***
(0.0305)

0.2654***
(0.0258)

Low
Wealth

This table reports the results from the minimum distance estimation presented in section 1.4.4.The parameters are estimated
using equation (1.20) and the standard errors using equation (1.21). The variance of shocks and the variance of the measurement
errors vary with each wave. I estimate ∆ci,t and ∆yi,t by excluding some of variables described in section (1.4.2) and their yeardummy interaction. In panel A, I remove the employment status of the reference person. In panel B, I remove dummy variables
for extra income earners and whether the spouse earns income. In panel C, I remove the region of residence dummy variables.
In panel D, I remove the marital status indicator. I use the diagonally weighted minimum distance estimator. *, **, and ***
denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

Table 1.12: Partial Insurance Estimates - Variation in the set of demographics variables
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Employees

0.3534
0.0555***
(0.0194)
0.0870***
(0.0195)

0.0534

0.0528***
(0.0150)

0.0758***
(0.0148)

0.2702

p-value test of equal φ

ψpre97

ψpost97

p-value test of equal ψ

0.2951***
(0.0202)
0.0512
0.0831***
(0.0184)
0.1176***
(0.0187)

0.2630***
(0.0174)

0.0248

0.0847***
(0.0150)

0.1019***
(0.0145)

0.4058

φpost97

p-value test of equal φ

ψpre97

ψpost97

p-value test of equal ψ

0.1912

0.3484***
(0.0219)

0.3149***
(0.0180)

φpre97

Panel D. Net of Marital Status

0.2702***
(0.0195)

0.2440***
(0.0170)

φpost97

0.2514

0.2943***
(0.0203)

0.2877***
(0.0176)

φpre97

Panel C. Net of Geographic Shocks

All
households

0.2863

0.0019
(0.0280)

0.0471
(0.0315)

0.1013

0.1293***
(0.0365)

0.2134***
(0.0381)

0.7178

0.0088
(0.0274)

0.0240
(0.0323)

0.4443

0.1406***
(0.0419)

0.1813***
(0.0366)

Entrepreneurs

0.0730

0.1038***
(0.0246)

0.0350
(0.0285)

0.0005

0.1241***
(0.0213)

0.2796***
(0.0408)

0.0423

0.0857***
(0.0236)

0.0108
(0.0284)

0.0033

0.1298***
(0.0228)

0.2564***
(0.0385)

Market
participants

0.1771

0.0979***
(0.0221)

0.0566***
(0.0212)

0.6805

0.4105***
(0.0417)

0.3914***
(0.0330)

0.0364

0.0836***
(0.0219)

0.0208
(0.0208)

0.9412

0.3873***
(0.0421)

0.3908***
(0.0325)

No
participation

0.2948

0.1057***
(0.0322)

0.0596**
(0.0294)

0.0021

0.1148***
(0.0282)

0.2671***
(0.0419)

0.1578

0.0948***
(0.0336)

0.0314
(0.0306)

0.0045

0.1120***
(0.0258)

0.2427***
(0.0393)

Stock
owners

0.0141

0.1140***
(0.0183)

0.0467**
(0.0208)

0.0650

0.3310***
(0.0274)

0.3971***
(0.0300)

0.0074

0.0895***
(0.0182)

0.0184
(0.0200)

0.0526

0.3165***
(0.0271)

0.3868***
(0.0303)

Non stock
owners

0.7641

0.0947***
(0.0281)

0.0837***
(0.0233)

0.0002

0.1805***
(0.0216)

0.3005***
(0.0265)

0.6374

0.0715**
(0.0285)

0.0539**
(0.0235)

0.0004

0.1555***
(0.0206)

0.2693***
(0.0264)

No transfer
receipts

0.8718

0.1067***
(0.0235)

0.1009***
(0.0263)

0.9500

0.3615***
(0.0489)

0.3574***
(0.0515)

0.7685

0.0786***
(0.0239)

0.0682***
(0.0253)

0.5290

0.3357***
(0.0442)

0.3769***
(0.0555)

Transfer
recipients

Table 1.13: Partial Insurance Estimates - Variation in the Demographics Set (Continued)

0.1947

0.0616***
(0.0187)

0.0281
(0.0183)

0.0040

0.1198***
(0.0215)

0.2075***
(0.0237)

0.1251

0.0564***
(0.0189)

0.0163
(0.0186)

0.0011

0.1120***
(0.0204)

0.2097***
(0.0237)

High
Wealth

0.0040

0.1449***
(0.0245)

0.0437*
(0.0251)

0.6187

0.3123***
(0.0302)

0.3312***
(0.0278)

0.0087

0.1176***
(0.0246)

0.0263
(0.0247)

0.9669

0.3072***
(0.0304)

0.3088***
(0.0268)

Low
Wealth

Figure 1.14: Partial Insurance Parameters Net of Demographic Characteristics

the time-varying insurance parameters for all households. These parameters are estimated
with shocks net of demographics variables. In the top panel, I see that the exclusion of the
various demographic components has a limited impact of permanent insurance parameters.
Furthermore, except for employment status, the other variables seem to have a limited impact
on ψt as well. Overall, the baseline results appear to be robust.
1.5

Conclusion

Financial innovation should improve risk-sharing. Indeed, the incentives for financial
innovation rely on insuring more states of nature. However, Simsek (2013a) and Simsek
(2013b), or Buss and Uppal (2017) argues that in the event of disagreement, speculation
could overtake the risk-sharing benefits thus reducing welfare. While the literature agrees
that markets are incomplete and households cannot fully insure their idiosyncratic risk, it
has yet to document how risk-sharing evolves through time. This gap in the literature is
all the more important considering the recent financial product innovation (Huang, O’Hara,
and Zhong, 2021; Iachan, Nenov, and Simsek, 2021) or process innovation (Turley, 2012).
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Using PSID data and an imputation methodology from Attanasio and Pistaferri
(2014), I create a panel of idiosyncratic consumption and income. I also use the identification
technique by Guvenen (2007) to identify financial market participants. By extension, I am
also able to identify households in the bottom and top of the wealth distribution. I also
identify entrepreneurs (as opposed to employees), and transfer recipients as further sources
of household heterogeneity.
I use two separate testing framework. First, I use a simple transmission model where
risk-sharing is the extent to which idiosyncratic consumption is affected by idiosyncratic
income. The results are in line with the literature. I find that a fair portion of income shocks
are insured and I reject full insurance. However, trends in risk-sharing show that households’
ability to smooth shocks has decreased or at the very least remained constant. I also find that
participating households smooth shocks more completely than nonparticipating households
in direct contradiction of results by Guvenen (2007). However, given data constraints, I am
unable to differentiate between households in a precise way. Thus, the observed differences
between participating and nonparticipating households may be caused by other household
characteristics: mainly wealth and entrepreneurial status.
I then turn to a more complete income and consumption process. I use the process and
minimum distance estimator in Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) to decompose risksharing into its permanent and transitory component. I find that the variance of transitory
shocks has increased while the variance of permanent shocks has decreased. Consistent with
the literature, I find that transitory shocks are transmitted to a lesser degree than permanent
shocks.
I test whether the transmission parameters have shifted over time. I find that permanent insurance has increased or at the very least remained constant. Market participants,
wealth households, and entrepreneurs are not only better insured than their counterparts
(non participating, low wealth, and employees respectively) but have seen their consumption
insurance increase. Transitory insurance has in some cases deteriorated though for most
subgroups has remained constant. I test whether the estimate are robust to different income
specifications. While trends are relatively similar to baseline results across groups, I do
find that business and transfer income are stronger sources of both permanent and transitory insurance than financial income. The baseline results are also robust to changes in the
estimation of shocks.
Overall, I find the impact of financial innovation on risk-sharing to be empirically
underwhelming. Indeed, the development of financial markets over the sample period is
undeniable. Furthermore, the traditional view is clear on the supposed effect of financial
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innovation on risk-sharing. The traditional view may thus need to be revisited. While I do
not find downward trends in risk-sharing, I do find significant heterogeneity in households’
ability to smooth out shocks. These sources of heterogeneity are likely to have welfare and
portfolio choice consequences, two questions I leave for further research.
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Chapter 2

RISK-SHARING, HOUSEHOLD WELFARE AND SUBJECTIVE
WELL-BEING

Abstract
I investigate the welfare and life satisfaction consequences of incomplete markets in a subset
of US households. I use a set of parameters describing households’ economic environments
in terms of income growth, income risk, and transmission risk. I find that changes in risksharing have significant implications for household welfare. Cross-sectional differences in risksharing environment result in significantly different welfare criteria. I then use IV-regressions
to separate the impact of permanent and transitory income and consumption shocks on life
satisfaction. As suggested by consumption insurance theory, I find that transitory shocks
have no effect on life satisfaction while permanent shocks do. This result suggest that risksharing environments have important consequences for households’ well-being as well as a
significant degree of insurance despite incomplete markets.
JEL classification: D12, D52, E21, I31, P36
Keywords: Idiosyncratic Risk, Welfare, Life Satisfaction
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2.1

Introduction

What are the welfare effects of incomplete markets? What are the well-being effects
of incomplete markets? A large body of economic literature is dedicated to quantifying the
degree of market completeness by measuring the transmission of income shocks to consumption shocks (Cochrane, 1991; Krueger and Perri, 2006; Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston,
2008; Kaplan and Violante, 2010; Gervais and Klein, 2010; Commault, 2020). Estimates
differ, the consensus appears to show that although incomplete, there exists a significant degree of consumption insurance. Furthermore, using Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008)
framework, Casado (2011), Kubota (2020), and Santaeulalia-Llopis and Zheng (2018) show
that permanent shocks are less insured than transitory shocks.
Another strand of literature investigates the welfare implications of idiosyncratic income risk. Floden and Linde (2001) and Floden (2001) show that idiosyncratic income risk is
a significant driver of household welfare. Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2008) echo
these results by showing that eliminating wage risk would improve household welfare to a
larger extent than eliminating business cycle risk. However, Karahan and Ozkan (2013) find
different welfare benefits for agents with different risk profiles. De Nardi, Fella, and PazPardo (2020) augments the traditional transitory/permanent income process with nonlinear
dynamics and show that welfare changes significantly depend on income process specifications.
In this paper, I investigate the welfare differences in US households from a consumption insurance perspective. First, I compare welfare estimates across time for groups of
representative households. Second, I compare welfare estimates across groups, and groups
and time. The first exercise is motivated by recent developments in the literature by Simsek
(2013a) and Simsek (2013b). In these papers, he argues that financial innovation’s impact on
risk-sharing benefits depends on the degree of price agreement between market participants.
His results go against the traditional view of financial innovation which suggests improving
market completeness and providing consumption insurance is the main driver of financial innovation (Cochrane, 2009, p. 56). Despite the undeniable development of financial markets
in the past 40 years (Iachan, Nenov, and Simsek, 2021; Huang, O’Hara, and Zhong, 2021),
Duvernois (2021) does not find significant improvements in the degree of consumption insurance since 19801 . However, he does find that the variance of transitory shocks is significantly
larger than the variance of permanent shocks post 1996. Furthermore, he finds that different
groups of households share risk differently and experience different income shocks.
I use Duvernois (2021)’s minimum distance parameters and the welfare framework
1

He uses the minimum distance estimator by Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008)
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from Santaeulalia-Llopis and Zheng (2018). In this framework, I define welfare as the annual
consumption equivalent change from a baseline estimation. Welfare is defined to be a function
of income growth, income risk, and transmission risk. I successively replace parameters with
counterfactual parameters which can be taken from the same group in a different period or
in the same period from a different group of households. I use the Panel Survey of Income
Dynamics (PSID) to estimate households’ income growth rate, saving rate, and risk aversion.
I find that the changes in economic environment between 1980-1996 and 1996-2016
have significant welfare implications. The slowdown in income growth dominates the welfare
calculations. However, households experience an overall lower risk and lower transmission
which generates significant welfare gains. With high levels of risk aversion2 , the welfare
benefits can be larger than the welfare costs of slower income growth. Furthermore, I find
that the differences in economic environment between types of households can generate
large welfare benefits. Indeed, I find that entrepreneurs, market participants, nontransfer
recipients, and wealthy households3 have significantly larger annual equivalent consumption
than their counterparts.
This paper also makes a contribution to the literature on subjective well-being. Bayer
and Juessen (2015) show that idiosyncratic income shocks have a significant impact on
households’ life satisfaction. I use the recently added life satisfaction question4 to investigate
whether income and consumption shocks have an impact on US household life satisfaction.
I find that total and permanent income shocks have a statistically significant impact while
transitory shocks do not. Furthermore, as suggested by Brown and Gathergood (2017),
consumption shocks have a stronger effect on life satisfaction. Transitory consumption shocks
do not consistent with the idea that transitory income shocks are fully insured. Risk-sharing
does have significant implications for household welfare and well-being.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 will connect this paper to
the related literature. Section 2.3 will present the main welfare framework. Section 2.4 will
present the data. Section 2.5 will present the welfare results while section 2.6 will present
the subjective well-being results. Section 2.7 will conclude.
2.2

Literature Review

Whether idiosyncratic income risk are insured and persistent is debated in the literature (Guvenen, 2007b; Guvenen, 2009). Whether idiosyncratic income risk matter for
household welfare is also debated in the literature. Floden (2001) shows that there are
2

implied from PSID 1996 risk attitude questionnaire.
relative to employees, non-participants, transfer recipients, and low wealth households
4
added to the PSID in 2009
3
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significant welfare effects due to the levels and changes in idiosyncratic uncertainty. They
consider an economy where agents are impacted by different idiosyncratic wage shocks and
whose ability to smooth shocks differ. Risk-sharing can be improved with public debt by
way of increased liquidity. They find that increased risk-sharing improves welfare by achieving better consumption/leisure allocation. This result goes against Aiyagari and McGrattan
(1998) who argue that welfare gains from more complete markets are negligible.
Karahan and Ozkan (2013) show that the persistence and size of shocks is not consistent over households’ life cycle. The variance of permanent shocks is U-shaped with age.
They find that assuming flat profiles understates welfare gains as younger households enjoy
a higher degree of consumption insurance. However, De Nardi, Fella, and Paz-Pardo (2020)
allows for richer, non-linear dynamics of income processes (suggested by Arellano, Blundell,
and Bonhomme, 2017) and calibrate a model which implies earnings risk generating lower
welfare costs than the traditionally used income processes.
Chetty and Looney (2006) further question the assumptions that as consumption is
relatively smooth, changes in risk-sharing have little welfare consequences. They argue that
consumption may be smooth because welfare consequences of fluctuating consumption are
in fact quite high. Indeed, they show that marginal welfare gains of a dollar of insurance
depends on the size of consumption shocks5 as well as how much households value a smoother
consumption path6 . Floden and Linde (2001) find significant difference in idiosyncratic wage
risk between the United States and Sweden. Furthermore, Duvernois (2021) finds significant
differences in idiosyncratic income risk and transmission risk across American households.
Buera and Shin (2011) use a generalized Bewley model (as defined by Ljungqvist and
Sargent, 2018) to show that welfare costs of missing consumption insurance and incomplete
markets depend on the degree of shock persistence and the relative impact of the opposing
effects. The literature on incomplete-market heterogeneous models tend to focus on the
consumption side in which welfare costs increase in the persistence of shocks. Buera and
Shin (2011) show that on the production side, welfare costs decrease in the persistence of
shocks due to improved self-financing for entrepreneurs.
Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2008) investigate the welfare impact of three
characterization of incomplete markets. They show that eliminating idiosyncratic risk generates welfare gains twice as large as welfare gains from eliminating business cycle risk. De
Santis (2007) focuses on consumption risk instead of income risk. However, they look at the
welfare impact of aggregate risk. They find that removing aggregate risk, thus producing a
5
6

How much smoother consumption now is.
i.e the relative risk aversion coefficient
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smoother consumption path, has significant welfare consequences. Heathcote, Storesletten,
and Violante (2008) also point out that removing risk yields lower welfare improvement than
insuring risk as the former also removes opportunities for labor productivity. As such, the
investigation of welfare and risk-sharing is opportune.
The literature above tends to measure welfare as costs as a ratio of two utility measures (one without insurance and one with insurance). Another strand of the literature investigates whether macroeconomic conditions or microevents impact households’ subjective
well-being. Subjective well-being is being increasingly substituted for welfare in economic
and policy research (Nikolova and Graham, 2020). Economists have augmented their studies
with happiness data to study a wide array of issues. Kimball and Willis (2006) make a clear
distinction between utility and happiness whereas utility is the extent to which individuals
acquire what they desire as evidenced by choices. Happiness is how individuals feel at a
given moment. Although different, Kimball and Willis (2006) argue that both are distinct
yet valid empirical candidates of welfare measures.
See A. E. Clark (2018) or Frey and Stutzer (2002) for an excellent review of the literature on the economics of happiness. For the purpose of this study, let’s focus on income
risk and happiness. Deaton (2008) finds that income is related to well-being. However, Kahneman and Deaton (2010) show that income effects on well-being are smaller in comparison
to other life events. Indeed, A. E. Clark and Oswald (1996), Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), and
Caporale et al. (2009) find that happiness depends upon a comparison level of income rather
that just income itself. Nonetheless, Frijters, Haisken-DeNew, and Shields (2004) show that
East-Germans’ life satisfaction levels converged to those of West-Germans along with the
increase in real household income brought by the reunification7 .
A. E. Clark and Oswald (1994) find that unemployment has strong effects on British
households’ self-reported life satisfaction. The effect is stronger than the effect of divorce or
marital separation. Furthermore, they find that the short-term unemployed (households that
just lost their job) are more affected than long-term unemployed households. L. Winkelmann
and R. Winkelmann (1995) use West-Germany panel data and similarly find that unemployment has strong negative effect on life satisfaction. Additionally, they find that income
support program has a small effect on the unemployed happiness. This would suggest that
income shocks are not the main cause of disutility. A. E. Clark (2003) show that the effect of
unemployment on life satisfaction is heavily influenced by a reference group unemployment;
that is heavily influenced by social norms. A. Clark, Georgellis, and Sanfey (2001) further
7
Although the West and East Germany reunification may have had non-income related impacts on
happiness such as higher personal liberties or increased savings as pointed out by Fuchs-Schundeln (2008).
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show that individuals that experience a large happiness shock upon entering unemployment
are less likely to remain unemployed for longer than one year.
Headey and Wooden (2004) show that wealth has a complementary effect to income
in increasing households’ life satisfaction. One explanation as to why can be found in Bayer
and Juessen (2015). They investigate the impact of idiosyncratic income shocks on German
households’ happiness levels. They find that income shocks have a significant impact on
happiness. Decomposing the income process into permanent and transitory components,
they show that only permanent income shocks have a significant effect on happiness shocks.
Some have argued that the low impact of income on satisfaction is caused by a
satiation around $75,000 Deaton, 2008. Stevenson and Wolfers (2013) and Lien, Hu, and Liu
(2017) challenge the satiation hypothesis and find no evidence of a satiation point. Around
this debate, Brown and Gathergood (2017) argue that consumption should matter more
than income for life satisfaction. After all, utility is measured as a function of consumption.
They find that consumption does indeed matter more for life satisfaction in US households.
Furthermore, they find that conspicuous consumption8 has a stronger impact alluding to
similar social effects documented by A. E. Clark (2003). Consumption levels do not appear
to have any level of satiation.
Brown and Gathergood (2017) and Bayer and Juessen (2015)’s result make interesting contributions to another area of the literature: consumption insurance. Indeed, if
consumption idiosyncratic income shocks matters for life satisfaction, there must be some
degree of transmission of income shocks to consumption. Although the literature does not
agree on a precise quantity of transmission, there is clear evidence of incomplete markets.
Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) develop a partial insurance framework to measure
the transmission of permanent and transitory income shocks to consumption. They find
that permanent shocks are less insurable than transitory shocks. This model has become
the workhorse of the consumption insurance literature and has been used to a variety of national household panels. Kubota (2020) applies the partial insurance framework to Japanese
data and finds that transitory shocks are almost fully insured despite increasing over time.
On the other hand, permanent shocks are insured by half and remain constant throughout
the sample period. Casado (2011) uses the Spanish Household Budget Continuous Survey
and find similar results. He also finds that home-owners, high-wealth households, and college educated households have higher degree of permanent insurance. Santaeulalia-Llopis
and Zheng (2018) use a longitudinal panel dataset of Chinese households. They find that
Chinese households experienced a decline in permanent insurance combined with increased
8

which can be easily observed by other households
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levels of income risk accompanying the rapid economic growth during the past 30 years.
Furthermore, they show that the welfare effects of growth can be as large as the welfare
effects of risk and insurance. Santaeulalia-Llopis and Zheng (2018) further use the partial
insurance parameters to estimate a welfare framework similar to the one presented by Floden
and Linde (2001). The following section presents that framework.
2.3

Welfare Framework

The main question I ask is: what are the welfare costs of changes in household income
risk and risk-sharing abilities. Furthermore, what are the welfare costs of heterogeneity in
risk and transmission? Indeed, Duvernois (2021) find significant changes in the income risk
environment and in their ability to smooth out these shocks for different households. The
welfare framework is adapted from Santaeulalia-Llopis and Zheng (2018); further details can
be found in their paper and the online appendix.
Consider a representative household income and consumption. The income and consumption process of the representative agent can be described as the sum of a deterministic
component and a stochastic component. Let us start by describing the income process. Although, the change in lifetime consumption is the main measure of welfare as is typical in the
literature (Chetty and Looney, 2006; Floden, 2001; Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante,
2008), most of the parameters are derived from the income process. Let y¯t be the deterministic component of income, yt be the stochastic component of income and Yt be total household
income9 . Empirically, I use disposable income, as opposed to labor income, as the main measure of Yt since it reflects what households can use for consumption (Catherine, Sodini, and
Zhang, 2020). The deterministic component of income is not of particular interest in my
framework. Instead, the focus is on the stochastic component yt as it generates the income
risk parameters. To match the consumption insurance literature (Blundell, Pistaferri, and
Preston, 2008; Santaeulalia-Llopis and Zheng, 2018), I model the stochastic component as
the sum of a permanent and transitory component, where the permanent component is a
martingale process with serially uncorrelated innovations (ζt ), and the transitory process is
an MA(0) process with serially uncorrelated innovations (εt ). Insofar as the deterministic
component is predictable, income shocks are changes in the unpredictable component:

∆yt = ζt + εt

(2.1)

Similarly, the consumption process combines deterministic and stochastic compo9

Although, I do not include the individual dimension of these components, it is understood that different
agents have different processes.
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nents. I assume the deterministic consumption growth rate γc to be determined by the
interest rate (r), the discount rate (δ), and the agent’s risk aversion (η):
(2.2)

γc = (δ(1 + r))1/η

The initial level of consumption is a function the household’s income at t = 0 and the
saving rate s. The deterministic consumption path is solved assuming no uncertainty given
the deterministic income growth rate γy . The risk component will reside in the stochastic
component of income. I can therefore write:
"P
c¯t = (1 − s)y0

T
(γy /(1 + r))t
PtT
t
t (γc /(1 + r))

#
(2.3)

The deterministic consumption growth rate γc is common to all households. The
parameters generating difference are s, y0 , and η. To simplify the notation, I write c¯t as
c0 (γy ). Differences in welfare are thus generated by changes in the saving rate, initial income
level, deterministic income growth rate, and risk aversion.
The stochastic component of consumption is modeled to reflect uncertainty. I adopt
the process in (Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston, 2008) and used by Duvernois (2021):
∆ct = φt ζt + ψt εt + ξt

(2.4)

Note that I take the change in stochastic consumption as the innovations in the
permanent and transitory components reflect the shocks. φ and ψ in equation (2.4) what
Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) refer to as partial insurance parameters. They reflect
the share of the income shock variance that gets transmitted to consumption. φ quantifies the
transmission of permanent shocks while ψ quantifies the transmission of transitory shocks.
ξ measures consumption shocks that are unrelated to income shocks and can be understood
as a shift in preference.
ζ and ε respectively represent permanent and transitory income shocks. In the welfare
representation, risk is the main concept. I define permanent and transitory income risk as
the cross-sectional variance of ζ and ψ written as σζ and σε . To identify these parameters,
Duvernois (2021)10 rely on the minimum distance estimator developed by Blundell, Pistaferri,
and Preston (2008).
10

More detail is provided in the data section of this paper
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Having described the income and consumption process of the representative household, I now turn to the welfare framework adopted from Santaeulalia-Llopis and Zheng
(2018). Consider a representative household with time-separable constant-relative-risk-aversion
(CRRA) utility function. Let δ be the discount factor and η the risk-aversion coefficient.
This representative agent’s ex-ante welfare can be written as:
E

∞
X

∞
X

t

δ u(Ct ) = E

t=0

t=0

δt

Ct1−η
1−η

(2.5)

Welfare, in this case, is quantified as the lifetime utility of consumption for the representative agent. The welfare can be characterized by the income growth rate γy , the total
income risk σ = (σζ , σε ), and the degree of transmission Φ = (φ, ψ). While I suppress
the time dimension of the parameters for space, the parameters in the welfare environment
can be time varying. Furthermore, I suppress the cross-sectional dimension; the parameters
can however be different for agents being representative of different groups of households.
Indeed, as shown by Santaeulalia-Llopis and Zheng (2018), urban and rural households in
China are characterized by different income, risk, and transmission environment. I can write
the household utility with the following notation:
E

∞
X

t

δ u(Ct ) ≡ E

∞
X

δ t u(Ct ; γy , σ, Φ)

(2.6)

t=0

t=0

Following Santaeulalia-Llopis and Zheng (2018)11 and the definition of the consumption path, the expected sum of discounted utility can be written as:
E

∞
X

t

δ u(Ct ) = E

t=0

E

∞
X
t=0

∞
X

δ t u(c¯t · ct )

t=0



T
(c¯0 γy )1−η 1−η X 1−η t
1
2
2
2 2
2 2
δ u(Ct ) =
c
(γ δ) exp (1 + η) (φ σζ + ψ σε + σξ )t
1 − η 0 t=1 c
2
t

(2.7)

Equations (2.6) and (2.7) are identical, the notation is simply more tractable and
illustrative of the following exercise. The expected total welfare can be written to reflect the
representative agent’s current state of nature. The current state of nature i is characterized
by an income growth rate (γyi ), income risk (σ i ), and insurance (Φi ). There also exists
another state of nature j characterized by different parameters: (γyj , σ j , Φj ). The expected
lifetime consumption for the representative agent in environment i will be different from the
11

Full derivations are found in their internet appendix.
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expected lifetime consumption for the representative agent in environment j. I can write the
difference in total welfare as 1 + ωT in the following equation:
E

T
X

t

δ u((1 +

ωT )Ct ; γyi , σ i , Φi )

t=1

=E

T
X

δ t u(Ct ; γyj , σ j , Φj )

(2.8)

t=1

(1 + ωT ) in equation (2.8) measures the total percentage change in lifetime equivalent
consumption from switching from environment i to environment j. In other words, I ask:
what would have been the welfare equivalent of a representative household i if their environment was characterized by j. Note that the welfare change is calculated for T periods
while the subscript T in ω represents the total change. The total change can be decomposed
into a growth, risk, and insurance effect. Indeed, from equation (2.8), it is easy to see that
each parameter in the ith environment can be individually replaced by the j th environment
parameter. The growth effect, noted as 1 + ωG is the percentage change in consumption
equivalent for switching from (γyi , σ i , Φi ) to (γyj , σ i , Φi ). I can re-write equation (2.7) to
reflect the change in environment and the growth effect:
T

T

(c¯0 i )1−η X 1−η t
(c¯0 j )1−η X 1−η t
(1 + ωG )
E
(δγc ) (ci,t )1−η =
E
(δγc ) (ci,t )1−η
1−η
1
−
η
t=1
t=1

(2.9)

Note that ci,t is on both sides of equation (2.9). That is the stochastic component of
the consumption path and only depends on the risk and transmission parameters. Thus, the
growth effect simplifies to:
 j 1−η
c¯0
1−η
(2.10)
(1 + ωG )
=
c¯0 i
In equation (2.3), c̄ is shown to depend on initial (at t = 0) levels of income, the
income growth rate, and the saving rate. This means that the growth effect from changing
to environment j also reflects a change in the representative saving rating. SantaeulaliaLlopis and Zheng (2018) use an average saving rate between the beginning and end of their
sample period. However, in the United States, the personal saving rate has been steadily
declining. Figure (2.1) shows that personal saving rate12 went from 11% in 1980 to under
7.5% in 2016. Furthermore, Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2004) find differences in saving
behavior across groups, mainly focusing on income and wealth groups. Similarly, Juster et
al. (2006) find a decline in the saving rate caused by capital gains, thus affecting households
based on their participation status. It is easy to see from equation (2.3) that a higher saving
12

The Bureau of Economic Analysis defines the personal saving rate as the ratio of personal saving to
personal disposable income.
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rate will lower deterministic consumption path, ceteris paribus. The saving rate plays a role
in a household’s ability to insure so the insurance effect will also be affected by changes in
the saving rate. However, the effect of the saving rate on the partial insurance parameters
cannot be accounted for in this framework. Time-series and cross-sectional differences in
savings play a role which I will account for in the growth effect.
Figure 2.1: Personal Saving Rate

The risk effect can be understood as the percentage change in lifetime consumption
equivalent of a representative agent in environment i caused by them experiencing the risk
environment j. In other words, the incremental change from (γyj , σ j , Φi ) to (γyj , σ j , Φi ). From
equation (2.7) and (2.9), I write the risk effect (1 + ωR ) as:


T
1
(c¯0 j )1−η 1−η X 1−η t
2 2
2
2
2 2
(1 + ωR )
c
(δγc ) exp (1 + η) (φi σζ,j + ψi σε,j + σξ )t
1 − η 0 t=1
2


T
(c¯0 j )1−η 1−η X 1−η t
1
2
2
2 2
2 2
=
(2.11)
c
(δγc ) exp (1 + η) (φi σζ,i + ψi σε,i + σξ )t
1 − η 0 t=1
2
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Note that σξ2 does not have an i or j subscript. σξ2 is the variance of consumption
shocks not caused by income shocks13 . It is therefore not attributable to risk or insurance
effects. In that regards, it is similar to risk aversion. It may nonetheless cause changes
in equivalent consumption. Indeed, there may be cross-sectional differences across environments. In practice, risk-aversion and preference shifts are different across groups. While
differences in risk preferences are likely to cause differences, the variances of preference shifts
are too small to cause significant changes in lifetime consumption equivalents. Solving for
the risk effect in equation (2.11):


PT
1
2
2 2
2 2
2
1−η t
) exp 2 (1 + η) (φi σζ,j + ψi σε,j + σξ )t
t=1 (δγc
1−η


(2.12)
(1 + ωR )
=
PT
1−η t
1
2 2
2
2 2
2
) exp 2 (1 + η) (φi σζ,i + ψi σε,i + σξ )t
t=1 (δγc
The insurance effect is similar to the risk effect. It is the welfare change caused by
switching from environment i to j and experiencing the transmission parameters of representative household j. It is written as:


PT
1
1−η t
2
2 2
2
2 2
) exp 2 (1 + η) (φj σζ,j + ψj σε,j + σξ )t
t=1 (δγc
1−η


(1 + ωI )
=
(2.13)
PT
1−η t
1
2 2
2 2
2
2
) exp 2 (1 + η) (φi σζ,j + ψi σε,j + σξ )t
t=1 (δγc
The total welfare effect is described in simple notation in equation (2.8). SantaeulaliaLlopis and Zheng (2018) show that it want be written in the following form:


PT
1
2
t
2
1−η
2
2
2
2
 j 1−η t=1 (δγc ) exp 2 (1 + η) (φj σζ,j + ψj σε,j + σξ )t
c¯0
1−η


(1 + ωT )
=
(2.14)
PT
c¯0 i
1−η t
1
2 2
2 2
2
2
) exp 2 (1 + η) (φi σζ,i + ψi σε,i + σξ )t
t=1 (δγc
which simplifies to:
(1 + ωT )1−η = (1 + ωG )1−η (1 + ωR )1−η (1 + ωI )1−η

(2.15)

The advantages of this decomposition are twofold. Firstly, it allows for a differentiation of the risk and insurance effect. Indeed, Krueger and Perri (2006) argue that an
exogenous increase in income risk incentivizes households to increase their insurance ability.
The net welfare changes thus depend on the size of the income shock variance and the share
13

Note that it is not a measurement error, simply a preference shift. Measurement error is captured by
ui,t in the minimum distance estimator. See Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) for details.
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that gets transmitted to consumption. Furthermore, Iachan, Nenov, and Simsek (2021) find
that while participation has increased (indicating an increase in financial innovation which
increases risk-sharing as predicted by theory14 ), the variance of households’ portfolio returns
has also increased (thus generating higher risks for households). The net welfare changes
may be ambiguous in this case. This framework allows for a clear separation of the two
effect as well as a total effect to quantify the net welfare gains or losses. Secondly, the framework is flexible and allows for multitudes of environment definitions. The framework allows
for a decomposition of welfare effects for the same representative agent across time, or for
representative agents of different groups in the same period.
2.4

Data

The data used come from the longitudinal survey, the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID has been surveying households since 1968. The panel dimension
of the PSID makes it unique in the US. Indeed, it tracks the original 5,000 households as
well as households formed by their descendants. The PSID reports various household characteristics, food spending, and income. In 1999, the PSID was redesigned and now includes
broader measures of consumption. This allows researchers to investigate more complex and
robust relationships between households’ consumption and income. Furthermore, a measure
of consumption can be imputed backward using methodology developed by Attanasio and
Pistaferri (2014) and Fisher and Johnson (2020).
The income risk and transmission parameters are gathered from Duvernois (2021). I
provide a cursory description of their data and estimation process here; a detailed description
can be found in their sections (3) and (4.3). The data in the calculations of certain parameters
are also from Duvernois (2021) to precisely match the sample selection. I define a household
by following the reference person through each wave. I drop the household-wave observation
for households experiencing a major family composition change as defined by a change to the
reference person or spouse. I assign these households a new unique identifier in the following
wave, thus becoming a separate household. All households are required to be present for at
least 4 consecutive waves. I restrict the reference person to be between 25 and 65 years old.
Households that received positive business income are considered as entrepreneurs.
Business income is comprised of labor and asset income for non-incorporated business or
farms. Transfer recipients are households that receive positive transfer income (including
social security income; I also include other family members in the calculation of transfer
income). Market participants are households that hold stocks directly or indirectly through
14

Simsek (2013a) and Simsek (2013b)
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IRAs. To identify stockholders in each wave, I follow Guvenen (2007a). High wealth household are household with above median total wealth15 .
The main measure of income is total family disposable income. Total family income
is defined as the sum of wage, business, financial16 , and transfer income for all individual
in the households17 . I use NBER Taxsim and guidelines from Feenberg and Coutts (1993)
and Kimberlin, Kim, and Shaefer (2014) to estimate household taxes for the 1992 wave
onward and use the PSID variable for federal taxes for the prior waves. Household income,
consumption, and wealth are deflated to 1980 dollars. Table 1 panel A presents summary
statistics for the average disposable income in the sample.
I calculate the average income for all households in sample as well as each subgroup.
Furthermore, I calculate the average income at three points in time, 1980, 1996, and 2016.
1980 and 2016 are the first and last waves in the sample. Duvernois (2021) tests whether
insurance parameters are different around 1996. Although arbitrary, 1996 does appear to
be a natural break point in the data and is represented by different risk and transmission
environment. I then calculate the average yearly growth rate of disposable income for each
subgroup, for each subsample, and over the entire sample period. The income growth rates
are calculated as:


log(Yt /Yt−1 )
(2.16)
γy = exp
Tt − Tt−1
Equation (2.16) is used to calculate the deterministic consumption path in equation
(2.3). The average disposable income in the overall sample is $26,900. The average annual
growth rate over the entire sample period is 1.19%. However, the growth rate is concentrated
on the first portion of the sample. Indeed, the average annual growth rate over 1980 to 1996
is 1.66%. The average income level was $34,993 and grew to $41,199 to 2016, implying
a growth rate of only 0.82%. Income grew at a much slower pace in the second portion
of the sample. This pattern is seen across almost all subgroups. Entrepreneurs have an
income growth rate of 1.60% over the 1980-1996 sample period versus 1.17% for the 19962016 period. Non-entrepreneurs have a similar growth rate in the pre-1996 sample period
(1.54%) but have a smaller growth rate in the post period relative to their counterparts. Not
only do nonentrepreneurs have lower growth rates, their disposable income levels are also
lower. Indeed, the average entrepreneur has disposable income of $34,427 vs $25,761 in 1980
and $56,020 vs $38,912 in 2016 for the average employed household. Households that do
not receive transfers have unsurprisingly higher levels of disposable income. Over the entire
15

These households are identified using a similar framework used to identify stockholders.
Financial income is defined as the sum of income from dividends, interest, trust funds, and royalties
17
This includes the reference person, spouse, and other family members.
16
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Table 2.1: Parameters used in the welfare decomposition
This table reports the parameters used in the welfare decomposition presented in section
(2.3). The parameters represent the average (per group and time period) which I take to
be the parameters describing the representative household. Y is the representative household
disposable income level in 1982 dollars. Disposable income is the sum of labor, business,
transfer, social security, and financial income minus federal taxes. γ Y is the growth rate of
income as described in equation (1.16). The saving rate for all households is retrieved from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The saving rate per group is defined as the group’s median
saving rate calculated as the change in wealth over the average income during the same period.
η is implied by the households’ responses to the 1996 risk attitudes question. See section (2.4)
and Hryshko, Luengo-Prado, and Sørensen (2011) for discussion. Participating households
have at least 1$ directly or indirectly invested in the stock market, entrepreneurs receive at
least 1$ in business income, transfer recipients receive at least 1$ in transfer income, wealthy
households are above the median level of total wealth.
All
Households
Y1980
Y1996
Y2016

Participation ?
Yes
No

Panel A. Household Parameters
26900
35520
34993
48018
41199
55001

Entrepreneur?
Yes
No

Transfer Receipts?
Yes
No

Wealthy?
Yes
No

21955
24850
31919

34427
44381
56020

25761
32918
38912

22861
33234
34005

29164
36301
45090

29710
40919
47593

16315
22635
25556

1.36%
1.60%
1.17%

1.25%
2.07%
0.61%

Y
γ1980−2016
Y
γ1980−1996
Y
γ1996−2016

1.19%
1.66%
0.82%

1.22%
1.90%
0.68%

1.04%
0.78%
1.26%

1.15% 1.11%
1.54% 2.37%
0.84% 0.11%

1.22%
1.38%
1.09%

1.32%
2.02%
0.76%

Saving Rate1980−2016
Saving Rate1980−1996
Saving Rate1996−2016

7.39%
9.12%
5.82%

9.70%
15.66%
8.81%

1.96% 11.84% 3.94% 2.79%
1.93% 15.64% 4.88% 3.88%
1.98% 10.43% 3.70% 2.62%

5.69%
6.86%
5.31%

11.10% -1.45%
12.48% -0.72%
10.70% -1.61%

Risk Aversion: η

11.71

10.47

12.74

10.95

11.88

11.76

11.68

12.26

11.47

Panel B. Partial Insurance Parameters
φ1980−2016
0.285
0.190
0.404
ψ1980−2016
0.070
0.064
0.053

0.208
0.015

0.297
0.079

0.337
0.084

0.249
0.055

0.196
0.035

0.334
0.066

φ1980−1996
φ1996−2016

0.320
0.251

0.318
0.125

0.408
0.408

0.221
0.137

0.309
0.288

0.308
0.347

0.330
0.177

0.245
0.114

0.331
0.324

ψ1980−1996
ψ1996−2016

0.057
0.082

0.009
0.102

0.030
0.081

0.028
0.013

0.074
0.083

0.086
0.086

0.040
0.067

0.017
0.058

0.034
0.106

Panel C. Average Permanent and Transitory Income Shocks
2
σζ,1980−2016
0.022
0.017
0.020
0.030
0.021
2
σε,1980−2016
0.032
0.025
0.041
0.054
0.026

0.021
0.053

0.018
0.021

0.018
0.028

0.024
0.035

2
σζ,1980−1996
2
σζ,1996−2016

0.025
0.017

0.016
0.018

0.024
0.014

0.036
0.025

0.024
0.016

0.025
0.017

0.019
0.016

0.020
0.015

0.029
0.018

2
σε,1980−1996
2
σε,1996−2016

0.029
0.035

0.021
0.032

0.038
0.046

0.046
0.062

0.024
0.029

0.051
0.056

0.019
0.022

0.024
0.034

0.032
0.039
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sample period, the income growth rates are relatively similar (1.11% for transfer recipients
vs 1.22%). nontransfer recipients have a larger growth rate of income in the pre-period than
in the postperiod. Transfer recipients have an income growth rate in the postperiod virtually
equal to 0. Indeed, transfer recipients’ income grew 2.37% annually on average between 1980
and 1996 but grew an average 0.11% between 1996 and 2016. Households above and below
the median level of wealth have similar rates of income overall and the subsamples. However
(and unsurprisingly), wealthier households have much larger levels of disposable income.
The average household above the median have a disposable income of $29,710 in 1980 while
households below the median have a disposable income of $25,556 in 2016. Households
that do not participate are the only households that do not fit the general pattern of table
(2.1). Indeed, participating households have a higher income growth rate prior to 1996.
nonparticipating households, however, enjoy a faster rate of income growth between 1996
and 2016 than they did between 1980 and 2016 (1.26% vs 0.78%). Santaeulalia-Llopis and
Zheng (2018) empirical framework is similar in that their sample period roughly match ours.
However, their sample of Chinese households experienced an acceleration of income growth
rates in the second period thus generating significant growth effect. The effect is likely to be
reversed in my sample considering the observed slow down.
Panel A also presents the personal saving rate. In this particular empirical exercise, I
need the personal saving rate for all households as well as the saving rate for each subgroup.
For the overall sample, I use the personal saving rate calculated by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis18 . This measure is more robust to data errors than the saving rate I could infer from
PSID. I take the average saving rate over the entire sample period and over each subsample.
Similarly to the income growth rate, the saving rate has been declining. The average rate is
7.39% over the entire sample period but is 9.12% in the 1980-1996 and 5.28% in the 19962016 subperiods. These patterns are consistent with Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2004) and
Juster et al. (2006) who also document declines in the saving rate in their sample period.
Calculating the saving rate in PSID can be tricky. Santaeulalia-Llopis and Zheng (2018) use
the same saving rate in all period and for all groups. While this would certainly be easier,
it would discount the heterogeneity observed across households.
There are several issues with estimating the saving rate. As pointed out by Dynan,
Skinner, and Zeldes (2004), there are several ways to define savings but each presents a
unique set of advantages and drawbacks. Savings can be defined to include all forms of
savings such as the realized and unrealized capital gains on financial assets, businesses, nonhousing and housing real estate. Another definition would exclude capital gains from income
18

See figure (2.1).
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and look at the difference between income and consumption. This is referred to as active
savings. However, capital gains are uncertain and should not be reflected in the deterministic
consumption path. An empirical issue also arises from using active savings. A measure of
active savings exists in the PSID for the 1989 and 1994 waves. However, the required
variables are not consistently available. Thus the measure of saving rate would be reflective
of the situation between 1984 and 1994 and not reflect the decrease in savings observed in
other time-series of saving rate. A simple definition of saving would be the difference between
income and consumption. However, this definition requires an unbiased measure of income.
Biases introduced by transitory income may be reflected in the saving rate across groups.
A good proxy for permanent income is difficult to find and use in the above definition. To
mitigate these problems, I calculate the personal saving rate as the change in wealth divided
the average income multiplied by n, n being the number of years between the two wealth
points. The average income is a proxy of permanent income (Catherine, Sodini, and Zhang,
2020). Indeed, prior to 1999, the wealth module is administered in the 1984, 1989, and 1994
waves. Thus I measure the change in wealth between 5 years intervals; the average income
will reflect permanent income. After 1999, wealth data is available at each wave, but the
survey is biennial making n = 2. I calculate the median saving rate per group to mitigate
the effect of large changes in wealth and potential biases in income.
The subgroup saving rates are in line with the saving rate measure from the BEA.
Indeed, for most groups, I find the saving rate to be lower in the second subsample. Market
participants have a saving rate of 15.66% prior to 1996 and 8.81% after 1996. Entrepreneurs
and wealth households have similar patterns. Non participants and non-entrepreneurs have
much lower saving rates relative to their group counterparts and do not experience a large
change between the two time samples. Households below the median level of wealth have a
negative saving rate indicating a negative change in wealth.
Finally, the last parameter to calculate is η, the risk aversion coefficient. SantaeulaliaLlopis and Zheng (2018) use η = 2 and η = 4 in their welfare decomposition. However, these
values are somewhat arbitrary and may not reflect the true risk aversion of the average representative household. Furthermore, applying a single risk aversion to all types of households
may not be truly representative. Households with lower risk aversion may select themselves
into groups characterized by higher income risk profiles. Estimating risk aversion at the
household level is extremely challenging mainly due to lack of data. However, in 1996, the
PSID included a series of questions designed to reveal households’ preferences and attitude
towards risk. If the reference person had been employed in 1995, households were asked
a series of 6 questions presenting a hypothetical gamble. The gambles offered different in82

come prospects designed to measure the reference person’s willingness to accept risk. All
hypotheticals have the same structure. The status quo (i.e., refusing the gamble) is a job
guaranteeing lifetime income equal to the household’s current total income. The alternative
(ie. taking the gamble) is a job doubling the current income level with a 50% probability or
cutting income by a 1 − λ fraction.
1 − λ is equal to 33.33% in the first gamble. On one hand, if the reference person
refuses, they are asked another hypothetical with 1 − λ = 20%. If the reference person
accepts, no other hypotheticals are presented; if they refuse, they are asked whether they
would accept the job with 1 − λ = 10%. On the other hand, if the reference person accepts
the initial gamble, they are presented with another gamble with a higher λ fraction. If the
reference person accepts the initial gamble, they are asked whether they would take the
job with 1 − λ = 50%19 . If they accept, they are presented with a final hypothetical with
1 − λ = 75%. Accepting the gamble simply means the following is true for the reference
person: 12 U (2c) + 21 U (λ)c ≥ U (C).
There are therefore 6 categories of households characterized by different levels of risk
aversion. On the two extreme sides of the spectrum, households that accept all gambles
are the least risk averse, and households that refuse all gambles are the most risk averse.
Hryshko, Luengo-Prado, and Sørensen (2011) use CRRA utily and methodology by Barsky
et al. (1997) to bracket each groups risk aversion parameters and calculate their respective
conditional means. From least to most risk averse, the relative risk aversion coefficients are
0.18, 0.63, 1.46, 2.83, 5.44, and 33.9. These coefficients are assigned to households based on
the 1996 responses. I then take the average by group, and assign each group the same risk
aversion for each wave.
The average risk aversion (as implied by Hryshko, Luengo-Prado, and Sørensen, 2011)
is 11.71. This coefficient is higher than the values used in Santaeulalia-Llopis and Zheng
(2018). However, in the overall sample, a more accurate measure of risk aversion is less
meaningful. Indeed, a higher η parameter simply amplifies the risk and insurance effects.
Granted, a more accurate risk aversion will result in a more accurate percentage change
in expected lifetime utility. Picking a reasonably low and high coefficients would serve to
bracket the true change and would be just as meaningful. Furthermore, in the overall sample,
I simply investigate the sub-period effects and the coefficient of risk aversion is static. Indeed,
while I can calculate the average risk aversion coefficient in 1980 or 2016 by carrying backward
and forward the 1996 coefficient, this would be problematic for two reasons. First, it would
require a significant number of households to be present at either point. Second, it would
19

If they refuse, no further questions are asked.
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require the risk aversion to remain constant. Hryshko, Luengo-Prado, and Sørensen (2010)
show that older households are more risk-averse than younger households indicating that a
change over the life-cycle. Furthermore, households that are present both in 1980 and 1996
are likely to be the 1996 older households; similarly, households present in 1996 and 2016 are
likely to be the 1996 younger households. Thus, by construction, the average risk aversion
will be higher in the pre-period and lower in the postperiod but may not reflect changes in the
true risk-aversion parameter. I, on the other hand, argue that the demographic composition
and risk aversion level are unlikely to vary through time for homogeneous groups.
In table 2.1, I find that participating households are less risk averse than their counterparts (10.47 vs 12.74). Entrepreneurs are also less risk averse than employees (10.95 vs
11.88). Whether households receive transfer income or not does not seem to play a role
on risk aversion. Finally, wealthy individuals are more risk averse than households below
median levels of wealth. Although surprising at first glance, wealthy individuals tend to be
older. Overall, there are cross-sectional differences in risk aversion that will potentially affect
the welfare decomposition. Panel B presents the partial insurance parameters estimated by
Duvernois (2021) for several measures of income. These parameters are estimated using a
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and moments implied by the variances, covariances, and autocovariances of the income and consumption process detailed in equations
(2.1) and (2.4). See Duvernois (2021) for a thorough discussion. φ quantifies the degree
of transmission of permanent shocks to consumption. ψ quantifies the degree of transitory
insurance. 0 implies perfect risk-sharing or no transmission of shocks to households’ consumption. Everything else being equal, a lower partial insurance parameter implies higher
welfare.
In panel C, I report the average variance of permanent and transitory shocks. The
averages are calculated over 3 different periods: the whole sample period (1980-2016), pre
1996 (1980-1996), and post 1996 (1996-2016). The variances for the 1980-2016 sample are
estimated with static transmission parameters, while the pre and post variances are estimated
with time-varying transmission parameters. In the all household sample, transitory shocks
(σε ) are larger than permanent shocks (σζ ). However, when looking at subperiods, permanent
shocks are larger in the pre-sample and smaller in the post-sample. I observe a similar
pattern for all subgroups expect participating households. Indeed, participating households’
transitory shocks are consistently larger than permanent shocks. Interestingly, panel C shows
that entrepreneurs experience the largest shocks (both permanent and transitory).
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2.5
2.5.1

Results
Welfare comparison across time

I present in the following section the results from the welfare decomposition. Empirically, I start with a baseline environment characterized by income growth, income risk,
and income shock transmission parameters. I then successively replace each parameter with
their counterpart environment parameters. Several empirical details are worth mentioning.
Firstly, the income growth rate, saving rate, and risk aversion are not estimated but measured
from the data. The sample selection process insures that these parameters are as unbiased
as possible. The risk and transmission parameters are, on the other hand, estimated and
may suffer from biases. These biases can be addressed using a bootstrapped estimation. By
assumption, the shocks are i.i.d. I can therefore draw a random vector of parameters from
the multivariate normal distribution characterized by the vector of estimated parameters
and the variance-covariance matrix of the estimates. I draw a thousand parameters and
estimate the welfare changes. The 95% confidence intervals are reported in each table. As
the growth effect does not depend on any risk-sharing parameters, it remains unaffected by
the bootstrap procedure. Secondly, the welfare path depends on average estimates of timevarying processes. Indeed, I use the average income growth rate over the sample period.
Similarly, the transmission parameters quantify the amount of shocks being transmitted to
consumption (on average). I do, however, have an estimates of the variance of shocks (both
permanent and transitory) for each year. I resolve the time-series of income risk by taking
the average. Finally, I take δ = 0.98, and interest rate = 2%.
Table 2.2 presents the welfare decomposition for all households as well as subgroups.
In panel A, the baseline scenario is characterized by parameters from the 1980-1996 subsample. I then successively replace the baseline parameters with their 1996-2016 counterparts.
The total effect measures the percentage change in consumption equivalent of a representative households had they experienced the 1996-2016 environment. I consider two levels of
risk aversion (in line with Santaeulalia-Llopis and Zheng, 2018) of 2 and 4. Recall from table
2.1, the income growth parameters were lower in the second subsample. Thus, the growth
effect is negative. The representative agent would have a consumption equivalent that is
6.28% lower had they received the 1996-2016 average growth rate of income. The negative
effect of the deterministic component is unsurprising and not that interesting in this research
framework. The stochastic component of income is the main point of research. The size of
the growth effect is however relevant. Santaeulalia-Llopis and Zheng (2018) find that the
rapid growth of the Chinese economy was accompanied by a deterioration of the income risk
and transmission environment. Furthermore, the risk and insurance effect can compare the
growth effect in magnitude. Duvernois (2021) documents a lower income risk environment
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and lower transmission (higher permanent insurance) in the post period. The PSID representative household had moderate welfare gains 0.33% and 1.07% with risk aversion coefficients
of 2 and 4 respectively. These positive changes in annual consumption variations are further
increased by a modest insurance effect accounting for 0.22% and 0.72%. The insurance and
risk effect, though positive, are not large enough to compare to the large welfare loss caused
by the slow down in income growth. Indeed, with low levels of risk aversion (η = 2), the
total effect is -5.77%; with eta = 4, the total effect is -4.59%. There is an unambiguous
welfare loss from moving from the PSID overall representative economic environment in the
80s/90s to that of the 21st century.
There is a similar trend across subgroups. Households that do not receive business
income have a negative growth effect of 5.26%. They experience a positive risk effect in
line with the average sample (0.31% vs 1.03% for the two risk aversion levels). However,
the insurance effect is 0.06% and 0.20% suggesting that employees experienced a slight improvement in their risk environment but virtually no changes in their insurance environment.
Indeed, while the permanent pass-through coefficient is slightly lower, the transitory component is slightly higher, thus counteracting each other. Entrepreneurs also have a negative
growth effect, albeit lower than their employed counterparts. With a risk aversion coefficient
of 4, the combined risk and insurance effects reduce the negative growth effect to -1.60%; a
welfare loss with an upper bound of -0.29%.
Households that receive transfer income have the worse total effect of all subgroups.
Indeed, they experienced a deterioration in the insurance environment (-0.18% and -0.59%) in
the post period and experienced only a modest improvement in the risk environment (0.30%
and 0.98%). Not only do these two effects cancel out, but they also pale in comparison to
the growth effect of -16.02%. Their counterpart fare much better. Households that do not
receive any transfers have a total effect of -0.25% for η = 4. The insurance effect (1.50%) does
much in offsetting the negative growth effect of 2.22%. High and low wealth households have
a similar negative growth effect, but the welfare effects of their respective risk and insurance
environments differ. High wealth households have a small but positive risk and insurance
effect. Low wealth households have a negative insurance effect but have a significant welfare
improvement from their lower risk-environment in the post 1996 sample.
Market participants have a large negative growth effect. The risk effect is insignificantly different from 0. With a risk aversion coefficient of 4, the insurance effect is 1.56%,
reducing the negative total welfare effect to -7.74%. nonparticipating households are the only
group that experience a positive growth effect in their alternative environment. A positive
growth effect of 3.76% compounded by 0.72% and 2.38% (with η = 2 and η = 4 respectively).
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0.22%
[0.04 0.39]

-5.77%
[-5.96 -5.59]

Insurance Effect
{γ post , σ post , Φpost }

Total Effect

-0.21%
[-0.30 -0.09]

-0.40%
[-0.67 -0.13]

6.90%
[6.67 7.14]

Risk Effect
{γ post , σ post , Φpre }

Insurance Effect
{γ post , σ post , Φpost }

Total Effect

Panel B. 1996-2016
Growth Effect
7.55%
{γ post , σ pre , Φpre }

0.33%
[0.22 0.42]

5.42%
[4.68 6.20]

-1.31%
[-2.20 -0.43]

-0.69%
[-0.98 -0.31]

7.55%

-4.59%
[-5.23 -4.00]

0.72%
[0.13 1.27]

1.07%
[0.73 1.38]

-6.28%

Panel A. 1980-1996
Growth Effect
-6.28%
{γ post , σ pre , Φpre }

Risk Effect
{γ post , σ post , Φpre }

η=4

η=2

All Households

5.81%
[5.58 6.07]

-0.12%
[-0.43 0.19]

-0.30%
[-0.42 -0.14]

6.25%

-4.90%
[-5.11 -4.72]

0.06%
[-0.12 0.23]

0.31%
[0.20 0.41]

-5.26%

η=2

4.80%
[4.04 5.65]

-0.39%
[-1.41 0.61]

-0.98%
[-1.37 -0.47]

6.25%

-4.09%
[-4.79 -3.48]

0.20%
[-0.40 0.76]

1.03%
[0.67 1.33]

-5.26%

η=4

Employees

3.20%
[2.72 3.78]

-0.50%
[-1.10 0.10]

-0.09%
[-0.19 0.15]

3.81%

-2.76%
[-3.25 -2.36]

0.33%
[-0.15 0.69]

0.21%
[-0.05 0.43]

-3.28%

η=2

1.83%
[0.29 3.70]

-1.62%
[-3.58 0.30]

-0.29%
[-0.62 0.48]

3.81%

-1.60%
[-3.24 -0.29]

1.05%
[-0.50 2.22]

0.67%
[-0.15 1.39]

-3.28%

η=4

Entrepreneurs

10.64%
[10.29 11.05]

-0.54%
[-0.86 -0.17]

0.06%
[0.01 0.11]

11.17%

-8.61%
[-8.92 -8.35]

0.48%
[0.05 0.82]

-0.05%
[-0.19 0.15]

-9.00%

η=2

9.46%
[8.35 10.78]

-1.73%
[-2.75 -0.56]

0.20%
[0.02 0.37]

11.17%

-7.74%
[-8.74 -6.91]

1.56%
[0.13 2.66]

-0.17%
[-0.61 0.49]

-9.00%

η=4

Mkt. participants

-4.70%
[-5.14 -4.22]

0.10%
[-0.82 0.89]

-0.77%
[-1.18 -0.14]

-4.05%

4.39%
[3.92 4.83]

-0.11%
[-0.56 0.29]

0.72%
[0.41 0.97]

3.76%

η=2

-6.19%
[-7.64 -4.62]

0.33%
[-2.83 2.95]

-2.55%
[-3.90 -0.46]

-4.05%

5.86%
[4.26 7.29]

-0.35%
[-1.82 0.95]

2.38%
[1.35 3.21]

3.76%

η=4

No participation

1.84%
[1.58 2.11]

-0.64%
[-0.92 -0.36]

-0.04%
[-0.08 0.02]

2.55%

-1.61%
[-1.84 -1.38]

0.46%
[0.21 0.69]

0.15%
[0.04 0.27]

-2.22%

η=2

0.28%
[-0.58 1.14]

-2.07%
[-2.96 -1.18]

-0.14%
[-0.27 0.07]

2.55%

-0.25%
[-1.02 0.51]

1.50%
[0.65 2.23]

0.50%
[0.11 0.87]

-2.22%

η=4

No transfer

21.48%
[20.84 22.26]

0.29%
[-0.67 1.13]

-0.42%
[-0.77 0.16]

21.64%

-15.92%
[-16.41 -15.53]

-0.18%
[-0.73 0.25]

0.30%
[0.01 0.52]

-16.02%

η=2

21.11%
[18.98 23.69]

0.99%
[-2.31 3.80]

-1.41%
[-2.56 0.53]

21.64%

-15.69%
[-17.32 -14.40]

-0.59%
[-2.41 0.82]

0.98%
[0.02 1.71]

-16.02%

η=4

Transfer rcpt.

11.14%
[10.94 11.35]

-0.39%
[-0.57 -0.20]

-0.01%
[-0.05 0.03]

11.58%

-8.97%
[-9.13 -8.83]

0.25%
[0.09 0.40]

0.11%
[0.03 0.18]

-9.30%

η=2

10.17%
[9.54 10.83]

-1.24%
[-1.81 -0.62]

-0.03%
[-0.15 0.11]

11.58%

-8.26%
[-8.76 -7.80]

0.80%
[0.29 1.26]

0.35%
[0.10 0.57]

-9.30%

η=4

High wealth

13.03%
[12.58 13.54]

0.09%
[-0.57 0.67]

-0.52%
[-0.79 -0.13]

13.52%

-10.33%
[-10.70 -10.02]

-0.13%
[-0.48 0.19]

0.52%
[0.30 0.71]

-10.69%

η=2

11.87%
[10.38 13.57]

0.29%
[-1.94 2.25]

-1.75%
[-2.64 -0.44]

13.52%

-9.51%
[-10.75 -8.46]

-0.42%
[-1.58 0.61]

1.74%
[0.98 2.36]

-10.69%

η=4

Low wealth

This table shows the effects on household welfare in percentage annual consumption equivalent from a baseline level in which I
replace income growth parameters, income risk parameters, and transmission parameters from one period with their alternative
period counterpart. The two sub-periods are 1980-1996 and 1996-2016. I use CRRA utility and risk aversion coefficient of 2 and
4. The income growth parameters are estimated using PSID data. The growth, income, insurance effects are estimated using
equations (2.10), (2.12), (2.13), and (2.15). In panel A, 1980-1996 is the baseline; in panel B, 1996-2016 is the baseline. 95%
confidence intervals are reported below and are based on 1000 bootstrap replicas.

Table 2.2: Welfare Effects of Growth, Risk, and Insurance: Comparison Across Time

The insurance effect is slightly negative, but the total welfare effect is significantly positive.
Panel B presents the results with the baseline environment being the 1996-2016 period. The signs are reversed and the magnitudes are different, but the results are similar and
can be interpreted similarly. The magnitudes are different for two reasons. First, the length
of each period is different, so the sums in equations (2.3), (2.12), and (2.13) are different.
Furthermore, I use the saving rate of the postperiod in panel B, thus resulting in a different
growth effect. The results are simply presented in this fashion for completeness. In table 3,
I consider the same welfare decomposition with the risk aversion coefficients implied by the
1996 questionnaire.
Table 2.3 considers the pre-1996 environment as the baseline while panel B considers the post-1996 environment as the baseline. The growth effect across groups remains
unchanged and the risk and insurance effects have been amplified. One could simply assume that the much larger risk aversion coefficients considered will be sufficient to generate
positive total welfare changes. Indeed, the smallest η considered is 10.47 for market participants. However, the negative growth effects still outweigh the combined risk and insurance
effects in some cases. In the PSID representative sample, with a risk aversion coefficient
of 11.71, the percentage change in annual consumption equivalent accounted by the lower
risk environment of the post-1996 environment is 6.32%. Furthermore, the lower (i.e better)
transmission parameters in the post sample generate welfare improvements of 4.21%. The
total welfare effect is 3.83% (with a 95% confidence interval of 0.19 and 7.48). With the
large negative growth effect, it takes a large risk aversion coefficient to generate a net welfare
gain.
With a lower negative negative growth effects, the lower risk environment and better
insurance of the post sample generates large total welfare changes of 5.63% for entrepreneurs.
Interestingly, with a large enough risk aversion coefficient, the percentage change in annual
equivalent consumption generated by a lower income risk environment is larger than the
growth effect for entrepreneurs (in absolute value). This is similar for the insurance effect,
implying that the total effect would be positive (although closer to 0) even if one of the two
effects remained constant between the two environments.
The higher risk aversion coefficient also intensifies the differences between risk and
insurance effect. The risk effect was larger than the insurance effect for employees in table
2.2. However, the pattern is more noticeable in table 2.3. The risk effect is equal to 6.20%
vs 1.16% for the insurance effect, more than 5 times larger. Similarly, the insurance effect
generates large welfare gains for participating households (7.54% with η = 10.47). However,
market participants also experience more risk in the post-1996 period, decreasing the welfare
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4.21%
[0.64 7.38]

3.83%
[-0.19 7.48]

Insurance Effect
{γ post , σ post , Φpost }

Total Effect

-3.93%
[-5.56 -1.80]

-7.39%
[-12.40 -2.69]

-4.30%
[-8.28 -0.25]

Risk Effect
{γ pre , σ pre , Φpost }

Insurance Effect
{γ pre , σ pre , Φpre }

Total Effect

Panel B. 1996-2016
Growth Effect
7.55%
{γ pre , σ post , Φpost }

6.32%
[4.22 8.19]

Risk Effect
{γ post , σ post , Φpre }

Panel A. 1980-1996
Growth Effect
-6.28%
{γ post , σ pre , Φpre }

All Households
η = 11.71

-2.08%
[-6.37 2.53]

-2.28%
[-8.44 3.40]

-5.69%
[-7.90 -2.83]

6.25%

1.78%
[-2.63 5.54]

1.16%
[-2.44 4.42]

6.20%
[3.98 8.07]

-5.26%

Employees
η = 11.88

-6.15%
[-13.84 2.47]

-8.24%
[-18.23 0.89]

-1.48%
[-3.21 2.40]

3.81%

5.63%
[-3.62 12.65]

5.49%
[-3.23 11.59]

3.52%
[-0.89 7.29]

-3.28%

Entrepreneurs
η = 10.95

3.19%
[-1.97 9.12]

-8.06%
[-12.73 -2.79]

0.97%
[0.08 1.75]

11.17%

-2.91%
[-8.05 1.13]

7.54%
[0.02 12.92]

-0.79%
[-2.91 2.30]

-9.00%

Mkt. participants
η = 10.47

-17.20%
[-25.93 -8.56]

2.17%
[-20.62 18.40]

-15.53%
[-23.47 -4.41]

-4.05%

18.14%
[6.09 28.13]

-2.23%
[-11.95 5.69]

16.46%
[8.65 22.46]

3.76%

No participation
η = 12.74

-9.79%
[-14.37 -5.45]

-11.33%
[-16.12 -6.83]

-0.79%
[-1.51 0.38]

2.55%

9.39%
[4.56 14.03]

8.75%
[3.48 13.11]

2.87%
[0.63 4.99]

-2.22%

No transfer
η = 11.68

18.57%
[5.80 32.65]

5.95%
[-16.04 22.12]

-7.99%
[-14.50 2.08]

21.64%

-14.11%
[-24.22 -6.72]

-3.36%
[-14.13 4.33]

5.83%
[-0.17 10.18]

-16.02%

Transfer rcpt.
η = 11.76

3.31%
[-0.29 7.11]

-7.24%
[-10.55 -3.80]

-0.19%
[-0.90 0.64]

11.58%

-2.99%
[-6.23 -0.13]

4.77%
[1.59 7.54]

2.08%
[0.57 3.44]

-9.30%

High wealth
η = 12.26

4.42%
[-3.70 13.12]

1.68%
[-11.89 12.45]

-9.54%
[-14.29 -2.93]

13.52%

-3.88%
[-11.53 2.25]

-2.34%
[-8.91 3.20]

10.21%
[5.52 13.90]

-10.69%

Low wealth
η = 11.47

This table shows the effects on household welfare in percentage annual consumption equivalent from a baseline level in which I
replace income growth parameters, income risk parameters, and transmission parameters from one period with their alternative
period counterpart. The two sub-periods are 1980-1996 and 1996-2016. The constant relative risk aversion coefficient are implied
from 1996 risk attitude questions and methodology by Hryshko, Luengo-Prado, and Sørensen (2011). The CRRA coefficient is
measure for each household present in 1996 and average over groups. The income growth parameters are estimated using PSID
data. The growth, income, insurance effects are estimated using equations (2.10), (2.12), (2.13), and (2.15). In panel A,
1980-1996 is the baseline; in panel B, 1996-2016 is the baseline. 95% confidence intervals are reported below and are based on
1000 bootstrap replicas.

Table 2.3: Welfare Effects of Growth, Risk, and Insurance: Comparison Across Time with PSID Estimated Risk Aversion

gains. Furthermore, the positive effect of higher consumption insurance is not sufficient to
offset the negative effect of higher income risks and lower income growth. There is therefore a
significant welfare loss from moving from the participating income/consumption environment
in the 80s/90s to that of the 21st century. As the only group with positive welfare changes
in table 2.2, nonparticipating households have the highest positive effect in table 2.3. This
is further exacerbated by the fact that nonparticipating households have the highest risk
aversion coefficient.
Transfer recipients’ welfare decomposition remains largely unaffected by the change
in risk aversion coefficient. Indeed, the risk and insurance effect have the opposite effect.
The lower risk environment is generating positive welfare changes while the lower insurance
environment is generating welfare losses. Although the risk effect is slightly stronger in
magnitude, it is not sufficient to make any kind of dent in the large negative growth effect.
The difference between ωT with η = 4 and ωT with η = 11.76 is 15.69% vs -14.11%. High
and low wealth households still have a negative welfare total effect despite the larger risk
and insurance effects.
In an unreported test, I solve for the risk aversion coefficient that makes the total
welfare effect equal to 0. For all household, η would need to equal 8.75 to force the total
welfare effect to equal 0. For employees and entrepreneurs, the value is 9.75 and 6.20,
respectively. For market participants, the risk aversion coefficient would need to be as high
as 13.50. nonparticipating households would need to be risk-loving and have a negative η to
have a net welfare change of 0. nontransfer recipients would be in line with the estimation
in table 2.2 with η = 4.20. High and low-wealth households are similar with η = 16. This
exercise yields unrealistic results for transfer recipients. Indeed, with a large negative growth
effect, the combined effect of risk and insurance need to be substantial. However, the effects
counteract each other, thus requiring a very large risk aversion coefficient of 77.50 to generate
a risk effect sufficiently large to compensate for the insurance and growth effect.
2.5.2

Welfare comparison across households

Until this point, the analysis focuses on how the change of the environment through
time affects the welfare of households. The flexibility of the welfare framework allows to consider differing environments across households. Indeed, they are cross-sectional differences
in households’ risk and transmission environment. I keep the same format for all tables
reporting the welfare implications of cross-sectional differences in risk-sharing environments.
Similarly to the time-varying welfare implications, I start with a base group. In this case,
the base group is not common to all columns. The base group is the opposite of the column
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header. The parameters are then successively replaced by the parameters of the column
header. Thus, the base group has the following environment: {γ N o , σ N o , ΦN o }. Let us take
the first group as an example: Participation. The base group is nonparticipating households,
hence the N o superscript describing the economic environment. As I successively replace the
parameters, the superscript change to Y es, indicating the parameters used are those of participating households. I use the exogenous parameters20 from the base group unless stated
otherwise. In the previous section, the saving rate emphasized the growth effect but did not
have a changing impact on the overall estimation. When comparing across households, the
situation is different. From equation (2.3), a higher saving rate mechanically reduces the
deterministic component of consumption. The question becomes: which saving rate should
be used in equation (2.10). Santaeulalia-Llopis and Zheng (2018) use an average saving rate
through time and space focusing solely on the income growth rate and discount heterogeneity in savings. There is, in my sample, large differences in saving rate and insurance across
subgroups. Insofar as savings are used to smooth income shocks (Mazzocco, 2004), there
is a trade-off between a lower saving rate (resulting in a higher growth effect) and higher
insurance (resulting in a higher insurance effect). To reflect these assumptions, I use each
groups’ respective saving rate in calculating their deterministic consumption path, thus a
higher income growth may not necessarily result in a positive growth effect if the saving is
large21 .
In table 2.4, I consider the entire sample period with one transmission parameters22
and annualized variances of shocks over the 36 years period. Similarly, the income growth
rates are taken over the 36 years period. The table reports the welfare decomposition for three
levels of risk aversion, 2, 4, and the PSID implied value. From table 2.1, entrepreneurs have
a higher annual income growth rate than employed households (1.36% vs 1.15%). However,
entrepreneurs’ saving rate is much higher than that of employed households (11.84% vs
3.94%). Despite the higher rate of growth, the growth effect is negative indicating that
the annual consumption equivalent of entrepreneurs is 4.90% lower than that of employees.
Furthermore, entrepreneurs experience slightly higher permanent shocks (0.030 vs 0.021) and
much higher transitory shocks (0.054 vs 0.026). Thus, the risk effect is significantly negative
even at low levels of risk aversion. Employees also have the highest risk aversion coefficients
across subgroups. Although small with η = 2 (-0.83%), the risk effect is -16.90% with
η = 12.74. Despite higher income risk23 , entrepreneurs have lower permanent insurance and
20

Preference shocks ξ and risk aversion coefficient η
I also repeat the analysis by keeping the savings constant between base and counterfactual groups to
highlight the income growth effect alone as in Santaeulalia-Llopis and Zheng (2018).
22
one for permanent and transitory shocks
23
Krueger and Perri (2006) argue that higher income risk increase the incentives to ensure so according
21
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Entrepreneurs?
η=4
η = 12.74

1.41%
[0.49 2.33]

-4.35%
[-4.84 -3.77]

Insurance Effect
{γ Y es , σ Y es , ΦY es }

Total Effect

-2.90%
[-4.71 -0.78]

5.26%
[1.69 8.69]

-3.01%
[-4.78 -1.03]

8.02%
[-4.88 21.76]

36.68%
[5.98 61.77]

-16.90%
[-26.51 -7.22]

-0.83%
[-1.31 -0.28]

1.41%
[0.49 2.33]

4.22%
[3.69 4.85]

Risk Effect
{γ Y es , σ Y es , ΦN o }

Insurance Effect
{γ Y es , σ Y es , ΦY es }

Total Effect

5.77%
[3.83 8.05]

5.19%
[1.59 8.61]

-2.97%
[-4.72 -0.98]

16.18%
[3.77 29.51]

32.43%
[5.92 54.63]

-15.34%
[-24.16 -6.40]

Panel B. 1980-2016 - Counterfactual Group Parameters
Growth Effect
3.62%
3.62%
3.62%
{γ Y es , σ N o , ΦN o }

-0.83%
[-1.31 -0.28]

Risk Effect
{γ Y es , σ Y es , ΦN o }

Panel A. 1980-2016 - Base Group Parameters
Growth Effect
-4.90%
-4.90%
-4.90%
{γ Y es , σ N o , ΦN o }

η=2

5.38%
[4.75 6.01]

1.81%
[0.95 2.54]

0.41%
[0.06 0.88]

3.08%

-2.94%
[-3.51 -2.36]

1.82%
[0.96 2.54]

0.41%
[0.06 0.88]

-5.06%

η=2

11.52%
[9.06 13.92]

6.58%
[3.24 9.28]

1.51%
[0.18 3.23]

3.08%

2.85%
[0.66 5.06]

6.70%
[3.48 9.34]

1.54%
[0.19 3.28]

-5.06%

Participation?
η=4

56.01%
[37.46 72.71]

40.00%
[15.66 57.66]

8.11%
[0.60 17.28]

3.08%

62.17%
[37.42 83.95]

54.55%
[20.04 78.98]

10.52%
[0.59 22.39]

-5.06%

η = 11.88

3.25%
[2.57 3.94]

0.84%
[-0.05 1.55]

0.51%
[0.20 0.96]

1.87%

0.18%
[-0.48 0.84]

0.85%
[-0.04 1.56]

0.51%
[0.20 0.97]

-1.17%

η=2

6.91%
[4.29 9.46]

3.04%
[-0.38 5.61]

1.85%
[0.73 3.52]

1.87%

3.85%
[1.40 6.32]

3.12%
[-0.16 5.75]

1.90%
[0.75 3.61]

-1.17%

No Receipts?
η=4

36.43%
[15.35 54.81]

19.96%
[-5.65 36.97]

11.64%
[4.01 22.18]

1.87%

33.03%
[12.62 51.12]

20.35%
[-5.07 37.68]

11.83%
[4.12 22.55]

-1.17%

η = 11.68

2.98%
[2.46 3.49]

1.15%
[0.59 1.60]

0.61%
[0.38 0.86]

1.20%

-9.74%
[-10.20 -9.30]

1.16%
[0.60 1.61]

0.61%
[0.38 0.87]

-11.32%

η=2

7.57%
[5.62 9.40]

4.04%
[1.96 5.65]

2.17%
[1.33 3.09]

1.20%

-5.37%
[-7.08 -3.67]

4.31%
[2.19 6.01]

2.31%
[1.44 3.28]

-11.32%

High Wealth?
η=4

50.83%
[32.18 66.79]

29.67%
[11.91 42.26]

14.95%
[8.73 21.45]

1.20%

29.23%
[14.91 42.15]

27.84%
[11.83 39.55]

13.99%
[8.30 20.06]

-11.32%

η = 11.47

This table shows the effects on household welfare in percentage annual consumption equivalent from a baseline level in which I
replace income growth parameters, income risk parameters, and transmission parameters from one group with their counterpart
group parameters. The base groups are non-entrepreneurs, non-participants, transfer receipts, and low wealth households. Groups
are not mutually exclusive. The decomposition is over the entire 1980-2016 period. I use CRRA utility and risk aversion
coefficient of 2, 4, PSID implied. The income growth parameters are estimated using PSID data. The growth, income, insurance
effects are estimated using equations (2.10), (2.12), (2.13), and (2.15). In panel A, I use base group risk-aversion parameters.
In panel B, I use counterfactual group parameters and assume similar savings rate across groups. 95% confidence intervals are
reported below and are based on 1000 bootstrap replicas.

Table 2.4: Welfare Effects of Growth, Risk, and Insurance: Comparison Across Groups

insignificantly different from 0 transitory insurance (implying perfect insurance). This better
insurance environment results in welfare gains of 1.41% to 36.68%. Recall from equation
(2.15) that the total welfare effect is the product of the growth, risk, and insurance effects.
Ignoring the growth effect, I can define the net effect as:

(1 + ωN et ) = (1 + ωG )(1 + ωR )(1 + ωI )

with

ωG = 0

(2.17)

By setting ωG = 0, I assume that the two groups have the same income growth rate
and the same saving rate. Obviously unrealistic, it allows me to isolate the combined effect
of risk and insurance. This is particularly interesting in the entrepreneurs vs. employees
case as the two effects differ in direction and magnitude. The net effect is 0.57%, 8.31%,
and 13.58% for risk aversions levels of 2, 4, and 11.88, respectively. Differences in risk and
transmission environment do cause significant differences in household welfare. At all levels
of risk aversion, the insurance effect overtakes the risk effect and generates welfare gains.
However, the total effect is significantly negative with η = 2 or η = 4. The total effect is
only positive with the high coefficient of risk aversion implied by the PSID questionnaire.
Assuming that consumption smoothing is the only motive for households’ saving, these
results would imply that entrepreneurs save too much for the level of insurance they are
getting. Setting entrepreneurs’ saving rate to 7.75% results in both groups having the same
consumption equivalent. Of course, this does not take into account the unrealized benefits
of higher savings (i.e in deferred consumption or bequest).
Turning to participating households, the growth effect is negative (-5.06%) because
of a high saving rate (despite a higher income growth rate). Participating households have
a higher annual income growth rate (1.22% vs 1.04%), and a higher saving rate (9.70% vs
1.96%). Market participants have lower transitory income risk and similar permanent income
risk. At low levels of risk aversion, the risk effect is 0.41% with the 95% confidence bound
at 0.06% and 0.88% indicating the differences are negligible. However with increasing levels
of risk aversion, the risk effects gets larger (1.54% with η = 4 and 10.52% with η = 11.88).
The insurance effect is significant at low levels of risk aversion. Indeed, while both groups
have similar levels of transitory shock transmission, participating households have a much
lower permanent insurance coefficient. With η = 2, the insurance effect is 1.82% and 54.55%
with η = 11.88. With low levels of risk aversion, the risk and insurance effects are not
extremely relevant to households’ welfare compared to the growth effect. The total effect
is negative with η = 2 at -2.94% but is positive with η = 4 and η = 11.88 at 2.85% and
62.17% respectively. With moderate levels of risk aversion, the risk and insurance effect
to them, the correct grammatical term would be in spite of
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outweigh the growth effect. With the growth effect carrying unrealized welfare gains of
participating households through higher saving rate, let us concentrate on the net effect of
risk and insurance. The annual consumption equivalent of participating households is 2.24%,
8.34%, and 70.81% (with η = 2; 4; 11.88 respectively) higher than that of nonparticipating
households over the 1980-2016 sample period24 .
The double negative in the third group implies that transfer recipients are the base
group. Households that do and do not receive transfers have similar annual income growth
rates over the entire sample period. The higher saving rate of nonrecipient causes a slightly
negative growth effect. However, the effect is small enough to get balanced out by the risk
and insurance effect. Indeed, the total effect is 0.18%, 3.85%, and 33.03%. Although the
total effect is not significantly different from 0 with η = 2, higher levels of risk aversion
generate significant welfare gains.
Comparing high and low wealth households, I find the net effect to be positive reflecting welfare gains from the lower risk and better insured environment. Wealthy households
have an annual consumption equivalent that is 1.78%, 6.72%, and 45.72% higher than that
of low wealth households that is directly attributable to their stochastic consumption path.
However, relative to households below the median level of wealth, high wealth households
have a deterministic consumption equivalent 11.32% lower. Although both groups have similar income growth rate, the difference in saving rate is large. This figure would imply that
high wealth households have lower welfare. This results serves to highlight the limitations
of the welfare framework. To circumvent this issue, I consider in panel B the welfare decomposition with exogenous parameters from the counterfactual group. That is the growth
effect is solely a function of the growth rate25 . It is noteworthy to mention that I substitute
counterfactual preference shocks and risk aversion. As such, the risk and insurance effects
are changed26 for all levels of risk aversion.
The risk and insurance effects with η = 2, 4 remains relatively unchanged. Households
that do or do not receive transfer income have relatively similar levels of risk aversion. The
risk and insurance effects remain stable from panel A to panel B. However, when only
considering the difference in income growth rate, nontransfer recipients’ annual consumption
equivalent is 1.87% higher than that of transfer recipients. The counterfactual groups all
have higher income growth rates than their respective base groups resulting in positive
growth effects. The total effects are smaller for entrepreneurs and participating households.
24

A saving rate of 7.5% would equalize both groups’ consumption equivalent.
The saving rate is that of the counterfactual group. However, since it affects both groups similarly, the
results remain unchanged should I use the saving rate of the base group.
26
Though marginally as the cross-sectional standard deviation in preference shocks is small.
25
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Indeed, these counterfactual groups are less risk averse than the base groups. Despite the
higher growth effect, the risk and insurance effects are lower27 . Overall, table 6 shows that
entrepreneurs, market participants, wealthy households, and households that do not receive
transfers have higher consumption equivalent relative to employed, nonparticipating, low
wealth households, and those that do receive transfers as a result of the better combined
risk and insurance effects. The growth effect is ambiguous. On one hand, the counterfactual
groups have higher income growth, but they also have higher saving rate, thus resulting
in a negative growth effect. Households can trade off consumption for higher insurance or
later consumption. As such, the welfare measure does take into account future consumption
resulting from higher saving past my sample period.
I then decompose welfare across groups and time by considering the economic environment of 1980-1996 and 1996-2016 separately. Although I don’t expect the results to be
different from table 2.4 (groups with higher consumption equivalent will still have higher
consumption equivalents), the decomposition across time and groups may reveal that the
economic environment did not change uniformly across households. In panels A and B of
table 2.5, I present the welfare decomposition with 1980-1996 and 1996-2016 subperiods as
the respective economic environment. These panels consider both income growth and saving
rate in the growth effect.
The income effect is negative for entrepreneurs, not as result of a difference in growth
rate but rather as a result of different saving rate. Indeed, the saving rate of employed
households in the 80s and 90s is 4.88% compared to 15.64% for entrepreneurs. On the other
hand, the better insurance environment is generating welfare gains for entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs do experience high income risk than employed households, both permanent and
transitory. Thus, I see a significantly negative risk effect. I find a similar pattern in panel
B in the 1996-2016 sample with different magnitudes. To compare whether the change in
environment affected both groups equally, I calculate the combined effect of risk and insurance. In the first subsample, the total effects for all three levels of risk aversion are 0.27%,
0.86%, and 5.1%; and 0.47%, 1.52%, and 9.34% in the second subsample. In either period,
with low levels of risk aversion, entrepreneurs do not have a higher consumption equivalent.
With high levels of risk aversion, entrepreneurs have annual consumption equivalent that
are 5.1% and 9.34% higher than employees in the first and second subsample respectively.
In panels C and D, I assume both groups that have the same saving rate to highlight the
income growth effect. Both groups have a similar average annual growth rate in the first
subsample (resulting in a growth effect of 0.47%) and entrepreneurs have a higher income
27

Only when considering the PSID implied risk aversion.
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Entrepreneurs?
η=4

-0.50%
[-0.87 -0.03]

0.77%
[-0.00 1.42]

-10.67%
[-11.02 -10.19]

Risk Effect
{γ Y es , σ Y es , ΦN o }

Insurance Effect
{γ Y es , σ Y es , ΦY es }

Total Effect

-10.14%
[-11.31 -8.59]

2.54%
[-0.07 4.72]

-1.64%
[-2.84 -0.11]

-10.90%

0.93%
[0.47 1.37]

-3.86%
[-4.04 -3.58]

Insurance Effect
{γ Y es , σ Y es , ΦY es }

Total Effect

-2.85%
[-3.43 -1.94]

3.07%
[1.54 4.57]

-1.50%
[-2.49 -0.45]

-4.30%

4.64%
[0.91 10.28]

19.62%
[8.73 29.59]

-8.59%
[-14.19 -2.93]

-4.30%

-6.35%
[-13.69 2.76]

15.89%
[-2.57 29.68]

-0.50%
[-0.87 -0.03]

0.77%
[-0.00 1.42]

0.73%
[0.33 1.26]

Risk Effect
{γ Y es , σ Y es , ΦN o }

Insurance Effect
{γ Y es , σ Y es , ΦY es }

Total Effect

1.32%
[0.01 3.07]

2.54%
[-0.07 4.72]

-1.64%
[-2.84 -0.11]

0.47%

5.01%
[-2.26 14.16]

14.04%
[-2.05 26.21]

-8.35%
[-14.36 -1.04]

0.47%

2.89%

-0.46%
[-0.76 -0.14]

0.93%
[0.47 1.37]

3.36%
[3.17 3.66]

Growth Effect
{γ Y es , σ N o , ΦN o }

Risk Effect
{γ Y es , σ Y es , ΦN o }

Insurance Effect
{γ Y es , σ Y es , ΦY es }

Total Effect

4.45%
[3.83 5.43]

3.07%
[1.54 4.57]

-1.50%
[-2.49 -0.45]

2.89%

11.38%
[7.88 16.73]

17.28%
[7.79 26.04]

-7.69%
[-12.73 -2.57]

2.89%

Panel D. 1996-2016 - Counterfactual Group Parameters

0.47%

Growth Effect
{γ Y es , σ N o , ΦN o }

Panel C. 1980-1996 - Counterfactual Group Parameters

-0.46%
[-0.76 -0.14]

-4.30%

Risk Effect
{γ Y es , σ Y es , ΦN o }

Growth Effect
{γ Y es , σ N o , ΦN o }

-10.90%

η = 12.74

-9.31%
[-16.00 -1.28]

Panel B. 1996-2016 - Base Group Parameters

-10.90%

Growth Effect
{γ Y es , σ N o , ΦN o }

Panel A. 1980-1996 - Base Group Parameters

η=2

-4.02%
[-4.33 -3.72]

1.16%
[0.48 1.69]

-0.26%
[-0.55 0.23]

-4.87%

10.13%
[9.62 10.70]

0.45%
[-0.16 0.97]

0.54%
[0.28 0.83]

9.06%

-10.71%
[-11.00 -10.43]

1.16%
[0.48 1.69]

-0.26%
[-0.55 0.23]

-11.50%

-5.29%
[-5.73 -4.79]

0.45%
[-0.16 0.97]

0.54%
[0.28 0.83]

-6.21%

η=2

-2.05%
[-3.09 -1.05]

3.86%
[1.51 5.63]

-0.86%
[-1.81 0.76]

-4.87%

12.63%
[10.92 14.52]

1.46%
[-0.52 3.18]

1.79%
[0.90 2.77]

9.06%

-8.87%
[-9.84 -7.95]

3.86%
[1.51 5.63]

-0.86%
[-1.81 0.76]

-11.50%

-3.14%
[-4.61 -1.51]

1.46%
[-0.52 3.18]

1.79%
[0.90 2.77]

-6.21%

Participation?
η=4

9.84%
[4.16 15.17]

20.51%
[6.27 30.32]

-4.19%
[-8.86 3.35]

-4.87%

27.67%
[17.96 37.81]

7.29%
[-3.02 15.83]

9.12%
[4.43 14.16]

9.06%

7.10%
[-0.42 13.97]

28.02%
[7.95 41.59]

-5.47%
[-11.57 4.14]

-11.50%

15.52%
[3.76 27.52]

9.80%
[-4.59 21.27]

12.18%
[5.72 18.97]

-6.21%

η = 11.88

9.66%
[9.25 10.04]

0.66%
[0.13 1.05]

0.20%
[0.01 0.51]

8.72%

-7.20%
[-7.69 -6.77]

-0.06%
[-0.65 0.39]

0.33%
[0.14 0.58]

-7.45%

6.63%
[6.24 7.00]

0.66%
[0.13 1.05]

0.20%
[0.01 0.51]

5.72%

-10.08%
[-10.55 -9.66]

-0.06%
[-0.65 0.39]

0.33%
[0.14 0.58]

-10.32%

η=2

11.83%
[10.46 13.10]

2.19%
[0.37 3.46]

0.66%
[0.03 1.71]

8.72%

-6.63%
[-8.26 -5.20]

-0.20%
[-2.13 1.27]

1.09%
[0.46 1.91]

-7.45%

8.74%
[7.40 9.97]

2.19%
[0.37 3.46]

0.66%
[0.03 1.71]

5.72%

-9.53%
[-11.11 -8.14]

-0.20%
[-2.13 1.27]

1.09%
[0.46 1.91]

-10.32%

No Receipts?
η=4

28.07%
[18.68 36.26]

13.38%
[1.12 21.34]

3.89%
[0.06 10.06]

8.72%

-2.62%
[-12.79 5.65]

-1.17%
[-12.63 6.94]

6.47%
[2.56 11.33]

-7.45%

24.71%
[15.48 32.76]

13.51%
[1.13 21.55]

3.93%
[0.05 10.15]

5.72%

-5.59%
[-15.55 2.49]

-1.18%
[-12.75 6.99]

6.53%
[2.58 11.44]

-10.32%

η = 11.68

2.20%
[1.94 2.44]

0.77%
[0.46 1.03]

0.13%
[-0.01 0.30]

1.29%

0.44%
[0.06 0.83]

0.41%
[-0.00 0.76]

0.42%
[0.25 0.60]

-0.39%

-10.18%
[-10.41 -9.97]

0.77%
[0.46 1.03]

0.13%
[-0.01 0.30]

-10.98%

-12.72%
[-13.05 -12.39]

0.41%
[-0.00 0.76]

0.42%
[0.25 0.60]

-13.45%

η=2

4.32%
[3.45 5.15]

2.56%
[1.52 3.44]

0.42%
[-0.03 0.99]

1.29%

2.39%
[1.11 3.67]

1.36%
[-0.01 2.50]

1.41%
[0.82 2.01]

-0.39%

-8.32%
[-9.08 -7.59]

2.56%
[1.52 3.44]

0.42%
[-0.03 0.99]

-10.98%

-11.03%
[-12.14 -9.92]

1.36%
[-0.01 2.50]

1.41%
[0.82 2.01]

-13.45%

High Wealth?
η=4

21.64%
[15.21 27.48]

16.99%
[9.42 23.06]

2.64%
[-0.27 6.22]

1.29%

18.00%
[8.66 26.75]

8.67%
[-0.63 15.94]

9.00%
[5.04 12.90]

-0.39%

5.21%
[0.13 9.83]

15.40%
[8.62 20.86]

2.41%
[-0.24 5.68]

-10.98%

1.03%
[-6.22 7.90]

7.88%
[-0.48 14.47]

8.20%
[4.61 11.74]

-13.45%

η = 11.47

This table shows the effects on household welfare in percentage annual consumption equivalent from a baseline level in which
I replace parameters from one group with their counterpart group parameters. The base groups are non-entrepreneurs, nonparticipants, transfer receipts, and low wealth households. In panels A and B, only the 1980-1996 period is considered; in panels
C and D, only the 1996-2016 sub-period is considered. 95% confidence intervals are reported below and are based on 1000
bootstrap replicas.

Table 2.5: Welfare Effects of Growth, Risk, and Insurance: Comparison Across Groups - Pre and Post 1996

growth rate in the second subsample (resulting in a growth effect of 2.89%). Overall, it
appears the welfare benefits of entrepreneurship are concentrated in the second subsample.
Similarly to entrepreneurs, the growth effect is negative for participating households
in the first 2 panels of table 2.5 despite a higher income growth rate. In panel C, the
effect is positive as market participants have a higher growth rate than nonparticipating
households. The effect is negative in panel D as market participants have now a lower rate
of income growth. The slow down in income growth is affecting participating households more
severely, generating welfare losses of 4.87% compared to the welfare gains of 9.06% in the
first subsample. Prior to 1996, participating households have a favorable risk and insurance
environment resulting in combined welfare gains of 0.99%, 3.28%, and 23.17% relative to
nonparticipating households. However, post 1996, the income risk of participating households
increases generating significant welfare losses. The insurance environment does ameliorates
generating net gains of 0.9%, 2.97%, and 21.07%. Market participants compensate the
welfare losses of higher risk with better insurance. Although the net effect of risk and
insurance is stable across the welfare advantage of participating households has changed in
nature.
2.6
2.6.1

Subjective Well-Being
Data Description

In the previous section, I show that the changes in economic environments, as it
relates to the size and transmission of idiosyncratic shocks, generates significant differences
in consumption equivalents. In turn, the differences in consumption equivalent are, within
the framework, interpreted as differences in household utility. In this section, I investigate
the impact of households’ idiosyncratic shocks on subjective well-being (SWB). Starting in
2009, households (reference people) are asked to categorize their life satisfaction on a scale
from 1 to 5, 1 being “completely satisfied”, 5 being “not at all satisfied” 28 . This measure is
used by Brown and Gathergood (2017) and a similar measure is used by Bayer and Juessen
(2015) in the German annual socio-economic panel (SOEP).
The objective is to quantify the impact of income and consumption idiosyncratic
shocks on households’ life satisfaction. Shocks to consumption are constructed following
Duvernois (2021). Consider the following process for life satisfaction:
hi,t = h∗i,t + f (zi,t )
28

(2.18)

The question asked is :“Please think about your life as a whole. How satisfied are you with it? Are you
completely satisfied, very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied?”
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zi,t is the set of observable characteristics used in the income and consumption shock
regressions. h∗ can be further written as:
h∗i,t = h∗∗ (ψi,t , φi,t ) + µi + ζi,t

(2.19)

µ is a household fixed-effect and ζ is the independently and identically distributed
influences on survey responses. These two terms are removed by first-differencing h∗ into
∆h∗ . I follow Bayer and Juessen (2015) to construct h∗ . I first estimate equation (2.18)
using an order-probit regression of the following form:
∗∗
hi,t = j if vi,t
∈ (c̄j , c̄j+1 ]

(2.20)

Bayer and Juessen (2015) infer an interval Vi,t = (c̄˜hi,t − f^
(zi,t ), c̄˜hi,t +1 − f^
(zi,t )] where
∗
h∗ exists. Assuming normality, the conditional expected value v¯i,t
is:
R
hφ(h)
h∈Hi,t
h¯∗i,t =
,
(2.21)
Φ(Hi,t )
where φ and Φ(H) are, respectively, the density and the probability of H. By assuming a standard normal distribution, h∗ and ∆h∗∗ can be used in OLS without bias to the
estimator. In table 2.6, I present the summary statistics for the sample used. I use the
PSID 2007 waves onward29 . The last available wave is 2019 and is used for instruments’ creation. Disposable income is the sum of labor, business, financial income for all households’
members net of federal taxes. Total consumption is the sum of all expenditure categories
(including the categories added after 2005) including imputed rent expenditure30 . I decompose consumption in two categories: conspicuous and inconspicuous consumption following
Brown and Gathergood (2017). Conspicuous consumption is visible by individuals outside
of households (food away from home, clothing, holidays,...). Both income and consumption
are deflated to 1982 dollars.
From table 2.6, 94% of the sample is employed. A household is considered employed
if the reference person (or spouse if present) report more than 13 weeks of works. The
average life satisfaction is 2.11, suggesting households in the PSID are generally satisfied
with their lives. The average respondent is 45 years old, male (88.2% of respondent are
male), white (88.2% of respondent are white), and college-educated (70% of respondent are
college-educated). The average household size is 2.849 with 0.886 child.
29

Although life satisfaction is measured starting 2009, 2007 is retained for conditioning purposes.
Rent expenditure is imputed as 6% of house value for homeowners (See Attanasio and Pistaferri (2014)
and Flavin and Yamashita (2002)).
30
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Table 2.6: Summary Statistics - Life Satisfaction Sample
This tables presents summary statistics for the PSID sample. Data are from the 2009 to 2019
waves. Disposable income is the sum of labor, business, financial income for all household
members minus federal taxes (estimated using TAXSIM). Total consumption is the sum of all
expenditures categories provided by the PSID plus rent imputation (as Flavin and Yamashita
(2002) for homeowners.). Conspicuous and inconspicuous consumption are calculated following Brown and Gathergood (2017). Employment is a dummy variable that takes the value
of 1 of the reference person reports more than 13 weeks of work. K6-Index refers to the
Kessler index modified to be bounded between 0 and 10. Gender is a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 for Male reference person. Race is a dummy variable that takes the value
of 1 if the reference person is white. College education is a dummy variable that takes the
value of 1 if the reference person has completed some college or higher.
Obs.

Mean

St. Dev.

25th Pctl.

Median

75th Pctl.

Disposable Income
Total Consumption
Conspicuous Consumption
Inconspicuous Consumption
Employment

11,221
11,221
11,221
11,221
11,221

33,060.730
21,820.470
5,626.563
16,193.910
0.933

21,343.290
14,641.280
5,894.363
10,467.250
0.250

20,670.670
13,056.460
2,445.782
9,873.916
1

30,821.470
19,189.980
4,063.959
14,498.170
1

41,801.450
26,619.160
6,689.771
19,941.630
1

Life Satisfaction
K6-Index

11,221
11,221

3.889
2.335

0.770
1.748

3
1

4
2

4
3

Age of Reference Person
Household Size
Number of Children
Gender of Reference Person
Race of Reference Person
College Education

11,221
11,221
11,221
11,221
11,221
11,221

45.479
2.849
0.886
0.842
0.882
0.692

10.261
1.439
1.184
0.365
0.323
0.462

36
2
0
1
1
0

45
3
0
1
1
1

55
4
2
1
1
1

In figure (2.2), I plot life satisfaction against income, expenditure31 , or wealth. Although it shows that neither of the measures alone explain life satisfaction, it reveals interesting patterns. Higher levels of consumption, income, and wealth are associated with
higher levels of satisfaction. A fuller bar indicates there are more households in the category
of life satisfaction. In all three metric, higher levels of satisfactions have fuller bars at higher
levels (of income, consumption, or wealth). However, there are very satisfied low-income
households. This indicates the need to look at shocks to get meaningful determinants of life
satisfaction.
Figure (2.2) plots all households in the sample. I average life satisfaction and consumption for all households and all years at the state level and plot the relationship in
figure (2.3). The expected relationship is higher consumption means higher satisfaction.
31

total household expenditure is divided by the OECD adult equivalent scale used by Attanasio and
Pistaferri (2014).
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Figure 2.2: Life satisfaction as a function of income, consumption, and wealth

The map’s color should move from the bottom left quadrant (mostly green colors) to the top
right quadrant (purple colors). Redish and blueish colors should be less prevalent. Green,
dark green, and brownish colors are the most prevalent colors in the map, suggesting an
average upward relationship between consumption and life satisfaction. Again, these are
levels are not shocks. Thus any causation may not be inferred.
2.6.2

Results

I first investigate the impact of shocks on life satisfaction. I regress income shocks
on shocks to household satisfaction. β is the coefficient on the independent variable ∆y,
the sum of a permanent and transitory component as described in equation (2.1). Shocks
to happiness h∗∗ can also be understood to be the sum of permanent and transitory shocks
as the notation in equation (2.19) suggests. Transitory shocks are more easily smoothed
(Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston, 2008; Duvernois, 2021) and should have less of an impact
on life satisfaction than permanent shocks. These shocks are not directly observable. However, Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) propose an instrumental variable regression
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Figure 2.3: Life satisfaction and consumption - state level averages

interpretation of their minimum distance estimator. Transitory and permanent shocks can
be identified with the following moment restrictions:
∗
∗
E[(∆h∗i,t − ∆yi,t
)∆yt+1
]=0

(2.22)

∗
∗
∗
∗
E[(∆h∗i,t − ∆yi,t
)(yi,t+1
+ yi,t
+ yi,t−1
)] = 0

(2.23)

Instruments for transitory shocks are therefore the income shocks at t+1; instruments
for permanent shocks are the sum of the residuals at time t, t + 1, and t − 1. The estimation
results are presented in table 2.7. There is a significant degree of transmission of income
shocks to household life satisfaction. The positive coefficient of 0.142 is in line with results
by Bayer and Juessen (2015) using German longitudinal survey.
In columns 3 and 4, the results show that permanent shocks to income have an
impact on household satisfaction while transitory shocks do not. Indeed, the coefficient on
the projection of transitory shocks is not statistically significant. Furthermore, not only
is the coefficient on permanent shocks significantly different, it is 3 times larger than the
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Table 2.7: Life Satisfaction and Income Shocks
This tables reports the effect of income shocks (permanent and transitory) on life satisfaction
shocks. IV regressions are estimated using equation (2.23) and equation (2.22) for permanent
and transitory shocks. Life satisfaction, income, and employment have been regressed on the
same set of control variables. Income and employment shocks are first-differenced residuals
from OLS regressions. Life satisfaction shocks are estimated using an ordered-probit regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and ***
denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

Income Shock:
All: β

OLS

OLS

IV

IV

IV

IV

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.142∗∗∗
(0.035)

0.130∗∗∗
(0.036)
0.527∗∗
(0.213)

0.589∗∗
(0.256)
0.163
(0.104)

0.338
(0.301)

Permanent: ψ

Transitory: φ
Employment Shock: ∆e

0.070
(0.058)

−0.596
(1.233)

−0.709
(1.168)

Constant: α

−0.003
(0.010)

−0.003
(0.010)

−0.006
(0.010)

−0.007
(0.010)

−0.003
(0.010)

−0.005
(0.010)

Observations

8,916

8,916

8,916

8,916

8,916

8,916

average shock. In both IV regressions, weak-instruments F-tests are rejected at the 1% level
suggesting the instruments are appropriate. Furthermore, I fail to reject Wu-Hausman test
at reasonable significance level, suggesting IV regressions are consistent with OLS.
Bayer and Juessen (2015) argue that as permanent and transitory shocks are latent
variable, the OLS regressions used are inherently biases caused by omitted variables. More
specifically, the literature points to the effect of employment on satisfaction (Grün, Hauser,
and Rhein, 2010; L. Winkelmann and R. Winkelmann, 1998). I therefore augment each specification with a shock to employment variable ∆e. ∆e is constructed as the first-differenced
residual of an employment dummy variable on household characteristics. The employment
variable is used in OLS specification. In IV regression, the effect is instrumented by the
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lagged employment shocks. The results of table 2.7, columns 2, 4, and 6 show that the
estimation is robust to the omitted variable bias.
As suggested by the permanent income hypothesis, transitory income shocks do not
have an impact on latent happiness. However, this is the case because transitory shocks are
better insured than permanent shocks in that the transmission to consumption shock is lower.
What of consumption shocks? Brown and Gathergood (2017) shows that while income does
have an impact on life satisfaction, the impact of consumption is stronger. Furthermore,
they do find evidence of satiation in consumption (unlike income). In table 2.8, I repeat a
similar analysis as table 2.7, in that I regress consumption shocks on happiness shocks. In
unreported results, I regress total, conspicuous, and inconspicuous consumption shocks on
happiness shocks. The coefficients are respectively 0.19, 0.08, and 0.16 and are all significant
at the 1% level. The point estimates are very similar to the point estimate in table 2.7. This
is surprising considering the significant amount of consumption insurance. However, consider
equation (2.4) describing consumption shocks. ζi,t reflect consumption shocks unrelated to
income shocks. Despite limited transmission of income shocks, the coefficients on ∆c∗i,t would
incorporate preference shocks. In the previous section, the welfare difference in preferences
are incorporated in the different effects as the preference parameter is estimated with the
minimum distance estimator. It is however not observable in the data. To net these effects,
I first regress income shocks on consumption shocks and collect the fitted values. This
projection is the proportion of income shocks that translate to consumption shocks and is
then used as independent variable against satisfaction shocks.
I use total income shocks as instrument in the first two columns of table 2.8. In panel
A, I use total consumption shocks; in panel B, I use conspicuous consumption; in panel C,
I use inconspicuous consumption shocks. The consumption shocks have a stronger effect
on life satisfaction than income shocks, even controlling for employment effects32 . Indeed,
the point estimates are 0.571, 0.459. and 0.581 for total, conspicuous, and inconspicuous
shocks respectively. Brown and Gathergood (2017) suggest that conspicuous consumption
affects life satisfaction more than non-visible consumption. This does not seem to be the
case here as the point estimates are comparable. If anything, the coefficient is lower for
visible consumption suggesting that these shocks affect households to a lesser degree.
To capture permanent and transitory shocks to consumption, I use the same of instruments as in table 2.7. I project permanent or transitory income shocks onto consumption and
use the fitted values from these IV regressions in columns (3)-(6)33 . Permanent consumption
32
33

In include employment shocks in column 2
Note that odd-numbered columns include employment shocks in the instrument set.
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Table 2.8: Life Satisfaction and Consumption Shocks
This tables reports the effect of consumption shocks (permanent and transitory) on life satisfaction shocks. Income shocks are first regressed on consumption shocks. Fitted values are
then used in a regression with life satisfaction shocks as dependant variables. Only the second
stage is reported in the table. Panel A reports the results with total consumption shocks as the
main independent variable. Panel B reports the results with conspicuous consumption shocks
as the main independent variable. Panel C reports the results with inconspicuous consumption shocks as the main independent variable. Standard errors are reported in parentheses
below the coefficients. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.
IV

IV

IV

IV

IV

IV

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.151∗∗
(0.037)

0.092∗∗
(0.033)

−0.003
(0.010)

−0.002
(0.010)

0.997∗∗∗
(0.242)
−0.004
(0.010)

0.001
(0.045)
−0.002
(0.010)

0.128∗∗
(0.031)

0.034
(0.022)

−0.003
(0.010)

−0.002
(0.010)

0.724∗∗∗
(0.173)
−0.005
(0.010)

-0.005
(0.024)
−0.002
(0.010)

0.158∗∗∗
(0.038)

0.113∗∗
(0.036)

0.006
(0.055)
−0.002
(0.010)
Yes
8,916

Panel A. Total Consumption
All: β
0.571∗∗∗
(0.138)
Permanent: ψ

0.520∗∗∗
(0.145)

Transitory: φ
Constant: α

−0.003
(0.010)

Panel B. Conspicuous Consumption
All: β
0.459∗∗∗
(0.110)
Permanent: ψ

−0.003
(0.010)
0.417∗∗∗
(0.115)

Transitory: φ
Constant: α

−0.004
(0.010)

−0.004
(0.010)

Panel C. Inconspicuous Consumption
All: β
0.581∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗
(0.141)
(0.147)
Permanent: ψ

−0.003
(0.010)

−0.003
(0.010)

−0.003
(0.010)

−0.003
(0.010)

1.100∗∗∗
(0.267)
−0.004
(0.010)

No
8,916

Yes
8,916

No
8,916

Yes
8,916

No
8,916

Transitory: φ
Constant: α
Employment Shock Instrument
Observations
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shocks are consistently significant and robust to the inclusion of employment shocks (with
the exception of panel B). While transitory consumption shocks have a strong significant impact on happiness, the statistical effect disappears when controlling for employment shocks.
This suggests that consumption is sensitive to employment shocks. Furthermore, it suggests
that transitory shocks to consumption not caused by changes in employment status do not
have an impact on households’ life satisfaction. In panel B, I find that permanent shocks to
conspicuous consumption do not affect life satisfaction. This result is surprising in the light
of Brown and Gathergood (2017)’s result. As social comparison of consumption seems to be
a significant driver of life satisfaction, permanent shocks should affect households’ happiness
which is not the case here. However, as visible consumption represents a smaller part of a
household’s budget as shown in table 2.6, shocks are likely to be small, thus not registering
a significant impact on happiness.
As an alternative definition of subjective well being, I consider the K6 Index of Nonspecific Psychological Distress developed by Kessler et al. (2002). The K6 is not a measure
of subjective well being but rather measures negative emotions. It has been included in
the PSID since 200134 . PSID respondent are asked to answer 6 with “All of the time” (4
points), “Most of the time” (3 points), “Some of the time” (2 points), “A little of the time” (1
point), or “None of the time” (0 points). The points are totaled for each household. The K6
is therefore measured between 0 and 24 with a higher score indicating severe psychological
distress. The K6 index is an imperfect measure of subjective well-being as it only includes
negative emotions. Furthermore, as the question asks respondent to consider the past 30
days, it makes it complicated to establish an empirical link with income shocks. However,
Kahneman and Deaton (2010) show that income correlates similarly to positive and negative
emotions. Clingingsmith (2016) finds that higher income reduces the experience of negative
emotions. Furthermore, he finds that the income effect on serious mental illness is more
pronounced in low-income households.
In table 2.6, I report summary statistics for the K6 Index. Note that although the
K6 Index is measured from 0 to 24, I group responses into 11 tranches from 0 to 1135 .
This is done to simplify pseudo-residuals estimations but limited information is lost as few
households have K6 scores above 13. It is also to be noted that a low life satisfaction score
indicates high well-being and low K6-score indicates high emotional well-being. Both scales
are inverted to reflect the direction of shocks (i.e a positive shock to income and consumption
suggests higher than predicted income or consumption). The correlation between the two
measures is 0.39 (consistent with Kahneman and Deaton, 2010 and Clingingsmith, 2016).
34
35

To match with the life satisfaction customer, I do not include waves prior to 2009.
(0-1):0;(2-3):1;(4-5):2;(6-7):3;(8-9):4;(10-11):5;(12-13):6;(14-15):7;(16-17):8;(18-20):9;(21-24):10
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Although similar, it is not unsurprising to have different information encapsulated in these
measures. As suggested by Kimball and Willis (2006), any good happiness measure should
reflect both positive and negative emotions.
In table 2.9, I repeat the same empirical framework as in table 2.7 and table 2.8.
In panel A, I consider the impact of income shocks on negative emotion shocks. Average
income shocks have a significant impact on negative emotions. This result is robust to the
inclusion of employment shocks. In panel B, the overall shocks on consumption also have
a significant impact on negative emotions. The coefficients (0.112 and 0.446) are similar to
the coefficients found in table 2.7 and table 2.8 (0.130 and 0.520).
The results on transitory and permanent income shocks are also similar. Transitory
shocks are found to have no statistically significant impact on negative emotions, while permanent shocks have a significant impact in column (4). It is to be noted that the significance
of ψ is revealed with the inclusion of employment shocks casting doubt on the effect. Similarly, in panel B, both permanent and transitory consumption shocks are significant with
the significance fading with the inclusion of employment shocks instruments.
It is important to note the differences between life satisfaction and K6-index. The
life satisfaction question asks households to gauge their overall satisfaction. While it may
be biased towards how a household feels during the interview, it does allow the household
to consider shocks beyond a certain time frame. The K6 Index frames the emotions around
the past 30 days at the time of the interview. As shocks are measured annually, the timing
of these shocks may not necessarily coincide with negative emotions, thereby reducing the
effect. Furthermore, the effect of ξ in equation (2.19) is likely to be stronger in the K6-index.
That is, day, month of the interview, current weather, interviewees’ mood are more likely to
impact the measurement of the K6-index than in the life satisfaction question. Nonetheless,
income and consumption shocks have a significant impact on life satisfaction and negative
emotions. Furthermore, permanent shocks have a stronger impact compared to transitory
shocks. These results complement the welfare framework in showing the importance of
consumption insurance.
2.7

Conclusion

The lack of complete markets has significant welfare implications. Floden and Linde
(2001), Buera and Shin (2011), or Chetty and Looney (2006) use different frameworks and
show that even-though consumption is relatively smooth, idiosyncratic wage risk can have
significant welfare costs. Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2008) show that insuring
wage risk yield welfare improvements that are higher compared to the elimination of wage
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Table 2.9: K6 Index, Income and Consumption Shocks
This tables reports the effect of income and consumption shocks (permanent and transitory)
on negative emotion shocks shocks. Negative emotions shocks are estimated from the K6
Index using an ordered-probit regression. Panel A reports the results with income shocks as
the main independent variable. Panel B reports the results with consumption shocks as the
main independent variable. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients.
*, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

Panel A. Income Shocks
All: β

(1)

(2)

0.141∗∗∗
(0.029)

0.112∗∗∗
(0.030)

Permanent: ψ

(3)

(4)

0.281
(0.174)

0.472∗
(0.272)

Transitory: φ
Employment Shock: ∆e
Constant: α

0.165∗∗∗
(0.049)
−0.003
(0.010)

−0.003
(0.010)

Panel B. Consumption Shocks
All: β
0.560∗∗∗
(0.110)
Permanent: ψ

0.446∗∗∗
(0.115)

(5)

(6)

0.125
(0.085)

0.458
(0.326)

−1.421
(1.386)
−0.003
(0.010)

−0.002
(0.010)

0.155∗∗∗
(0.031)

0.034
(0.022)

Transitory: φ

−1.425
(1.357)
−0.004
(0.010)

−0.002
(0.010)

0.862∗∗∗
(0.174)

-0.060∗
(0.032)

Constant: α

−0.002
(0.008)

−0.002
(0.008)

−0.001
(0.008)

−0.001
(0.008)

−0.003
(0.008)

−0.001
(0.008)

Employment Shock Instrument
Observations

No
11,221

Yes
11,221

No
11,221

Yes
11,221

No
11,221

Yes
11,221
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risk. In this paper, I investigate the welfare consequences of changes in the risk-sharing
environment of US households. Indeed, Duvernois (2021) finds that households’ ability to
insure against permanent shocks slightly increased since the 1980s while transitory insurance
has deteriorated. Households experience stronger transitory shocks since the turn of the 21st
century while the variance of permanent shocks has fallen over the same period.
I use the minimum distance parameters from Duvernois (2021) and the welfare framework from Santaeulalia-Llopis and Zheng (2018). I use PSID data from 1980 to 2016 to
calculate income growth rate and saving rate. I also use the 1996 questionnaire on attitude
towards risk and methodology by Hryshko, Luengo-Prado, and Sørensen (2011) to estimate
households’ risk aversion level. I average the risk aversion measure per group and assume
it remains constant over my sample period. The welfare framework characterizes household
utility as a function of a deterministic income growth rate, stochastic income risk parameters
(variance of permanent and transitory shocks), and stochastic transmission parameters (partial insurance parameters as defined by Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston, 2008). The welfare
measure represents the percentage change in annual consumption equivalent caused by a
household theoretically stitching from one environment (baseline environment) to another
environment (counterfactual environment) characterized by different parameters.
I first estimate the framework over time and split the sample period into two blocks:
1980-1996 and 1996-2016. The average annual income growth rate is lower in the second
subsample which has significant welfare costs across all households. However, the lower risk
and better risk-sharing environment of the 21st century generates welfare gains. However,
the risk and insurance effects outweigh the growth effect only with high levels of risk aversion.
Transfer recipients and low-wealth households do have negative welfare gains as their risksharing abilities deteriorate between the two sample periods. Comparing across groups, the
results are unequivocal. Entrepreneurs, market participants, high wealth, and nontransfer
recipients have significantly higher annual consumption equivalents than their respective
counterparts as a result of their economic environments. This is true even for entrepreneurs
who experience larger risk effects. The counterfactual groups have negative growth effects
but also much higher saving rate suggesting unrealized insurance effects, which would further
increase counterfactual groups’ welfare gains.
This welfare framework is without doubt weakened by the Lucas critique as pointed
out by Santaeulalia-Llopis and Zheng (2018). To strengthen my argument that the transmission of income shocks is a significant determinant of household welfare, I make use of
the recently added life satisfaction question. Although Kimball and Willis (2006) argue that
utility and happiness are not perfect proxy of each other, Bayer and Juessen (2015) show
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that income shocks have an impact on life satisfaction. I use the same empirical strategy as
Bayer and Juessen (2015) with IV regression to investigate the impact of income shocks on
life satisfaction shocks. I find that permanent shocks have a statistically significant impact
on life satisfaction while transitory shocks do not. These results are robust to employment
shocks. Furthermore, to the extent that consumption is a stronger predictor of life satisfaction (Brown and Gathergood, 2017), I replace income shocks by consumption in the IV
regressions. Since this study aims to measure the impact of risk-sharing on household welfare, I need to identify the proportion of consumption shocks caused by income shocks. I
project income shocks on consumption shocks using the same IV regressions and use the
fitted values as permanent and transitory consumption shocks. Similarly to income shocks,
transitory shocks do not have a significant impact on life satisfaction while permanent shocks
do. Furthermore, the effects of consumption shocks on life satisfaction are larger than the
effects of income.
This paper provides evidence that the size and transmission of income shocks are
significant determinants of household welfare and life satisfaction. The relatively short time
span in which life satisfaction data is available in the PSID prevents me from investigating
how shocks affect different groups of households. This question is left for further research to
be investigated with richer datasets.
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Chapter 3

INCOME AND CONSUMPTION SHOCKS, AND PORTFOLIO CHOICE

Abstract
What are the portfolio choice implications of idiosyncratic income shocks and their transmission? Household consumption is well insured against income shocks. As idiosyncratic
income shocks are not consumed, I investigate whether these shocks have implications for
portfolio choice. Using household level income, consumption, and wealth data, I find that
positive income shocks are associated with an increase in participation, risky allocation, and
a decrease in unsecured debts. Using a two-stage instrumental variable approach, I find
that permanent shocks are invested in housing while transitory shocks are used to reduce
households’ short-term liabilities. While these results are robust to definition change, the
economic impact is obscured by the latent variable approach. As such, I can only measure
the direction of the relationship.
JEL classification: D12, D14, G11, G51
Keywords: Idiosyncratic Risk, Labor Income, Portfolio Choice, Debt
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3.1

Introduction

What are the portfolio choice implications of idiosyncratic income shocks and their
transmission? A large body of household finance literature is dedicated to understanding
the low participation puzzle. Indeed, financial markets offer investors a change to diversify
their sources of income, yet participation rates remain low. In the Panel Survey of Income
Dynamics (PSID), the average direct participation is 25% while indirect is 50%1 . Drivers
of portfolio choice are a relevant question considering the development of financial markets
(Frame and White, 2004), increased exchange-traded assets (Iachan, Nenov, and Simsek,
2021), and reduced transaction cost (Turley, 2012). Nonetheless, participation and portfolio
allocation appears suboptimal for most households.
The prevailing view argues that participation in financial market participation and allocation to risky assets depends on households’ exposure to uninsurable risk (Cocco, Gomes,
and Maenhout, 2005; Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein, 2007; Lynch and Tan, 2011).
Theoretical models (such as Viceira, 2001) argue that investors rationally invest in assets
that are uncorrelated with their labor income risk. Households try to hedge their uninsurable wage risk by making portfolio decisions. There is empirical support in the literature
(Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese, 1996; Betermier et al., 2012; Bonaparte, Korniotis, and
Kumar, 2014) that households reduce their risky share in the presence of background risk.
Furthermore, the cyclicality of background risk is critical. Palia, Qi, and Y. Wu (2014) find
that participation increases as the correlation between risk and market returns decreases.
Catherine, Sodini, and Zhang (2020) show that higher moments of risk (skewness of household idiosyncratic income risk) dominate portfolio decisions.
Fagereng, Guiso, and Pistaferri (2018) argue that proxies of background risk are incomplete and incorporate large heterogeneity components. They isolate a better proxy of
wage risk by matching households with the firm that employs them and find statistically
and economically significant support for the hedging hypothesis. Their results are in contradiction of Massa and Simonov (2006) who find that households do not hedge. They instead
invest in stocks with low information acquisition costs, familiar stocks that tend to be linked
to their wage risk.
The econometric concerns raised by Fagereng, Guiso, and Pistaferri (2018) are indeed non-trivial. Their results are economically more robust than previous results. More
importantly, there is an important bundle of papers looking at determinants of portfolio composition (Barasinska, Schäfer, and Stephan, 2012; Dimmock and Kouwenberg, 2010; Guiso,
1

Direct participation entails owning shares directly as opposed to indirectly through Individual Retirements Accounts (I.R.A).
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Sapienza, and Zingales, 2008; Renneboog and Spaenjers, 2012). Risk, loss-aversion, trust,
financial literacy, and education are strong determinant of portfolio choice.
While this paper is related to household risk, I concentrate on households’ income
shocks and their transmission to income shocks. In that regards, this paper is related to
Addoum, Delikouras, and Korniotis (2019) who show that income-consumption sensitivities
are important determinants of portfolio choice. However, I ask a simpler question. There
is significant evidence that households are well insured against income shocks; that is consumption is not highly sensitive to income shocks. Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008)
and Commault (2020) document low marginal propensity to consume out of shocks both
transitory and permanent. However, there is a gap in the literature in that I am the first
to ask how do households’ portfolio adjust to the realization of shocks, not their risk. This
paper is therefore more related to Basten, Fagereng, and Telle (2016). They show that
households’ deplete their savings in direct response to a negative employment shocks. Surprisingly, they find that households increase savings three to four years prior to the labor
shock indicating households have significant information on future shocks. Primiceri and
Van Rens (2009) argue that households do in fact possess superior information about shocks
that appears unpredictable to the econometrician. Basten, Fagereng, and Telle (2016) also
find that households reduce risky asset participation and shift composition to safer assets
following the labor shocks2 . Fagereng, Holm, and Natvik (2019) use lottery wins to investigate the impact of positive income shocks. They find a significant marginal propensity to
consume out of the shock but limited portfolio changes. They find that while savings do
increase slightly, they are consumed within the year. Similar results are found for stock and
bond investments, or changes in household debts.
I use data from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics which contains rich data
on a representative sample of US households. I concentrate on the dynamics of income,
consumption, and wealth. Following the redesign of the PSID, detailed consumption and
wealth variables are available at every wave3 . I use labor income to avoid income shocks being
correlated with portfolio performance. I calculate income and consumption shocks following
Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008). I use a latent variable approach to deal with the two
main problems in using survey based wealth data. I first calculate several ratios indicative
of household portfolio choices: stock to financial wealth, stock to total wealth, stock to total
wealth and home equity, secured debt to total debt or total wealth, unsecured debt to total
debt or total wealth, total debt to total wealth. This ratios are typically used in the literature
to describe portfolio allocation (Palia, Qi, and Y. Wu, 2014; Brown, Garino, and Taylor,
2
3

Their sample period is not long enough to determine whether the effect is permanent or transitory.
Waves are available biennially.
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2013). However, these ratios are likely to contain measurement errors (Neri and Rannalli,
2011; Vermeulen, 2016). To reduce the impact of measurement error, I assign households
to an 11-point scale from 0 to 10 depending on their respective percentages. This reduces
mismeasurement problems but not truncation problems. I use the methodology proposed
by Bayer and Juessen (2015) to estimate pseudo residuals from an ordered probit model.
The change in residuals can be understood as the change in latent utility from portfolio
allocation. This methodology has two advantages. Firstly, it removes household observed
and unobserved heterogeneity in portfolio decision. By removing household characteristics
and fixed effects, I can identify the impact of income or consumption shocks on portfolio
choices. Secondly, I can use simple linear regression models and do not have to use truncated
models to account for low participation.
The main independent variable becomes idiosyncratic labor income shocks and the left
hand side variables become latent portfolio choices. Another benefit of such a framework is
that it allows from more complex income and transmission processes. Indeed, income shocks,
defined as changes in residuals, are a weighted average of permanent and transitory shocks.
While latent and unobserved variables themselves, they play an important role. Indeed,
Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008), Kaplan and Violante (2010), or Bayer and Juessen
(2015) show that transitory shocks have a much lower (if any) impact on consumption
or happiness than permanent shocks do. I therefore use a set of instruments describe by
Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) and formally used by Bayer and Juessen (2015) to
measure the impact of different shocks on household portfolio choices.
A drawback of this framework is that it obscures the economic impact. While less
important in happiness studies, quantifying the actual shift in portfolio composition would
have been interesting. I can nonetheless look at the direction of the impact of shocks. I find
that positive income shocks to household labor increase their latent portfolio participation.
However, only permanent shocks that are transmitted to consumption have a statistically
significant impact on portfolio choice. This is caused by the lack of permanent insurance.
Households consume a significant portion of these shocks. On the other hand, transitory
income shocks are significantly impactful for household participation; only for stocks and
do not impact I.R.As allocation. These results hold true for different measures of risky
allocations as well. Furthermore, the results are robust to the definition of permanent shocks.
I also investigate the impact of shocks on household debt. I find that households
experiencing positive labor income shocks reduce their share of unsecured debt. However, the
effect only holds true for transitory shocks. Permanent shocks induce an increase in secured
debt. Secured debt is comprised of mostly mortgage debt. This indicate that households use
118

permanent shocks to lever up and increase their housing investment. This result is supported
by Cocco (2005) who show that housing and stock investments are substitutes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 will connect this work to
the related literature. Section 3.3 will describe the data I use. Section 3.4 will describe the
methodology used to estimate shocks. Section 3.5 will present results and section 3.6 will
conclude.
3.2

Literature Review

The literature on household portfolio choice tends to focus on uninsurable risk. While
household risk is generate via a myriad of sources, the most prominent source across a
majority of households is wage risk or labor income risk. The empirical consensus is that
households’ avoid unnecessary risks and will reduce their ownership of risky assets in the
presence of uninsurable wage risk. This is often referred to as the income hedging motive.
Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) develop a model to show that in the presence of
labor risk, agents will increase their investments in risky assets, assuming labor income is
uncorrelated with equity returns. Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2007) look at
portfolio choice in a market when labor income and dividends are cointegrated. Their model
fit empirical facts that older households hold more of their wealth in stocks contrary to
conventional wisdom. Lynch and Tan (2011) argue that countercyclical variation in labor
income growth plays a significant role in portfolio dynamics. This result is supported by
Bonaparte, Korniotis, and Kumar (2014) who find that individuals with low income-return
correlation have a higher propensity to participate in financial markets and higher allocation
toward risky assets in samples of Dutch and American households.
Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese (1996) find that Italian households will hold a lower
proportion of risky asset when experiencing higher background risk. Furthermore, when
faced with idiosyncratic risk, households become concerned with borrowing constraints and
allocate wealth to more liquid assets. Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese (1996) rely on subjective expectations on risk which is appealing to the econometrician as it encompasses only
information available to households4 . However, as all survey measurements, the expectations
are prone to errors. This is further compounded by measurement errors in wealth (Neri and
Rannalli, 2011; Vermeulen, 2016). To mitigate measurement errors, researchers can use administrative records. Betermier et al. (2012) use Swedish household records and find that
households do adjust their portfolio depending on human capital risk. Their study is robust
to heterogeneity mismeasurement. Indeed, Fagereng, Guiso, and Pistaferri (2018) point out
4
Hochguertel (2003) uses similar expectations in Dutch panel and Kézdi and Willis (2009) in an American
panel and finds similar results.
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that unobserved heterogeneity may contribute to both background risk and portfolio allocation. Betermier et al. (2012) circumvent this issue by looking at households that switch
industries creating an exogenous shock to wage risk.
It is important to point out that the hedging motive is not the only driving force of
portfolio choice. Massa and Simonov (2006) argue that portfolio choice models often only
consider three components: uninsurable risk, a risky asset, and a risk-free asset. These considerations are done to match survey data which seldom provides specific holdings. They use
Swedish data which allows them to match income and wealth data to specific holdings. Their
findings are contrary to hedging. Indeed, they find that households invest in stocks which
are linked to their labor income. They coin the term familiarity to explain this phenomenon;
households invest in stocks in which information is cheaper to acquire. Another mechanism
at play is the transmission of these income shocks to consumption shocks. Addoum, Delikouras, and Korniotis (2019) find that households’ whose consumption is more sensitive to
income shocks have stronger incentives to hedge and thus invest more in risky assets.
The studies cited above all share a common econometric issue in that the proxy for
background risk is not necessarily robust. Risk is often defined as residuals (or change in
residuals) from regressions removing household characteristics from income. Primiceri and
Van Rens (2009) argue that these unpredictable changes are, in fact, known to households
and only unknown to the observer. Fagereng, Guiso, and Pistaferri (2018) use administrative
data from Norway and match households’ income and wealth to the companies that employ
them. This rich data allow them to isolate heterogeneous wage risk that depends on workers
earnings’ variation. They find that the effect of wage risk on portfolio choice is significant.
Indeed, the effect is much larger than estimates from previous studies ignoring econometric
issues.
The small economic impact of covariance risk on portfolio choice along with papers
showing that cyclical skewness in labor income risk fits equity premium data (Constantinides
and Ghosh, 2017; Schmidt, 2016; Guvenen et al., 2015) has motivated researchers to look at
higher moments’ impact on portfolio choice. Catherine, Sodini, and Zhang (2020) find that
households facing skewed income risk in low market returns environments participate less
and invest lower amounts in stocks. Shen (2018) shows that cyclical skewness in idiosyncratic
income risk is transmitted to both consumption growth and portfolio allocation.
In addition to the impact of wage risk on portfolio choice, another strand of literature focuses on the heterogeneous determinants mentioned above. Barasinska, Schäfer, and
Stephan (2012) use a reliable measure of risk preferences from the German Socioeconomic
Panel and find that more risk averse individuals hold fewer assets and concentrate their hold120

ings in risk-free assets. Furthermore, they find that borrowing constraints and precautionary
motives are significant predictors of portfolio choice, echoing results by Guiso, Jappelli, and
Terlizzese (1996). However, they conclude that the low participation puzzle5 cannot be explained alone by risk attitudes and argue that financial literacy or participation costs may
play an important role. Similarly, Dimmock and Kouwenberg (2010) use data from the The
Netherlands and estimate households’ loss aversion. They find that loss averse households
have a lower probability of participation. When they do participate, they are more likely
to hold mutual funds rather than individual stock, suggesting heterogeneity in households
affects both choice and allocation. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) show that trust in
the stock market is also a strong determinant of participation. Trust in stock markets is also
a central theme of Renneboog and Spaenjers (2012) who show that religious attitudes are
related to household finance behaviors.
Risk and loss preferences are difficult concepts to measure. There are other easier
to measure variables affecting portfolio choice. Branikas, Hong, and Xu (2020) show that
household residence location is linked to portfolio choice and the demand for stocks. They
argue that their results are driven by economic prospects expectation of the target location.
However latent, a household’s choice of residence may reflect a certain demand for stocks.
Rosen and S. Wu (2004) find that households with poorer health are less likely to hold
stocks. However, Love and Smith (2010) argue that a proper econometric treatment renders
any effect insignificant. Wiemann and Lumsdaine (2020) find that health care uncertainty
alone is enough to drive portfolio choice. In additional to health and health care risk, Bogan
and Fertig (2013) show that poor mental health reduces risky holdings and increases riskfree holdings. Spaenjers and Spira (2015) use a subjective life horizon question in the 1995
Survey of Consumer Finances and find that households with longer life horizons invest more
in risky assets. Love (2010) shows that family composition matters for portfolio choice,
mainly marital status and the presence of children. Alessie, Hochguertel, and Soest (2004)
further the argument on heterogeneity in household and portfolio decisions by showing it
correlates to ownership in stocks or mutual funds. They find that unobserved heterogeneity
influences how much to invest but also which assets to invest in.
On the other side of asset allocation, there is debt allocation. As borrowing constraints
appear to be driving portfolio choice in the presence of uninsurable wage risk, a small portion
of the literature focuses on household debts. As risk attitudes are linked to asset allocation, so
is debt allocation. Brown, Garino, and Taylor (2013) find that highly risk averse households
tend to accumulate less debt. Jiang and Lim (2018) show that trusting households hold
5

Another econometric issues which forces the research to truncate a significant portion of the sample.
Note that this low participation puzzle is common to many countries and datasets.
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more debt but are also less likely to default. Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, and Liu (2011)
find that many households characteristics affecting financial market participation (marital
status, children, education, etc.) also affects debt levels. Almenberg et al. (2020) find that
household characteristics can be proxies for attitudes towards debt. Furthermore, they argue
that debt attitudes have social and cultural dimensions.
However, to the best of my knowledge, I am the first to investigate a direct link
between household income shocks and debt allocation. The literature focuses on choice in
the presence of risk. I chose to focus on households’ response to shocks. That is, I ask what
is the marginal allocation (in either assets or debt) of income shocks? In other words, what
is the marginal propensity to invest out of labor income shocks. The following section will
describe the data and empirical strategy.
3.3

Data

I use data from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is a survey of
American households covering consumption, income, and wealth6 . Furthermore, the survey
is longitudinal and follows the same households wave after wave. The panel dimension
allows the use of more robust econometric estimators. While the PSID started in 1968 with
a representative sample of 5,000 households, I use data from the 1999-2019 waves. The PSID
underwent redesign in 1999 in two impact ways for this paper. Firstly, the wealth module
is administered at every wave as opposed to every 5 years prior to 1999. This allows me to
track households’ financial market participation status, financial holdings, wealth, and debts
without resorting to imperfect identification techniques as in Guvenen (2007). Secondly,
the PSID expanded the expenditure categories to include items beyond food consumption.
These items now cover to 70% of the categories covered by the CEX7 (Blundell, Pistaferri, and
Saporta-Eksten, 2016). This allows me to estimate consumption shocks without resorting
to imputation techniques as in Attanasio and Pistaferri (2014), Blundell, Pistaferri, and
Preston (2008), or Fisher and Johnson (2020). One drawback of using the redesigned PSID
is the frequency of the data. Surveys are now administered every other year, which may
obscure certain transmission mechanisms between waves.
Although wealth and expenditure data starts in 1999, I will use first differenced data
and thus require previous wave data. My sample period is thus 1997-2019, which covers 11
distinct surveys. The main measure of income is household disposable labor income. Labor
6
The PSID actually contains a wide range of topics but the main interest of this papers focuses on these
three dimensions of the survey
7
The Consumer Expenditure Survey is the survey of reference when it comes to household consumption
patterns. However, it lacks a panel dimension.
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income is defined as the sum of labor income of reference person, spouse (if present), and
other family members8 (if present). I estimate households’ federal taxes using NBER Taxsim
and guidelines by Feenberg and Coutts (1993) and Kimberlin, Kim, and Shaefer (2014). This
tax liability is estimated over all sources of income. I therefore calculate the ratio of labor
income to taxable income and assume that ratio is the proportion of taxes paid out of labor
income.
Consumption is defined as the sum of all 1999 expenditure categories. Further categories where added in 2005 but I only consider items present in all waves for consistency.
The items are home insurance, electricity, heating, water, miscellaneous utilities, car insurance, car repairs, gasoline, parking, bus fares, taxi fares, other transportation, school tuition,
other school expenses, child care, health insurance, out-for pocket health, rent, food at home,
food away from home, and food delivered. For home owners, I follow Flavin and Yamashita
(2002) and Attanasio and Pistaferri (2014) and impute a rent expenditure equal to 6% of
the reported house value.
In the wealth modules of 1984, 1989, and 1994, financial assets are grouped into
one category containing direct ownership of stocks, mutual funds, or through I.R.As. After
1999, these two categories are separated, allowing me to identify households that participate
directly or indirectly in financial markets. These separation is important as Bonaparte,
Korniotis, and Kumar (2020) point out; there is limited trading activity in I.R.A accounts.
I define stock owners as households with a positive value of reported stock ownership; I
define I.R.A owners as households with a positive value of reported I.R.A ownership. I also
identify households that own positive values in either accounts or both. Indeed, Alessie,
Hochguertel, and Soest (2004) identify state dependence between the ownership of the two
types of assets suggesting switching costs. I then define several ratios of households risky
asset share. I scale the value of stocks with financial wealth, total wealth without home
equity, and total wealth with home equity following Palia, Qi, and Y. Wu (2014). I define
financial wealth as the sum of stocks, I.R.As, and cash, savings account, and treasury bills.
This ratio is the risky share of financial assets. Scaling financial wealth by total wealth
considers further investment vehicles available to households such as non-public business
or non-residential real estate investments. I consider total wealth without home equity as
imputed rent expenditure is part of consumption. The inclusion of house value explicitly in
wealth or implicitly in consumption may induce measurement errors. I also consider these
three ratios with the sum of stocks and I.R.As as the numerator. I.R.As are not riskless
8

Labor income of other family members is not consistently measured across waves. For consistency, I
use OFUMs taxable income. Although taxable income may contain financial asset income which may bias
the estimation. However, taxable OFUM income represents a small portion of household income.
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assets and the choice to invest and how much to invest may be depend on the households’
labor income risk profile.
The wealth module does not only consider households’ assets but also debts. I define
two types of debt following Brown, Garino, and Taylor (2013): secured and unsecured debts.
Unsecured debt is the sum of debt categories such as for credit card charges, student loans,
medical bills, legal bills, and loans from relatives. I define secured debt as the sum of debt
categories such as mortgages9 , debt on business or farms, and debt on other real estate
holdings. Household total debt is the sum of secured and unsecured debt. I calculate 5 debt
ratios, secured debt to total debt, unsecured debt to total debt, secured debt to total wealth,
unsecured debt to total wealth, and total debt to total wealth. Note that these ratios are
truncated at 1; that is, households whose debts are worth more than their assets have a
maximum debt ratio of 100%. Although incorrect, this is an issue for a very small number
of households.
All income, consumption, and wealth data are deflated to 2010 dollars. Although
data quality is not necessarily an issue in the PSID, it is nonetheless survey-based and not
administrative records. I therefore apply several filters to ensure data quality. I exclude
households with 0 food consumption10 . I exclude households with missing observations on
education, region of residence, age of reference person, and employment status. I exclude
households with a retired reference person. Furthermore, if the reference person retires at
any point during the sample period, previous observations for these households are also
dropped. I require the reference person to be between 25 and 65 years old. I only consider
households from the Survey of Research Center sample and exclude households from the
Survey of Economic Opportunities and immigrant refresher samples. I remove households
whose income is less than $100, grows by more than 500% or falls by more than 80%. Finally,
I require all households to have at least 4 continuous observations to be included.
The final sample is composed of 3,035 unique households and 21,771 household-year
observations. Table 3.1 reports summary statistics for the final sample. The average and median disposable labor income are $98,595 and $76,919 respectively. While this seems higher
than nationally representative statistics, the sample selection criteria are constructed in a
way that exclude low-income households. Indeed, by considering labor income, households
whose main income source is government transfers are excluded from the sample. Household
consumption is on average $38,541. 22.1% of the sample own stocks, 35.3% own I.R.As,
14.5% own both, and 42.9% own either. The average financial portfolio is composed of
9
10

Reference persons are asked about their first and second mortgages.
This filter also excludes households with 0 total consumption
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
This presents summary statistics for the final sample used. This sample covers the 19972019 PSID surveys. 1997 and 1999 are only kept for conditioning, first-differencing, and
instrumentation. It is composed of 21,771 household year observations and 3,035 unique
households. Labor income is the sum of labor income for all household members (including
reference person, spouse, and other family members). Federal taxes, estimating with NBER
Taxsim, are deducted from labor income to calculate disposable labor income. The proportion
of labor to total income is used to adjusted households’ tax liabilities. Households must have
$100 of income and income growth between -80% and 500% to be included. Total household
consumption is the sum of all expenditure categories in the 1999 survey. Household are
required to have positive food and total consumption. Household with non-zero stock or
I.R.A ownership have a value of 1. Financial wealth is defined as the sum of stock, I.R.As,
checking and savings accounts, CDs, and treasury bills. Secured debt is the sum of mortgages,
business or farm debt, and other real estate debt. Unsecured debt is the sum of credit card
debt, legal and medical bills, student loans, and loans from relatives.

Disposable Labor Income
Total Household Consumption
Stock Ownership
I.R.As Ownership
Stock and I.R.As Ownership
Stock or I.R.As Ownership
Stk./Financial Wealth
Stk&IRA./Financial Wealth
Stk./Wealth w/out home equity
Stk&IRA./Wealth w/out home equity
Stk./Wealth with home equity
Stk&IRA./Wealth with home equity
Secured/Total Debt
Unsecured/Total Debt

Mean

St. Dev.

25th P ctl.

Median

75th P ctl.

93,595
38,541
0.221
0.353
0.145
0.429
0.095
0.302
0.066
0.207
0.043
0.136
0.591
0.268

105,419
23,770
0.415
0.478
0.352
0.495
0.229
0.392
0.184
0.327
0.133
0.240
0.450
0.396

48,276
23,642
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

76,919
33,474
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.9
0.04

113,402
46,819
0
1
0
1
0
0.7
0
0.4
0
0.2
1.0
0.3
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10% of stocks and 30.2% of financial risky assets. When considering a broader definition
of wealth, the financial risky share of household portfolio is 13.6%. The average household
holds 60% of its debt in mortgages.
3.4

Shocks to Income, Consumption, and Portfolio

Estimating idiosyncratic shocks to households’ income and consumption is straight
forward. I regress log income (or consumption) on a set of household characteristics, collect
the residuals, and first difference them. For example, income shocks can be written as:
∆yi,t = log(yi,t+2 )∗ − log(yi,t )∗ ,

(3.1)

\
log(yi,t )∗ = log(yi,t ) − f (t,
Zi,t )

(3.2)

where log(yi,t )∗ is:

Note that equations (3.1) and (3.2) are used to estimate consumption shocks noted
as ∆ci,t . Equation (3.2) represents the difference between the actual and fitted values from
a pooled OLS regression with log income or log consumption as the dependant variable.
f (t, Zi,t ) is a vector of household characteristics containing family size, number of children,
and dummy variables for education11 , region of residence, year of birth, year, employment
status, marital status, race of reference person12 , presence of income earning spouse, presence
of income earning other family members, gender of the reference person, and whether the
household supports children outside of the household. These variables are allowed to vary
with time. Similar regressions are used in Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008), or Gervais
and Klein (2010).
As seen in table 3.1, the wealth variables are skewed towards 0. Indeed, a majority
of households do not hold any financial assets or debts. This fact creates estimation issues.
This is usually resolved in the literature by employing a 2-stage Heckman (Heckman, 1979) to
account for the probability of participation. However, this not does solve all estimation issues
in this case. Indeed, participation and portfolio allocation is extremely likely to be affected
by a series of unobservable household characteristics. The most likely are risk aversion
and future expectations (Bucciol, Miniaci, and Pastorello, 2017; Barasinska, Schäfer, and
Stephan, 2012; Kézdi and Willis, 2009). Furthermore, while I can observe the decision to
participate in financial markets or not, or the allocation of risky assets, I cannot observe the
11
12

Less than high school, high school diploma, some college or more
white, black, or other.
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net utility of said decision. I am therefore interested in the latent variable and the impact
of shocks on the latent variable. This is a well-known problem in the subjective well-being
literature. I adopt the methodology by Bayer and Juessen (2015) to estimate the effect of
shocks on latent participation and portfolio allocation. Consider a household’s share of risky
assets si,t generated by an ordered Probit model such as:
si,t = s∗i,t + f (t, zi,t )

(3.3)

s∗i,t = s∗∗ (Ψi,t ) + µsi + ξi,t

(3.4)

I assume that latent portfolio allocation is additively separable in household characteristics (zi,t ), household fixed effects (µsi ), and an i.i.d error term capturing survey measurement error (ξi,t ). I can remove the effect of household observable characteristics in a
first-stage regression. Latent portfolio allocation is the residual from this regression. I can
further remove the household fixed effects by first-differencing s∗i,t . I can then estimate the
marginal effect of shocks (Ψi,t could be income or consumption shocks) on latent portfolio
choice or portfolio allocation13 .
Bayer and Juessen (2015) use this type of framework on a happiness variable that is
measured on a scale from 0 to 10. I assume that the portfolio allocation is generated by an
ordered Probit but the actual measured variable is not. In fact, it is a continuous variable
between 0 and 1. I thus bucket the ratios presented in table 3.1 on a 11-point scale between
0 and 1. Households with 0 values are given 0 point; households with a ratio between 0.01%
and 9.99% are given 1 point; and so on. This re-measuring serves two purpose. First, I can
then estimate an ordered Probit. Second, it reduces a well-known measurement error. As
pointed by Neri and Rannalli (2011) and Vermeulen (2016), measuring wealth in surveys is a
tricky endeavor. Heaton and Lucas (2000) show that portfolio composition and the impact of
demographics is sensitive to wealth measurements and definitions. Vermeulen (2016) further
emphasizes measurement issues for financial wealth which tends to be under-reported. By
segmenting portfolio allocation in large increments, the effect of mismeasuring wealth is likely
to be attenuated. I recognize that this could increase measurement error in ξi,t if households
get assigned a non-continuous value that is above or below their true allocation. However,
this is only likely for households near breakpoints and thus not likely to be a significant issue.
13

Note that I use portfolio choice for participation, and portfolio allocation for the amount invested in
risk assets (or debts).
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I therefore follow Bayer and Juessen (2015) in estimating latent allocation from observed portfolio allocation. I assume that allocation si,t is determined by:
si,t = j if s∗∗
¯ ]
i,t ∈ (c¯j , cj+1

(3.5)

I estimate the effects of household characteristics and cutoff values c¯j with a standard
ordered Probit estimator. Note that f (t, zi,t ) is the same set of variables and interactions
used in equation (3.2) when estimation income and consumption shocks. Thus, the same
effect of risk aversion impacting portfolio choice and household self-selecting in industry
with smoother labor income profiles can be removed. Given the estimated f\
(t, zi,t ), I infer
∗
an interval Si,t = (c˜¯sit − f[
¯sit+1 − f[
t,zi,t , c˜
t,zi,t ], where the true latent allocation si,t is. I
∗
then assume normality for vi,t
are calculate the conditional expected value of residual latent
∗
portfolio allocation (si,t ):
R
s∗i,t =

s∈Si,t

sφ(s)

Φ(Si,t )

,

(3.6)

where φ is the density and Φ(S) the probability of S for a standard normal distribution. I use s∗i,t as a measure of latent allocation s∗i,t . Bayer and Juessen (2015) argue that
this method is an extension and generalization of Van Praag (2004) probit-OLS procedure.
Furthermore, working with first differenced-residuals on both sides allows me to use simple
linear regression to estimate the effects of shocks. This procedure is applied to all financial
wealth and debt ratios of table 3.1. Each of the continuous variables is sorted into tranches
of 10%. It is also applied to participation despite the ordinal variable being either 0 or 1.
This results in only one cutoff point being equal to the constant term from a simple probit
model.
3.5

Results

The main goal of this analysis is to investigate the impact of idiosyncratic income
and consumption shocks on portfolio decisions both choice and allocation. As pointed out
in the previous section, the ordered probit removal of characteristics allows for simple linear
regression of the following form:
∆s∗i,t = α + β∆yi,t + ε

(3.7)

∆s∗i,t can be calculated using any of the wealth and debt ratios. Furthermore, ∆yi,t
can be replaced by ∆ci,t or any other shock proxies. I first consider the impact of average
income and consumption shocks on latent portfolio choice. That is, how the latent ownership
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status of households responds to idiosyncratic income or consumption shocks. The results
are presented in table 3.2. I consider the impact of income shocks in panel A and the
impact of consumption shocks in panel B. In panel C, I first regress income shocks and
consumption shocks and use the fitted values as the measure of shocks. Indeed, there is
significant evidence in the literature14 . The fitted values are therefore the share of income
shocks that get transmitted to income shocks.
The dependant variables are the latent participation variables. I consider four choices
made by households: invest directly in stocks or mutual funds (1), invest indirectly through
investments vehicles such as I.R.As (2), invest in both (3), and invest in either (4). In panel
A, all coefficients are significantly positive. These results suggest that income shocks have a
positive impact on households’ participation decisions. The point estimate for specification
(1) is larger than the point estimate for specification (2) (0.083 vs 0.052). While both positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level, this would suggest that income shocks have a
stronger impact on the decision to directly invest in the stock markets. The coefficients for
specifications (3) and (4) are similar to the ones for (1) and (2), suggesting that the two
investment vehicles are not substitute. The decision to invest in either is separate.
In panel B, the coefficients are also statistically positive at the 1% level. However, the
point estimates are now larger for investing in I.R.As in specifications (2) and (4). Indeed,
the coefficient for stocks is 0.038 vs 0.086 for I.R.As. Unexplained consumption ∆c can be
written as the sum of transmitted income shocks and changes in consumption independent
of income shocks such as preference shocks, or innovation to higher moments of the income
process (Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston, 2008)15 :

∆ci,t = β∆yi,t + Ξi,t

(3.8)

In panel C, I remove the effect of Ξ in equation (3.8) by estimating the fitted values
of ∆y on ∆c. A small proportion of income shocks (11%) get transmitted to consumption
shocks. The results are therefore similar to the patterns observed in panel A. Income shocks
that are transmitted to consumption shocks impact the decision to participated in financial
markets directly more so than the decision to indirectly participate. These results, taken
with the results of panel B, suggest that is partly driven by consumption shocks independent
of income shocks. ∆c may be capturing preference shifts not removed in the first stage
14

See Mace, 1991; Cochrane, 1991; Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston, 2008; Gervais and Klein, 2010
Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) argue that Ξ may also contain measurement error in consumption. They add a specific term ui,t to catch the measurement error. As I use measured expenditure as
opposed to imputed consumption, measurement error is less likely to be an issue.
15
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Table 3.2: Latent Portfolio Choice and Average Idiosyncratic Shocks
This table reports the OLS estimation of equation (3.7). The dependant variables are latent
participation estimated with the framework presented in section (3.3) and equations (3.3) to
(3.6). Stocks refers to latent direct participation. I.R.As refer to latent indirect participation. Both refers to households who have non-zero funds in both stocks and I.R.A accounts.
Either refers to households who have non-zero funds in both stocks and I.R.A accounts. The
independent variables are ∆y and ∆c estimated using equations (3.1) and (3.2) for panels A
and B respectively. In panel C, the effect of Ξ in equation (3.8) is removed. Standard errors
are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.

Ownership of :

Stocks
(1)

I.R.A
(2)

Both
(3)

Either
(4)

0.052∗∗∗
(0.018)

0.098∗∗∗
(0.018)

0.054∗∗∗
(0.018)

−0.003
(0.007)

0.009
(0.006)

0.003
(0.007)

Panel B. Consumption Shocks
Shocks : ∆c
0.038∗∗
0.086∗∗∗
(0.019)
(0.021)

0.061∗∗∗
(0.020)

0.077∗∗∗
(0.020)

0.010
(0.006)

0.003
(0.007)

0.916∗∗∗
(0.169)

0.510∗∗∗
(0.171)

0.007
(0.007)

0.002
(0.007)

Panel A. Income Shocks
Shocks : ∆y
0.083∗∗∗
(0.017)
Constant : α

Constant : α

0.016∗∗∗
(0.006)

0.016∗∗∗
(0.006)

−0.003
(0.007)

Panel C. Consumption Shocks Projection
c
Shocks : ∆c
0.775∗∗∗
0.490∗∗∗
(0.155)
(0.172)
Constant : α

0.013∗∗
(0.006)

−0.004
(0.007)
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estimation. However, these preference shifts are unlikely impact risk aversion. Indeed,
I.R.As are likely to be safer investment vehicles than individual investment accounts. I.R.As
are managed by professionals and are diversified. On the other hand, individuals investors
are seldom fully diversified (Ivković, Sialm, and Weisbenner, 2008).
The income shocks described by equation (3.1) can be understood as the sum of
two components: permanent and transitory. Modeling income as such is common is this
literature (Kaplan and Violante, 2010):
yi,t = Pi,t + vi,t ,

(3.9)

where Pi,t , the permanent component, is a martingale process with serially uncorrelated innovations ζi,t . The transitory component is a MA(0) process with serially uncorrelated innovations εi,t . The innovations in permanent and transitory components are
independently and identically distributed. I can therefore write the growth in unexplained
income growth as:
∆yi,t = ζi,t + εi,t

(3.10)

The transmission of shocks to latent portfolio variables can be written as:
∆s∗i,t = φζi,t + ψεi,t

(3.11)

Unfortunately, just as latent portfolio choice is unobserved, neither permanent nor
transitory shocks are observed. Fortunately, Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) offer an
instrumental variable approach to the Minimum Distance Estimator (also used in Bayer and
∗
∗
Juessen, 2015). I follow their example and use yi,t+1
− yi,t−2
as an instrument for permanent
∗
shocks, and ∆yi,t+1
as an instrument for transitory shocks. See Blundell, Pistaferri, and
Preston (2008) or Kaplan and Violante (2010) for a detailed explanation of the proposed
instruments. Permanent and transitory are transmitted to consumption (or ∆s∗i,t ) with
parameters φ and ψ respectively with φ 6= ψ. I employ a two-stage process to measure the
impact of “permanent” and “transitory” consumption shocks. I first use the IV framework
with consumption shocks on the left hand-side and estimate the fitted values. I then use the
fitted values as independent variables in a simple OLS regression with latent variables on
the left-hand side. I repeat the analysis of table 3.2 with permanent shocks in table 3.3.
In panel A, I use the IV regression with latent participation as the dependent variable.
The coefficients on permanent income shocks are not significant for the first 3 specification
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Table 3.3: Latent Portfolio Choice and Permanent Idiosyncratic Shocks
This table presents the impact of permanent shocks on latent portfolio choice. In panel A,
∗
∗
I use an IV regression with yi,t+1
− yi,t−2
as an instrument for permanent shocks and latent
choice as the dependent variable. Only the first stage is reported. In panel B, I first use
the IV regression with consumption shocks as the dependent variable and estimate the fitted
values. These fitted values, representing permanent consumption shocks, are then used in a
simple linear regression with latent choice as the dependant variable. Stocks refers to latent
direct participation. I.R.As refer to latent indirect participation. Both refers to households
who have non-zero funds in both stocks and I.R.A accounts. Either refers to households who
have non-zero funds in both stocks and I.R.A accounts. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

Stocks
(1)

I.R.A
(2)

Both
(3)

Either
(4)

0.147
(0.092)

0.059
(0.093)

0.239∗∗∗
(0.092)

−0.006
(0.008)

0.001
(0.008)

−0.003
(0.008)

Panel B. Consumption Shocks Projection
c
Shocks : ∆c
0.352∗∗∗
0.239∗∗
0.345∗∗∗
(0.086)
(0.093)
(0.094)

0.275∗∗∗
(0.093)

Panel A. Income Shocks
Shocks : ∆y
0.137
(0.085)
Constant : α

Constant : α

0.009
(0.007)

0.009
(0.007)

−0.005
(0.008)
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−0.000
(0.008)

−0.001
(0.008)

(Stocks, I.R.As. both) but is significantly positive for the latent participation in either.
These results might suggest that permanent income shocks have no impact on the decision
to participate in financial markets which would be surprising. However, consider the results presented in panel B. The transmission of permanent income shocks to consumption
is approximately 39% which is consistent with estimates in the literature. The projection
of permanent income shocks on consumption on latent portfolio choice yields statistically
significant and positive coefficients. Permanent income shocks have a significant impact on
portfolio choice if they are transmitted to consumption shocks. As in table 3.1, the point
estimate for stock participation appears larger than the point estimate for I.R.As. The result that permanent income shocks do not have an impact on participation but permanent
consumption shocks do is puzzling. I offer two potential explanations. The first one relates
to Campbell and Cochrane (1999) habit formation hypothesis. Positive income shocks that
do not get transmitted to consumption shocks do not affect the level of habit. As such the
agent’s risk aversion remains unchanged and so does their portfolio. On the other hand, income shocks that do get transmitted to consumption shocks result in the agent being above
their habit level, reduces risk aversion, and increases the participation. The second alternative is more mechanical. Households are not perfectly insured against permanent shocks
and thus consume a significant portion of income shocks. A smaller portion of these shocks
remain for households to allocate to assets and debts. The projection is not the proportion
of shocks allocated to investments but rather the consumed portion. From an estimation
perspective, it is simply (1 − ψ) ∗ ∆y as opposed to ψ∆y and are therefore perfectly correlated. In panel B, I therefore measure the impact of shocks that remains after they have
been transmitted to consumption.
I repeat the same analysis with transitory shocks in table 3.4. Unlike the coefficients
on permanent shocks, some of the coefficients on transitory income are statistically significant. More specifically, the coefficients on stock participation and participation in both. The
coefficients on I.R.As and either (specifications 2 and 4) are not, suggesting that the significance of the coefficient is the result of stock participation. The positive coefficients indicate
that participation increases following positive transitory shocks. In contrast to table 3.3,
this is surprising. Indeed, one would expect transitory shocks to have less of an impact on
participation. The significant impact may indicate that investors have short term horizons.
However, this would imply that households have exact information on the nature of shocks
their incur. Kaufmann and Pistaferri (2009) do find that households have some superior
information.
Looking at panel B, I infer a high degree of transitory insurance. The share of
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Table 3.4: Latent Portfolio Choice and Transitory Idiosyncratic Shocks
This table presents the impact of transitory shocks on latent portfolio choice. In panel A, I
∗
as an instrument for transitory shocks and latent choice
use an IV regression with ∆yi,t+1
as the dependent variable. Only the first stage is reported. In panel B, I first use the IV
regression with consumption shocks as the dependent variable and estimate the fitted values.
These fitted values, representing transitory consumption shocks, are then used in a simple
linear regression with latent choice as the dependant variable. Stocks refers to latent direct
participation. I.R.As refer to latent indirect participation. Both refers to households who
have non-zero funds in both stocks and I.R.A accounts. Either refers to households who have
non-zero funds in both stocks and I.R.A accounts. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **,
and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

Stocks
(1)

I.R.A
(2)

Both
(3)

Either
(4)

−0.044
(0.061)

0.120∗∗
(0.061)

−0.032
(0.061)

0.000
(0.007)

0.002
(0.007)

0.008
(0.007)

Panel B. Consumption Shocks Projection
c
Shocks : ∆c
2.636∗∗∗
2.036∗∗∗
2.923∗∗∗
(0.545)
(0.596)
(0.595)

2.151∗∗∗
(0.596)

Panel A. Income Shocks
Shocks : ∆y
0.123∗∗
(0.056)
Constant : α

Constant : α

0.015∗∗
(0.007)

0.002
(0.007)

−0.011
(0.008)
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−0.012
(0.008)

−0.004
(0.008)

transitory variance transmitted to consumption is approximately 5%16 . This would suggest
that the marginal propensity to consume out of transitory shocks is low, thus leaving a
larger share of shocks to invest in stocks. Alternatively, a negative shocks would decrease
latent participation. In this case, a household would exit the market, divest assets, and
use the proceeds to fund consumption, explaining the high degree of transitory consumption
insurance. While transitory income shocks do not affect latent I.R.A participation, it appears
that transitory consumption shocks does. This would imply that given a high enough degree
of consumption insurance, households are more likely to participate in retirement accounts
following positive transitory shocks to their income. This implies that habit formation and
changes to risk aversion are not likely to drive these results. Indeed, as transitory shocks are
well insured and have limited impact on consumption shocks, there is no reason to believe
a positive shock would shift consumption above habit levels. However, the low marginal
propensity to consume out of transitory shocks implies households with positive transitory
shocks have more disposable income not to consume with but to invest with.
I have shown that average, permanent, and transitory shocks have an impact on
households’ portfolio choice. I then test whether these same shocks affect portfolio allocation.
I test whether households allocate more to their risky assets relative to three definitions of
wealth: financial wealth, wealth excluding, and including home equity. Scaling the value
of stocks with financial wealth reflects the share of risk assets invested in financial assets.
Scaling the value of stocks with total wealth reflects the decision to invest in risky financial
assets relative to the investment set available to the household. Indeed, households may
choose to invest in non-dwelling real estate or businesses with the lack of investment in stocks
being the portfolio allocation choice. I consider two wealth ratios including and excluding
housing wealth as Cocco (2005) show that housing investments serve as a substitute for stock
investment. I first test the impact of average idiosyncratic income and consumption shocks
in table 3.5. In panel A, I use idiosyncratic income shocks as the independent variable. I
find the coefficients on wealth ratios using only stocks in the numerator to be statistically
significant and positive. The coefficients with the value of investments in retirement accounts
in the numerator are all insignificant. The significant coefficients indicate that households
receiving positive idiosyncratic shocks increase their allocation into risky financial assets.
This result is robust to the definition of wealth.
In panel B, I use ∆c as the measure of shocks. Odd-numbered specifications are
not significant while even-numbered are. Positive idiosyncratic consumption shocks being
associated with an increase in stocks and I.R.A investment but not stocks investment would
16

Furthermore, Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) find that transitory shocks are fully insured.
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Table 3.5: Latent Portfolio Allocation and Average Idiosyncratic Shocks
This table reports the OLS estimation of equation (3.7). The dependant variables are latent
allocation estimated with the framework presented in section (3.4) and equations (3.3) to
(3.6). Financial wealth (in columns 1 and 2) is the sum of stocks, IRAs, checking and
savings accounts, CDs, and treasury bills. Wealth (columns 3 and 4) excludes home equity
while total wealth in (columns 5 and 6) includes home equity. The independent variables are
∆y and ∆c estimated using equations (3.1) and (3.2) for panels A and B respectively. In
panel C, the effect of Ξ in equation (3.8) is removed. Standard errors are in parentheses. *,
**, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Stocks /
Stocks + IRA /
Fin. Wealth
Fin. Wealth
(1)
(2)
Panel A. Income Shocks
Shocks : ∆y
0.058∗∗∗
(0.019)

Stocks / Stocks + IRA /
Wealth
Wealth
(3)
(4)

Stocks /
Tot. Wealth
(5)

Stocks + IRA /
Tot. Wealth
(6)

0.017
(0.023)

0.071∗∗∗
(0.017)

0.030
(0.023)

0.062∗∗∗
(0.016)

0.031
(0.021)

0.003
(0.008)

0.013∗∗
(0.006)

0.002
(0.008)

0.014∗∗
(0.006)

−0.003
(0.007)

Panel B. Consumption Shocks
Shocks : ∆c
0.015
0.068∗∗∗
(0.021)
(0.026)

0.028
(0.019)

0.061∗∗
(0.026)

0.009
(0.018)

0.029
(0.023)

0.014∗∗
(0.006)

0.001
(0.008)

0.015∗∗
(0.006)

−0.004
(0.007)

Panel C. Consumption Shocks Projection
c
Shocks : ∆c
0.542∗∗∗
0.158
0.665∗∗∗
(0.179)
(0.214)
(0.162)

0.281
(0.217)

0.583∗∗∗
(0.154)

0.294
(0.193)

0.001
(0.008)

0.013∗∗
(0.006)

−0.004
(0.007)

Constant : α

Constant : α

Constant : α

0.011
(0.007)

0.012∗
(0.007)

0.009
(0.007)

0.003
(0.008)

0.003
(0.008)

0.011∗
(0.006)

indicate the effect is driven by the allocation into I.R.As. This effect is likely to be driven
by preference shifts. To test this assertion, I consider the transmission of income shocks to
consumption shocks and use the fitted values against latent allocation in panel C. As expected, the even-numbered specification are not significantly from 0. These results are partly
suggested by Bonaparte, Korniotis, and Kumar (2020). They argue that trading activity in
retirement accounts is lower. It is thus unlikely to respond to shocks. However, changes in
preference can be significant enough to shift the allocation into retirement accounts.
In tables 3.6 and 3.7, I consider the impact of permanent and transitory shocks
on portfolio allocation. Table 3.6 shows the results of the IV regressions with permanent
shocks instrumentation. It appears that permanent income shocks have no impact on the
allocation of risky assets into stocks. Indeed, specifications (1), (3), and (5), which only
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consider the allocation of stocks, are statistically insignificant. However, the allocations
ratios that take into account retirement accounts are statistically significant at the 5% level.
It would appear that positive idiosyncratic labor income shocks get invested into I.R.As as
opposed to individual stock accounts. This contrasts the results from table 3.5 which showed
that average shocks had no impact on I.R.A allocation. I then consider the projection of
permanent income shocks onto consumption shocks. In panel B, only the ratios considering
stock allocation alone are statistically significant. This result suggests that the transmission
of permanent shocks is an important factor of portfolio allocation.
Table 3.6: Latent Portfolio Allocation and Permanent Idiosyncratic Shocks
This table presents the impact of permanent shocks on latent portfolio allocation. In panel
∗
∗
A, I use an IV regression with yi,t+1
− yi,t−2
as an instrument for permanent shocks and
latent choice as the dependent variable. Only the first stage is reported. In panel B, I first
use the IV regression with consumption shocks as the dependent variable and estimate the
fitted values. These fitted values, representing permanent consumption shocks, are then used
in a simple linear regression with latent choice as the dependant variable. Financial wealth
(in columns 1 and 2) is the sum of stocks, IRAs, checking and savings accounts, CDs, and
treasury bills. Wealth (columns 3 and 4) excludes home equity while total wealth in (columns
5 and 6) includes home equity. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Stocks /
Stocks + IRA /
Fin. Wealth
Fin. Wealth
(1)
(2)
Panel A. Income Shocks
Shocks : ∆y
0.132
(0.099)

Stocks / Stocks + IRA /
Wealth
Wealth
(3)
(4)

Stocks /
Tot. Wealth
(5)

Stocks + IRA /
Tot. Wealth
(6)

0.230∗∗
(0.116)

0.130
(0.089)

0.229∗
(0.118)

0.121
(0.084)

0.214∗∗
(0.105)

−0.000
(0.010)

0.006
(0.008)

−0.008
(0.010)

0.008
(0.007)

−0.010
(0.009)

Panel B. Consumption Shocks Projection
c
Shocks : ∆c
0.273∗∗∗
0.099
0.332∗∗∗
(0.100)
(0.117)
(0.090)

0.157
(0.119)

0.291∗∗∗
(0.085)

0.165
(0.106)

−0.006
(0.010)

0.008
(0.007)

−0.008
(0.009)

Constant : α

Constant : α

0.007
(0.008)

0.008
(0.008)

0.002
(0.010)

0.006
(0.008)

Transitory shocks, however only seem to affect latent stock allocation. Indeed, the
specifications that include I.R.As are not statistically significant. The coefficients on income
shocks and the projection on consumption shocks are significant only for stock allocation
regardless of the wealth definition. I find that average and transitory shocks do not have
an impact on I.R.A allocation while permanent shocks do. This lack of significance would
indicate that the majority component of labor income shock is transitory in nature. It
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nonetheless impacts portfolio allocation. It follows that it would only impact stocks. Indeed,
I.R.As have a longer investment horizon. Permanent shocks may be associated with changes
in the allocation into retirement accounts as it foretells future preference shifts.
Table 3.7: Latent Portfolio Allocation and Transitory Idiosyncratic Shocks
This table presents the impact of transitory shocks on latent portfolio allocation. In panel A,
∗
as an instrument for transitory shocks and latent choice
I use an IV regression with ∆yi,t+1
as the dependent variable. Only the first stage is reported. In panel B, I first use the IV
regression with consumption shocks as the dependent variable and estimate the fitted values.
These fitted values, representing transitory consumption shocks, are then used in a simple
linear regression with latent choice as the dependant variable. Financial wealth (in columns
1 and 2) is the sum of stocks, IRAs, checking and savings accounts, CDs, and treasury bills.
Wealth (columns 3 and 4) excludes home equity while total wealth in (columns 5 and 6)
includes home equity. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Stocks /
Stocks + IRA /
Fin. Wealth
Fin. Wealth
(1)
(2)
Panel A. Income Shocks
Shocks : ∆y
0.116∗
(0.065)

Stocks / Stocks + IRA /
Wealth
Wealth
(3)
(4)

Stocks /
Tot. Wealth
(5)

Stocks + IRA /
Tot. Wealth
(6)

−0.033
(0.076)

0.121∗∗
(0.059)

−0.042
(0.077)

0.095∗
(0.056)

−0.060
(0.069)

0.008
(0.009)

0.009
(0.007)

0.003
(0.009)

0.012∗
(0.007)

−0.001
(0.008)

Panel B. Consumption Shocks Projection
c
Shocks : ∆c
1.884∗∗∗
0.783
2.268∗∗∗
(0.636)
(0.741)
(0.575)

1.115
(0.754)

1.997∗∗∗
(0.542)

1.354∗∗
(0.676)

−0.003
(0.010)

0.002
(0.007)

−0.009
(0.009)

Constant : α

Constant : α

0.010
(0.008)

0.002
(0.008)

0.004
(0.010)

−0.001
(0.008)

These results (along with latent portfolio choice) suggest that households do participate more and increase their allocation into receiving positive idiosyncratic shocks. The
transmission of these shocks is important as the proportion not consumed is allocated to
risky assets. However, the investment decision and the allocation into assets is only one
side of households’ balance sheets. As Cocco (2005) points out, mortgage debt can be used
by households as leverage to finance investments in stocks. As households’ receive positive
(negative) labor shocks, they may reduce (increase) their debt liability. However, not all
debt have the same horizon period. As such, I consider two types of debts. First, I consider
unsecured debt which is the sum of credit card charges, student loans, medical bills, legal
bills, and loans from relatives. These debt items are directly related to consumption categories (education expenditure, health expenditures, etc.). As the variables are changes in
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residuals, this link is of no econometric consequence. The interest of this particular variable
is the direction of the sign. Indeed, previous variables where expected to have positive signs.
However, the nature of the variable construction means the portfolio choice and portfolio
allocation variables carried similar information. Unsecured debt can be understood to be
borrowing constraint variable. As such, households have the incentive to reduce their borrowing constraints as they experience positive shocks. I thus expect the impact of positive
shocks to have a negative impact on latent debt allocation.
The second debt category is secured by assets and is the sum of all household mortgages as well as business, farm, and other real estate debts. The impact of shocks on secured
debt is ambiguous. On one hand, positive shocks could have households pay down their
mortgage with the additional income. On another hand, positive shocks could have households to increase their debts as they finance nonfinancial investments17 . Furthermore, the
implications of the transitory/permanent income process on latent debt allocation is also
clearer. Indeed, I expect permanent shocks to have a limited (if any) impact on unsecured
debt and transitory shocks to have a limited (if any) impact on secured debt. This can be
expected for two reasons. First, transitory shocks may have the same horizon as unsecured
debts. Consider a one time payment such as the 2020 Covid-19 relief payments18 . Coibion,
Gorodnichenko, and Weber (2020) and Baker et al. (2020) show that households consumed
some of the payments but also used the rest to reduce their short-term debt overhang. While
I do not rely on natural experiments, the IV framework I use is more generalizable to a variety of transitory shocks (bonuses, increased overtime, or negative shocks such as short-term
unemployment, reduced hours, etc.).
I consider five debt ratios to reflect different balance sheets. I first scale each debt
category by the household’s total debt. This would reflect the households’ allocation of debt
regardless of debt levels. This might obscure some of the dynamics of transitory shocks on
unsecured debts. Indeed, a household with high level of wealth might be less concerned by
their credit card debts as low-wealth households. As such, I scale the debt variables with
wealth19 . Finally, I consider total debt to wealth. As the effect of shocks on secured and
unsecured debts might have opposite effects, this ratio may reflect the relative strength of
each. In table 3.8, I present the result of average idiosyncratic shocks.
In panel A of 3.8, I use the general idiosyncratic labor income shocks. The results
are as expected. I find that positive idiosyncratic labor income shocks are used to reduce
17
18

Implying housing investments as substitute to stock investments (Cocco (2005)).
Although there were multiple payments, each payment considered as a separate event would be transi-

tory.
19

Note that debts are added back into the wealth definition.
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Table 3.8: Latent Debt Allocation and Average Idiosyncratic Shocks
This table reports the OLS estimation of equation (3.7). The dependant variables are latent
debt allocation estimated with the framework presented in section (3.4) and equations (3.3)
to (3.6). Unsecured debt is the sum of credit card charges, student loans, medical bills, legal
bills, and loans from relatives. Secured debt is the sum of mortgages, business, farm, and
other real estate debt. Total debt is the sum of unsecured and secured debt. Total wealth is
the total value of assets (not removing debt still left to pay). The independent variables are
∆y and ∆c estimated using equations (3.1) and (3.2) for panels A and B respectively. In
panel C, the effect of Ξ in equation (3.8) is removed. Standard errors are in parentheses. *,
**, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

Secured/
Total D.
(1)

Unsecured/
Total D.
(2)

Secured/
Total W.
(3)

Unsecured/
Total W.
(4)

Total D./
Total W.
(5)

−0.107∗∗∗
(0.019)

0.075∗∗∗
(0.023)

−0.111∗∗∗
(0.019)

−0.063∗∗∗
(0.021)

0.000
(0.007)

0.008
(0.008)

−0.004
(0.007)

−0.002
(0.008)

Panel B. Consumption Shocks
Shocks : ∆c
0.256∗∗∗
0.024
(0.018)
(0.022)

0.156∗∗∗
(0.026)

0.013
(0.021)

0.110∗∗∗
(0.023)

0.007
(0.008)

−0.004
(0.007)

−0.003
(0.008)

−1.043∗∗∗
(0.177)

−0.594∗∗∗
(0.197)

−0.001
(0.007)

−0.000
(0.008)

Panel A. Income Shocks
Shocks : ∆y
0.149∗∗∗
(0.016)
Constant : α

Constant : α

0.003
(0.006)

0.003
(0.006)

−0.000
(0.007)

Panel C. Consumption Shocks Projection
c
Shocks : ∆c
1.394∗∗∗
−1.001∗∗∗
0.702∗∗∗
(0.152)
(0.181)
(0.216)
Constant : α

−0.001
(0.006)

0.003
(0.007)

0.005
(0.008)
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household unsecured debts as suggested by Baker et al. (2020). Positive shocks, however,
increase the latent allocation of secured debts. This result is consistent with Cocco (2005).
I find that households use positive income shocks to lever up. The coefficient (0.149) is also
almost 3 times larger than the one on stock allocation in table 3.5. This is also consistent
with the fact that a large portion of households’ portfolios is concentrated on household
wealth. Looking at the ratio of total debt to total wealth, I find a negative coefficient
consistent in magnitude with the third specification. This result suggests that average labor
shocks allow household to reduce their debt liabilities. This further suggests that the effect
on unsecured debt is larger. Comparing the second and fourth specifications of panel A,
I find similar point estimates (-0.107 vs -0.111). This suggests that the effect of positive
labor income shocks on unsecured debt is not affected by a household overall level of wealth.
However, when comparing specifications (1) and (3), the wealth scale coefficient is nearly
half of its counterpart (0.149 vs 0.075). This suggests that the effect on secured debt is
indeed dependant on household.
In panel B, I use consumption shocks as the independent variable. Consumption
shocks are significant determinants of latent secured debt allocation. The fifth specification
is also significantly negative. This result suggests that unexplained consumption is not
financed with unsecured debt. However, unexplained consumption growth is associated with
an increase in secured debt liability. This is likely the result of preference shifts. Indeed,
consumption shocks might be reflecting a change in family situation not captured by the first
stage regression. The result in panel C support this claim. Indeed, I find that consumption
shocks caused by labor income shocks are indeed consistent with the results of panel A. I
then consider the impact of permanent and transitory shocks on latent debt allocation in
tables 3.9 and 3.10.
The coefficients on permanent labor income shocks are as predicted. Indeed, I find
that the impact on secured debt ratios are positive and highly significant. This indicate that
households use permanent income shocks to invest in housing investment. Furthermore, I
find that permanent labor income shocks have no impact on unsecured debt allocation. The
effect on total debt is positive but not significantly different from 0. The point estimates in
the first and third specifications are comparable (0.384 vs 0.350), suggesting wealth may not
play an important role in households’ debt allocation response to permanent income shocks.
In panel B, I find that not only income shocks matters, but their transmission to
consumption shocks also matters. Indeed, while the statistically significant coefficients remain statistically significant, the coefficients in the unsecured specifications are now negative
and statistically significant. These results suggest that permanent and positive consumption
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Table 3.9: Latent Debt Allocation and Permanent Idiosyncratic Shocks
This table presents the impact of permanent shocks on latent debt allocation. In panel A, I
∗
∗
as an instrument for permanent shocks and latent
− yi,t−2
use an IV regression with yi,t+1
choice as the dependent variable. Only the first stage is reported. In panel B, I first use the IV
regression with consumption shocks as the dependent variable and estimate the fitted values.
These fitted values, representing permanent consumption shocks, are then used in a simple
linear regression with latent choice as the dependant variable. The dependant variables are
latent debt allocation estimated with the framework presented in section (3.4) and equations
(3.3) to (3.6). Unsecured debt is the sum of credit card charges, student loans, medical bills,
legal bills, and loans from relatives. Secured debt is the sum of mortgages, business, farm, and
other real estate debt. Total debt is the sum of unsecured and secured debt. Total wealth is the
total value of assets (not removing debt still left to pay). Standard errors are in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

Secured/
Total D.
(1)
Panel A. Income Shocks
Shocks : ∆y
0.384∗∗∗
(0.081)
Constant : α

−0.003
(0.007)

Unsecured/
Total D.
(2)

Secured/
Total W.
(3)

Unsecured/
Total W.
(4)

Total D./
Total W.
(5)

−0.147
(0.094)

0.350∗∗∗
(0.114)

−0.138
(0.092)

0.113
(0.102)

−0.001
(0.008)

−0.000
(0.010)

−0.004
(0.008)

−0.012
(0.009)

0.243∗∗
(0.115)

−0.411∗∗∗
(0.093)

−0.258∗∗
(0.103)

0.003
(0.010)

−0.004
(0.008)

−0.010
(0.009)

Panel B. Consumption Shocks Projection
c
Shocks : ∆c
0.514∗∗∗
−0.363∗∗∗
(0.082)
(0.095)
Constant : α

−0.000
(0.007)

−0.001
(0.008)

shocks are associated with an increase in secured debt and a decrease in unsecured debt.
Furthermore, the effect on total debt is now statistically significant and negative indication that permanent consumption shocks are associated with a decrease in households’ total
liabilities.
The coefficients on transitory income are also as predicted. The coefficients in specifications (2) and (4) considering unsecured debt are statistically significant from 0 and
negative. A household receiving positive transitory labor income shocks will reduce the unsecured debt liability. The coefficient in the first specification of table 3.10 is significantly
positive. This result is unexpected. This would suggest that households use transitory income shocks to invest. However, the scaled by wealth coefficient is insignificant suggesting
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Table 3.10: Latent Debt Allocation and Transitory Idiosyncratic Shocks
This table presents the impact of transitory shocks on latent debt allocation. In panel A, I
∗
as an instrument for transitory shocks and latent choice
use an IV regression with ∆yi,t+1
as the dependent variable. Only the first stage is reported. In panel B, I first use the IV
regression with consumption shocks as the dependent variable and estimate the fitted values.
These fitted values, representing transitory consumption shocks, are then used in a simple
linear regression with latent choice as the dependant variable. The dependant variables are
latent debt allocation estimated with the framework presented in section (3.4) and equations
(3.3) to (3.6). Unsecured debt is the sum of credit card charges, student loans, medical bills,
legal bills, and loans from relatives. Secured debt is the sum of mortgages, business, farm, and
other real estate debt. Total debt is the sum of unsecured and secured debt. Total wealth is the
total value of assets (not removing debt still left to pay). Standard errors are in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

Secured/
Total D.
(1)
Panel A. Income Shocks
Shocks : ∆y
0.108∗∗
(0.054)
Constant : α

0.008
(0.006)

Unsecured/
Total D.
(2)

Secured/
Total W.
(3)

Unsecured/
Total W.
(4)

Total D./
Total W.
(5)

−0.106∗
(0.064)

−0.069
(0.078)

−0.158∗∗
(0.063)

−0.144∗∗
(0.070)

−0.008
(0.008)

0.016∗
(0.009)

−0.009
(0.007)

−0.005
(0.008)

−3.347∗∗∗
(0.613)

−1.961∗∗∗
(0.682)

0.007
(0.008)

0.004
(0.009)

Panel B. Consumption Shocks Projection
c
Shocks : ∆c
4.106∗∗∗
−3.052∗∗∗
2.197∗∗∗
(0.530)
(0.625)
(0.758)
Constant : α

−0.013∗
(0.007)

0.007
(0.008)

0.004
(0.010)

that there is no impact on secured debt when taking into account wealth. Panel B of table
3.10 also show that the transmission of the shocks is an important factor of portfolio choice.
Overall, this results indicate that idiosyncratic labor income shocks have a significant
impact on households’ decision to participate in financial markets, how much to allocate to
their assets, and how to manage their liabilities. Furthermore, the transmission of income
shocks to consumption shocks play an integral role in these decisions. However, these results
depend on the validity of the instruments chosen to represent permanent and transitory
shocks. Although statistical tests show the instruments are valid, I use Kopczuk, Saez, and
Song (2010), Bonaparte, Korniotis, and Kumar (2014), and Catherine, Sodini, and Zhang
(2020) definition of permanent income. I calculate the permanent component of log labor
143

disposable income as the average over three continuous data points:

ŷP,it =

yi,t−1 + yi,t + yi,t+1
3

(3.12)

In the literature, this definition is often applied to yearly data and is thus calculated
over a three-year window. The PSID data is biennial20 . Permanent income is thus understood
to be calculated over a 6-year window. This is undeniably a longer horizon. However, the
instruments I use to proxy for permanent and transitory shocks are also calculated over
continuous wave points as opposed to yearly data points. I use this permanent income proxy
and re-estimate equations (3.1) and (3.2) to get permanent income shocks. I then repeat
the analysis of table 3.3, 3.6, and 3.9 with OLS instead of IV regressions. The results are
presented in table 3.11.
The results of table 3.11 are mostly consistent with previous results. The coefficients
are statistically significant with expected signs. Overall, this table shows that the impact of
permanent income shocks is robust to the definition of permanent shock. Panel A’s results
are the only one with major differences. Indeed, in table 3.3, I find that permanent income
shocks do not have a statistically significant impact on latent choice. In panel of table 3.11,
I do find that the coefficients are statistically significant. The fourth specification (which
considers ownership in either investment vehicle) is significant in both table and the point
estimates are similar.
In panel B, I use latent debt allocation as the dependant variables. As expected
permanent, shocks do not impact unsecured debt allocation. Permanent shocks are however
positively associated with an increase in secured debt. The coefficient on total debt is also
positively significant, indicating the impact of permanent shocks on the secured portion of
household debt is significant enough to show up despite the effect being diluted in overall
debt. In table 3.6, only income shocks that are transmitted to consumption are found to be
significantly different from 0 except for ratios including allocation into retirement accounts.
In panel C of table 3.11, all latent allocation variables are found to be positively impacted by
permanent shocks. In unreported results, I test the transmission of the alternatively defined
permanent shocks to consumption shocks and found similar results as previously found. The
transmission coefficient is found to be similar.
In a final robustness check, I sort households based on the reference person’s industry.
I do so for several reasons. The first one is simply because I do not control for industry in my
estimations of residuals. Secondly, while I could simply reevaluate the change in residuals
20

After 1997 which is the sample period I use.
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Table 3.11: Alternative Permanent Shocks and Latent Choice, Asset, and Debt Allocation
This table repeats the analysis of tables 3.3, 3.6, and 3.9 with the permanent income shocks
proxy described by equations (3.12), (3.1), and (3.2). Panel A uses the dependent variables of table 3.3; panel B uses the dependent variables of table 3.9; and panel C uses the
dependent variables of table 3.6. See the tables for variable definitions. Standard errors
are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.
(1)
Panel A. Participation
Stocks
Shocks : ∆y
0.219∗∗∗
(0.038)
Constant : α

0.009
(0.007)

Panel B. Debt Shares
S./T.D.
Shocks : ∆y
0.421∗∗∗
(0.036)
Constant : α

−0.001
(0.007)

(2)

(3)

(4)

I.R.A
0.197∗∗∗
(0.041)

Both
0.197∗∗∗
(0.041)

Either
0.261∗∗∗
(0.041)

−0.007
(0.008)

−0.001
(0.008)

−0.003
(0.008)

U./T.D.
−0.011
(0.042)

S./T.W.
0.316∗∗∗
(0.050)

U./T.W.
−0.052
(0.041)

T.D./T.W.
0.111∗∗
(0.045)

−0.004
(0.008)

0.001
(0.010)

−0.007
(0.008)

−0.011
(0.009)

S./W.
0.214∗∗∗
(0.040)

S&RA/W.
0.198∗∗∗
(0.052)

S./W.+HE.
0.179∗∗∗
(0.037)

S&RA/W.+HE.
0.175∗∗∗
(0.046)

0.006
(0.008)

−0.008
(0.010)

0.008
(0.007)

−0.009
(0.009)

Panel C. Risky Asset Shares
S./F.W.
S&RA/F.W.
Shocks : ∆y
0.197∗∗∗
0.231∗∗∗
(0.044)
(0.051)
Constant : α

0.007
(0.008)

−0.001
(0.010)

(5)

(6)

with industry dummies, separating households may reveal endogenous relationships. Indeed,
industry selection may itself be a latent choice variable as opposed to a random selection.
Consider a household with low risk aversion. They would, ceteris paribus, have higher
risky asset shares. Furthermore, they may also choose a riskier career path or an industry
characterized by riskier labor income paths. Betermier et al. (2012) and Fagereng, Guiso,
and Pistaferri (2018) argue that these endogeneity concerns are likely to create a downward
bias in estimations. By separating out industries, I can consider the specific labor-industry
shocks and their respective effects on portfolio choice and allocation.
The PSID industry classification is based on the 4-digit 2010 Census Detailed Industry Codes. It is a 19 industry classification. As my sample size is limited, I regroup
industries into 6 broader industries to ensure each has a sufficient number of households and
observations. Industries are classified as follows: Agriculture & Fishing, Mining & Construc145

Table 3.12: Average shocks and Latent Choice, Asset, and Debt Allocation by Industries

Agriculture
(1)

Mining
(2)

Manufacturing
(3)

Trade
(4)

Services 1
(5)

Services 2
(6)

Panel A. Stock Participation
Shocks : ∆y
0.030
0.041
(0.050)
(0.045)
c
Shocks : ∆c
0.365
0.502
(0.607)
(0.543)

0.081∗
(0.041)
0.848∗
(0.437)

0.136∗∗∗
(0.041)
1.169∗∗∗
(0.352)

0.066
(0.053)
0.455
(0.360)

0.097∗∗∗
(0.029)
0.880∗∗∗
(0.259)

Panel B. Risky share
Shocks : ∆y
−0.030
0.021
(0.058)
(0.052)
c
Shocks : ∆c
−0.366
0.257
(0.702)
(0.638)

0.098∗∗
(0.049)
1.030∗∗
(0.519)

0.130∗∗∗
(0.047)
1.119∗∗∗
(0.405)

−0.012
(0.062)
−0.080
(0.423)

0.071∗∗
(0.032)
0.645∗∗
(0.294)

Panel C. Secured debt share
Shocks : ∆y
0.035
0.184∗∗∗
(0.056)
(0.047)
c
Shocks : ∆c
0.422
2.238∗∗∗
(0.675)
(0.574)

0.231∗∗∗
(0.042)
2.433∗∗∗
(0.446)

0.128∗∗∗
(0.043)
1.099∗∗∗
(0.366)

0.110∗∗
(0.048)
0.751∗∗
(0.332)

0.154∗∗∗
(0.026)
1.394∗∗∗
(0.234)

Panel D. Unsecured debt share
Shocks : ∆y
0.005
−0.072
(0.061)
(0.056)
c
Shocks : ∆c
0.066
−0.875
(0.742)
(0.678)
Observations
1,944
1,818

−0.184∗∗∗
(0.048)
−1.933∗∗∗
(0.506)
3,117

−0.201∗∗∗
(0.052)
−1.728∗∗∗
(0.444)
2,543

−0.123∗∗
(0.057)
−0.843∗∗
(0.390)
1,681

−0.072∗∗
(0.032)
−0.649∗∗
(0.291)
6,266

tion, Manufacturing, Trade21 & Food Services, Services 122 , and Services 223 . In the interest
of space, I consider the effect of income and consumption shocks on four variables: stock
participation, risky financial asset allocation, secured debt share, and unsecured debt share.
Table 3.12 present the results of average shocks.
In panel A, I consider the impact of income (and consumption shocks) on latent
stock participation. The coefficients are positive across industries although not consistently
significant. Agriculture, Mining and Services 1 are insignificant while coefficients on Manufacturing, Trade, and Services 2 are significant. While it could be that some industries are
21

Wholesale and retail
Finance, Real Estate, Management Support, and Warehousing
23
Educational services, health care, arts & entertainment, and other services including public administration.
22

146

not impacted by these shocks, a keen observer will see that insignificant industries have the
lowest number of observations. It is entirely possible that the small number of households
renders the power of the test too low to make any determination. From the second regression
of panel A (separated by the dashed line), I can infer the degree of transmission of income
shocks to consumption shocks. The risk-sharing coefficients are consistent across industries
and thus the results are not driven by heterogeneous insurance capabilities. The results of
panel B are similar to those of the first panel and are consistent in direction and magnitude
with previous results, thus alleviating some endogeneity concerns.
In panels C and D, I look at debt rations. The results statistically significant for all
industries except for Agriculture in panel C. The coefficients on secured debt are positive
and statistically significant at the 5% level. Manufacturing has the largest coefficient while
Services 1 has the lowest (0.231 vs 0.110). Services 1 has, on the other hand, the largest
transmission coefficient (14%). It is however complicated to argue for any kind of economically different impact. In panel D, the coefficients are negative and significant for four out
of six industries. Overall, this table reinforces earlier results. I then use IV regressions to
measure the impact of permanent and transitory shocks. Results are presented in table 3.13
As the instruments require a lead data point, the last observation of each household is
drop, thus reducing further each sample group. The low power of table 3.12 is compounded
in table 3.13. Some results are nonetheless significant and of expected signs. Furthermore,
the transmission to consumption shocks yields the most significant results. Interestingly,
panels C and D which consider debt ratios have the most significant results. This would
indicate that income shocks have a stronger effect on households’ debt consideration than
on asset allocation, specifically financial assets. This is not entirely surprising considering
the low participation puzzle.
3.6

Conclusion

The current economic literature has shown that insurance markets are neither complete nor incomplete. As such idiosyncratic income risk has important implications for
consumption smoothing, household welfare, and portfolio choice. Not only do idiosyncratic
shocks matter, their persistence is critical. As a consequence, the transmission mechanisms
of income shocks on portfolio decisions and allocations depends on the nature of the income
process.
This paper assesses the link between household income and consumption shocks and
portfolio allocation. I use longitudinal survey data from the PSID to ask whether households’
portfolio choices are impacted by income shocks. Households are, on average, well insured
147
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0.228
(0.350)
0.197
(0.156)
0.112
(0.416)
0.125
(0.187)
0.452
(0.357)
0.529∗∗∗
(0.159)
−0.193
(0.404)
−0.308∗
(0.181)
1,296

−0.463∗∗
(0.196)
−9.445
(11.556)
share
−0.067
(0.182)
3.710
(10.847)

Panel B. Risk Share
Shock : ∆y
0.349
(0.296)
c
Shock : ∆c
−0.750
(0.564)

Panel C. Secured debt
Shock : ∆y
−0.051
(0.266)
c
Shock : ∆c
−0.060
(0.514)

Panel D. Unsecured debt share
Shock : ∆y
0.141
−0.006
(0.292)
(0.199)
c
Shock : ∆c
0.301
3.097
(0.564)
(11.900)
Observations
1,386
1,603
0.210
(0.155)
−3.045
(1.919)
1,474

0.171
(0.131)
5.843∗∗∗
(1.635)

0.390∗∗
(0.156)
1.353
(1.923)

0.313∗∗
(0.130)
2.301
(1.612)

Mining
Permanent Transitory

Panel A. Stock Participation
Shock : ∆y
0.210
−0.340∗∗
(0.250)
(0.168)
c
Shock : ∆c
−0.161
1.142
(0.480)
(9.911)

Agriculture
Permanent Transitory

−0.214
(0.311)
−0.383∗∗∗
(0.148)
2,221

0.611∗∗
(0.287)
0.554∗∗∗
(0.134)

0.274
(0.333)
0.482∗∗∗
(0.158)

0.298
(0.284)
0.296∗∗
(0.135)

−0.291∗
(0.150)
−3.179∗∗∗
(0.933)
2,532

0.197
(0.134)
3.747∗∗∗
(0.831)

0.234
(0.158)
2.688∗∗∗
(0.981)

0.154
(0.133)
2.086∗∗
(0.828)

Manufacturing
Permanent Transitory

−0.188
(0.246)
−1.009∗∗∗
(0.364)
1,813

0.789∗∗∗
(0.219)
0.554∗
(0.309)

0.070
(0.235)
0.756∗∗
(0.348)

0.012
(0.204)
0.790∗∗∗
(0.302)

−0.277
(0.173)
−7.389∗∗∗
(1.775)
2,096

0.168
(0.145)
4.435∗∗∗
(1.492)

0.262
(0.161)
3.803∗∗
(1.650)

0.248∗
(0.140)
4.136∗∗∗
(1.434)

Trade
Permanent Transitory

−0.530∗∗
(0.257)
−0.277
(0.220)
1,181

0.371∗
(0.218)
0.175
(0.188)

0.133
(0.297)
−0.170
(0.258)

0.147
(0.248)
−0.013
(0.216)

−0.096
(0.194)
−3.514
(3.144)
1,369

−0.022
(0.164)
2.903
(2.650)

−0.121
(0.215)
−2.072
(3.488)

0.010
(0.181)
0.943
(2.931)

Services 1
Permanent Transitory

−0.060
(0.135)
−0.259
(0.179)
4,471

0.273∗∗
(0.109)
0.625∗∗∗
(0.144)

0.072
(0.143)
0.393∗∗
(0.190)

0.107
(0.125)
0.548∗∗∗
(0.166)

−0.126
(0.118)
−1.568∗
(0.897)
5,149

0.108
(0.095)
3.828∗∗∗
(0.725)

0.117
(0.121)
1.993∗∗
(0.924)

0.139
(0.106)
2.852∗∗∗
(0.805)

Services 2
Permanent Transitory

∗
∗
∗
This table reports the IV estimation of shocks on latent variables with yi,t+1
− yi,t−2
and ∆yi,t+1
as permanent and transitory
instruments respectively. The dependant variables are estimated with the framework presented in section (3.4) and equations
(3.3) to (3.6). Panel A uses latent stock participation as the dependent variable. Panel B uses the ratio of stocks to financial
assets as the dependent variable. Panel C uses the ratio of secured debt to total debt. Panel D uses the ratio of unsecured
debt to total debt. The industry classification is based on 4-digit 2010 Census Detail Industry Codes. Standard errors are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

Table 3.13: Permanent and Transitory shocks and Latent Choice, Asset, and Debt Allocation by Industries

against income shocks. This limited ability indicates that households consume a non-zero
amount of these shocks. What of the non-consumed share of idiosyncratic labor income
shocks?
I circumvent low participation and low allocation issues in the data by estimating
latent wealth variables. I tranche allocation ratios and assume portfolio choices are generated
by an ordered probit. From this process, I can estimate pseudo-residuals and shocks to
latent utility derived from these decisions. While economic impacts are obscured, I find the
following results.
Positive income shocks are associated with positive shocks to latent participation
variables. This would suggest that households receiving positive labor income shocks tend
to participate in financial markets more. However, this effect is only noticeable for direct
participation as latent indirect participation is not impacted by income shocks. Furthermore, transitory income shocks are associated with higher participation, only permanent
consumption shocks are associated with significant changes in latent participation. This
result suggests that transmission of shocks (i.e, insurance) is a significant driver of portfolio choice. Not only are households increasing their participation, they also increase their
allocation towards risky assets. Negative shocks would reduce participation and reduce risk
allocation; results observed in the literature.
Households invests some positive downfall towards risky assets. On the liability side,
households use transitory income shocks to pay down unsecured debt. Positive shocks are
associated with a decrease in latent unsecured debt allocation. However, permanent income
shocks are associated with an increase in secured debt allocation. This result imply that
households receiving permanent idiosyncratic labor income shocks will increase their housing
investment, suggesting that stock and housing investments are substitutes. Overall, I find
that as households’ consumption is well insured, income shocks that are not consumed, are
allocated towards a reduction of debt and investment in risky assets.
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